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ABSTRACr 
The formation of the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) in 
1981 was perceived by most observers to be a collective security response to 
the Iran-Iraq war. Despite this view, the group has endured ten years of 
integration in a turbulent region and has survived: external threats to its 
sovereignty, Islamic fundamentalism, the decline of oil prices, internal 
unrest, attempted coups, and the invasion and occupation of a constituent 
member. This poses the question: has the integration of these countries 
proved to be a success? This thesis attempts to answer this question with 
the aid of a three dimensional analysis. 
The first dimension examines the theory and practice of 
integration. Its primary objective is to provide an insight into integration. 
As the GCC can, at best, be categorised as a Customs Union, this chapter 
concentrates on Free Trade Areas and Customs Union theories and 
explores their relationships with tariffs, protectionism, developing 
countries, and politics. A review of the empirical analyses in the field is 
essential due to the fact that a mathematical technique is applied to GCC 
trade in the latter part of this thesis. The existence of political, economic 
and manpower factors are found to be more detrimental to the GCC's 
interests than its adherence or convergence to the theory and practice of 
integration. 
An analysis of these three factors constitutes the second 
dimension of the thesis. This commences by examining the Islamic 
antecedents of the member countries, pan-Islamism and nationalism in 
the 19th century, and Middle Eastern efforts at integration from the 
decline of the Ottoman Empire to the present. The establishment of the 
existing GCC nations and an examination of their natural resources, 
demography, industry, infrastructure, agriculture, and fisheries is covered, 
as is the impact of the 1990-91 occupation of Kuwait and the BCCI 
liquidation. A review of manpower factors includes an examination of 
the labour market in the pre and post 1973 period with emphasis given to 
the role of expatriate and indigenous labour. In addition, the influence of 
education, women in the workforce, nationality, and residence policies on 
indigenous labour is discussed. 
The third dimension reviews the prospects of the GCC. This 
is performed through the construction and utilisation of matrices which 
examine the similarity or dissimilarity of GCC trade to the World, 
Developed and Developing Countries. United Nations Standard 
Industrial Trade Category (SITC) data up to 3-digits, has been used to 
construct twenty seven 22 x 22 matrices. Nine of these matrices indicate 
GCC trade with the Rest of the World and are linked to economic and 
financial literature on the Gulf in order to examine their credibility. 
Eighteen matrices which indicate trade with the Developing and 
Developed World indentify potential trade creation, trade diversion and 
prospects. 
It is the conclusion of the thesis that the GCC has not 
succeeded in its integration efforts. The lack of co-ordination to perform 
as a single unit in economic, political, and military areas, the 
undemocratic political systems, the exploitation of expatriate labour, the 
segregation of indigenous labour, and most importantly, the wasted 
opportunities indicated by the matrices of greater trade creation with the 
Developed and Developing Countries contribute significantly to the 
ineffectiveness of the group. 
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1. INTRODUMON 
This thesis endeavours to examine the efforts towards 
economic integration of the six Arab Gulf states of Saudi Arabia. - Kuwait, 
Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, and the UAE. On 10 March, 1981, these countries 
formed -the Cooperation. Council for the Arab States of the Gulf, 
alternatively referred to as the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC). The 
objectives involved in the formation of the GCC can be observed in article 
four of the council's charter. They emphasige the reasons behind the 
formation of the GCC as being: 
"To effect co-ordination, integration and inter-connection between 
member states in all fields in order to achieve unity between them. 
To deepen and strengthen relations, links and areas of cooperation 
now prevailing between their peoples in various fields. 
To formulate similar regulations in various fields including the 
following: 
a. Economic and financial affairs 
b. Commerce, customs and communications 
c. Education and culture 
d. Social and health affairs 
e. Information and tourism 
'f. Legislative and adn-dnistrative affairs. 
To stimulate scientific and technological progress in the fields of 
industry, mining, agriculture, water and animal resources; to 
establish scientific research; to establish joint ventures and 
encourage cooperation by the private sector for the good of their 
peoples. " (GCC 1990: 4) 
The formation of the GCC was not a pioneering effort in Gulf 
integration. Britain's decision to withdraw from the Gulf in 1970's upset 
the status quo in the region and resurrected the hitherto dormant 
CHAPTER 12 
memories in the smaller Gulf monarchies of Iran and Iraq's hegemonic 
aspirations. The formation in 1971 of the seven small Emirates of Abu 
Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Fujairah, Ras al Khaimah, Ajman, and Umm al 
Qayarn into the United Arab Emirates, was the first attempt by these Gulf 
states at an organisation that would collectively provide them with 
political and economic security. In 1974, the Shah of Iran proposed a 
grouping of the Gulf countries when he stated that: 
"Faced by increasing dangers, it seemed to me that a policy of 
solidarity between the countries around the Gulf was necessary. 
Between them they should guarantee its safety" (Pahlavi 1980: 135). 
The Shah, wanted to extend the organisation into a common market 
around the shores of the Indian Ocean, comprising Pakistan, India, 
Ceylon, Bangladesh, Burma, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia, 
Australia, and New Zealand. But the Shah's attempts at integration came 
to naught, as Iran's sincerity was doubted by the smaller Gulf monarchies, 
who believed that he wanted to further his power in the Gulf at their 
expense. Their suspicions were justified by the Shah's own statement 
that: 
"The safety of the Persian Gulf had, however, to be guaranteed, and 
who but Iran could fulfil this function? " (Pahlavi 1980: 135). 
Thus, it can be observed that though the unification of 
Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Qatar, and the UAE in 1981 was 
rapid, (the immediate catalyst being the commencement of hostilities 
between Iran and Iraq in September 1980) the pressure of a number of 
factors contributed to its final outcome. If listed in chronological order, 
these factors would be, the withdrawal of the British military deterrent in 
the Persian Gulf in the 1970's, the enormous oil price rises in 1973 which 
provided the GCC countries with superabundant financial revenue, the 
threat posed by the larger Persian Gulf states of Iran and Iraq to these 
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countries political survival, the fall of the Shah of Iran in 1979, and the 
hostile attitude of the Islamic regime that replaced him towards the Gulf 
monarchies. It was a combination of these factors that convinced the Arab 
Gulf monarchies that their survival depended upon a collective 
organisation which would counterbalance the instability in the region and 
prevent it from overflowing into their countries. 
The GCC is organised into a Supreme Council, a Ministerial 
Council, and a Secretariat-General. The Supreme Council consists of the 
heads of member states who meet annually in ordinary session, unless an 
emergency session is demanded by two or more members. The annual 
presidency of the council rotates from each state in turn in alphabetical 
order. The supreme council's functions as stated in article eight of the 
charter emphasise that it should: 
0 "Review matters of interest to the member states. 
Lay down the higher policy for the Cooperation Council and the 
basic lines it should follow. 
Review the recommendations, reports, studies and joint ventures 
submitted by the Ministerial Council for approval. 
" Review reports and studies which the Secretary-General is charged 
to prepare. 
" Approve the basis for dealing with other states and international 
organisations. 
" Approve the rules of procedure of the Commission for the 
settlement of disputes and nominate, its members. 
" Appoint the Secretary General. 
" Amend the Charter of the Cooperation Council. 
" Approve the Council's internal rules of procedure. 
" Approve the budget of the Secretariat - General. " (GCC 1990: 5-6) 
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The Ministerial Council consists of the foreign ministers of 
member states who meet every three months unless an emergency session 
is demanded by two or more members. Its functions in article twelve, 
entail that it must: 
"Propose policies, prepare recommendations, studies and projects 
aimed at developing cooperation and co-ordination between 
member states in various fields and adopt the resolutions or 
recommendations required in this regard. 
Endeavour to encourage, develop and co-ordinate activities existing 
between member states in all fields. Resolutions adopted in such 
matters shall be referred to the Ministerial Council for further 
submission, with recommendations, to the Supreme Council for 
appropriate action. 
Submit recommendations to the Ministers concerned to formulate 
policies whereby the Cooperation Council's resolutions may be put 
into effect. 
Encourage means of cooperation and co-ordination between the 
various private sector activities, develop existing cooperation 
between the member states' Chamber of Commerce and industry, 
and encourage the movement within the G. C. C. of workers who 
are citizens of the member states. 
Refer any of the various aspects of cooperation to one or more 
technical or specialised committee for a study and presentation of 
appropriate recommendations. 
Review proposals related to amendments to the Charter and submit 
appropriate recommendations to the Supreme Council. 
Approve Rules of Procedure of both the Ministerial Council and 
Secretariat-General. 
Appoint the Assistant Secretaries-General as nominated by the 
Secretary-General for a term of three years, which is renewable. 
Approve periodic reports as well as internal rules and regulations 
relating to administrative and financial affairs proposed by the 
Secretary-General, and submit recommendations to the Supreme 
Council for approval of the budget of the Secretariat-General. 
Make arrangements for meetings of the Supreme Council and 
prepare its agenda. 
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Review matters referred to it by the Supreme Council. " (GCC 1990: 
7-8) 
The Secretariat-General is headed by the Secretary-General 
and supporting staff. All member states contribute equally towards the 
budget of the Secretariat-General. The functions attributed to the 
Secretariat-General in article fifteen of the GCC, (1990: 9) charter, gives it 
the responsibility of converting the resolutions, drafts, or other legislation 
from the Supreme Council and Ministerial Council into the final form 
necessary for implementation. R further undertakes any activities 
entrusted to it by the other two bodies, and prepares the budgets and 
accounts of the Council for approval, from the Supreme and Ministerial 
Council. 
A unified economic agreement was drawn up by the finance 
ministers in June 1981, and was approved on 11 November, 1982. The 
agreement covers the abolition of customs duties, improved banking 
regulations, and financial and monetary integrati on. 1 Since then/ duties 
on domestic products were abolished in March 1983, a common external 
tariff on foreign goods with a range of 4 to 20 percent was levied in 1986, 
the governors of the member states' central banks agreed in principle to 
co-ordinate their rates of exchange in 1987, and a common industrial and 
agricultural policy was formulated in 1985. Since 1985, committees on 
agriculture, industry, energy, communication, transport, trade, and other 
activities have been discussing policies on co-ordination. Efforts towards 
regional security have resulted in the ground forces of the member states 
holding joint military exercises in October 1983, and naval and air 
exercises in 1984. Further, an agreement for a joint defence force was 
reached in November 1984 among the member states. The Gulf War of 
1990-1991 has renewed interest in the formation of a regional defence 
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organisation, the particulars of which will be mentioned in a latter part of 
this dissertation (chapter 4). 
While the impetus for the GCC's integration was provided by 
political events, a theoretical examination of their economies should be 
expected to indicate the ideality of integrating their economies. The GCC 
countries share a common language, religion, culture, demography, 
monarchical political systems, and economies that are not only similar in 
most dominant features, but are also totally driven by the oil sector. 
Further, they are not separated by any great geographical distance. 
However, a detailed examination of the group uncovers problems in the 
structure of the individual economies, education, industries, agriculture, 
and manpower. This thesis examines the subject of GCC integration 
through a three dimensional plane. Firstly, it examines integration with 
its theoretical and empirical elements, and observes the convergence or 
divergence of the GCC to its principles. Secondly, the problems involved 
in the integration are analysed. Finally, the prospect for success of the GCC 
is evaluated. 
The first dimension: 
The first dimension analyses the theory and practice of 
integration. 2 It commences with a brief review of the evolution of the 
historical tenets of integration from the contributions of Quesnay, Smith, 
Ricardo, McCulloch, and List. The pure theory of integration, reviews the 
four -broad elements of Free Trade Areas, Customs Unions, Common 
Markets, and Economic Unions. It is difficult to rigidly categorise the 
GCC under any of these systems, as it has adapted ý principles from each 
system to suit its needs. However, it can be loosely associated with 
Customs Unions, though it frequently incorporates the principles of Free 
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Trade Areas and Economic Unions into the group, if they are felt to be 
advantageous. Further, the theory of integration has well developed 
theories on Free Trade Areas and Customs Unions, with Customs Unions 
constituting the bulk of the analyses. This is due to the ability of most 
integration groupings to move from Free Trade Areas to Customs Unions 
with relative ease. The real difficulty is the transition to Common 
Markets which requires greater commitment and maturity. This 
categorisation of the GCC as a Customs Union has warranted greater 
emphasis on analysing the theory of Custom Union formation, with 
specific examination of the trade creation and trade diversion generated. 
Other elements associated with integration like the political effects of 
integration, protectionism, and the interaction of Free Trade Areas and 
Custom Unions with the developing world has also been discussed. 
Finally, the empirical methods involved in analysing the 
static and dynamic effects of integration are examined as part of the 
'practice of integration'. The benefits of ex ante and ex poste analyses are 
observed, and the various mathematical models used in measuring 
integration are mentioned. Generally, models are categorised into 
residual models, analytical models, and those that measure the dynamic 
effects of integration. Further, the views of various applied analysts to 
empirical theory is reviewed, especially if their approaches contribute to a 
new dimension in understanding the quantitative methodology of 
integration. 
The second dimension: 
The second dimension of this thesis, i. e., the problems that 
beset the integration group, are covered in chapters three to five. They 
consist of an examination of the structure, attributes, and defects of the 
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GCC, and covers Pan Islamism and unification in the 19th and 20 
centuries, the establishment of individual GCC states, demography, 
economic and financial indicators, government participation, industry, 
agriculture, fisheries, the state of the GCC economies since the 1990 Gulf 
war, and manpower problems. The economic data is obtained from 45 
tables compiled from statistical year-books of the UN, UNESCO, ILO, and 
other reliable International Organisations. 
Pan Islamism and unification in the 19th and 20th centuries, 3 
will examine the various attempts by Arab reformers to unify the region 
when confronted with the decline in Ottoman authority in the latter part 
of the 19th century. It commences with an examination of the Islamic 
antecedents which is- vital to an understanding of the political structure 
upon which these states are ultimately based. 4 The efforts of reformers 
and political leaders are registered from the decline of the Ottoman 
Empire right up to the formation of the GCC in 1981. The transformation 
of the GCC states from autonomous units owing nominal allegiance to 
the Ottoman empire, into individual -states with British protection, 5 and 
their search for religious and political legitimacy is also covered. 
Human and Natural Resources, 6 observes the enormous 
influence of oil and natural gas on resources, the numerical deficiency of 
the indigenous populations (in spite of large population growth rates), 
and the rural-urban divide. The Economic and Financial probleMS7 
views the instability in the growth of the Gross Domestic Product and GDP 
by industrial activity, as a result of the influence of the oil sector. Also 
examined are: international reserves, increased consumption associated 
with international trade, imports and exports to'trading partners, and the 
problems and benefits associated with Government receipts and 
disbursementS. 8 Expenditure on education, and its breakdown indicating 
the availability of manpower, provides information on the success of 
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replacing expatriate labour and combating illiteracy. GCC efforts at 
research, health and hospital establishments and its success in increasing 
life expectancy provides a positive note to the groups efforts. 9 Yet, in spite 
of intense efforts by these governments towards development, there 
remains a large difference between these countries income and 
development as indicated by the inclusion of a Human Development 
Index. 10 I 
Industry's dependence upon government expenditure, its 
down stream diversification in the oil sector, and the growth of the 
manufacturing industry is noted. The advances in communication, 
transportation, civil aviation, and energy consumption per capita is also 
examined. 11 The promotion of agriculture and livestock is a cornerstone 
of GCC policy, with Saudi Arabia and Oman taking the lead in agricultural 
production. The potential of the fishing industry is observed to be 
enormous and little exploited. In addition, the state of the GCC economies 
since the 1990 Gulf war constitutes an important element of, this analysis. 
The destruction of Kuwait by the occupation forces, and the enormous 
costs faced by Saudia Arabia are mentioned. Further, the financial set-back 
to the UAE through the BCCI scandal is also discussed. 12 
An analysis of the labour market is undertaken in chapter 
five. 13 It commences with the situation of labour in the GCC prior to the 
second world war, when Britain maintained its political and military 
supremacy in the area. The influx of Palestinian labour between 1945 and 
1973 is also mentioned., The enormous oil price rises in 1973 warranted a 
more detailed analysis on labour in the post 1973 period. The influx of 
large numbers of Arab, Asian, and European labour in the wake of oil 
wealth, and the upsurge of Far Eastern labour in the late 1980's is briefly 
documented. The economic, political, and social effects of these migrations 
on the sending countries, and in particular the effects of their remittances 
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are considered. An important aspect of this chapter is the impact of wealth 
and the influx of expatriate labour on the indigenous populations, 
especially on population and education, and the role of indigenous 
women in the labour market as a result, is analysed. This has in turn 
necessitated an examination of the effects of nationality, law, and 
residence policies promulgated by the GCC countries on labour. 
Finally, the effects of the Gulf War of 1990-1991, and the 
financial losses faced by the Emirate of Abu Dhabi as a result of the Bank of 
Credit and Commerce International's (BCCI) liquidation have been 
incorporated into relevant sections of the thesis. 
The third dimension: 
The third and final dimension of this thesis examines the 
prospects for success of the GCC. It is observed through the assistance of a 
mathematical analysis which examines the trading similarities and 
dissimilarities of the economies, with the analysis specifically examining 
non-oil trade. The analysis employs United Nations Standard Industrial 
Trade Classification (SITC) data up to 3-digits for the six GCC countries. 
The range of comparison is from 1971 to 1987, and subject to the 
availability of data, the GCC countries have been compared in the same or 
in similar years. This has resulted in 44 years of data entered, with 22 years 
of GCC exports, and 22 years of imports. The rationale for the construction 
of the similarity indices is, that, the higher the similarity in trade, the 
higher the possibility of duplication of industries and of diminished 
growth in the future. The reliability of the technique is observed in the 
accuracy of its mathematical indication of the trends of the GCC 
economies. Chapters six and seven examine GCC trading patterns with 
the Rest of the World, the Developed, and Developing countries. 
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Non-oil exports are given special consideration throughout 
the analysis. While the mathematical matrices of GCC exports and 
imports to the rest of the world are observed to be efficient indices of the 
countries' economies and structure, they have also proved to be capable of 
indicating possibilities of trade creation and diversion. The extension of 
the technique to analyse GCC exports and imports to the Developed and 
Developing countries enhances the portrayal of the GCC prospects, and the 
potentiality of trade creation and diversion. The concluding chapter, 
(eight), attempts to link the problems faced by the GCC and its prospects at 
rectification, with suggestions that could alleviate the groups problems if 
taken into consideration. 
Finally, mention must be made of the Technical Appendix 
at the end of the thesis. The (154) pages of the appendix comprising ten 
sections, commences with a reproduction of the 1982 Unified Economic 
Agreement of the GCC. The second section consists of forty five tables 
that have contributed to chapter four, followed by a section listing the two 
tables that have provided statistics on education and literacy in chapter 
five. The similarity technique developed by May, Schumacher and Malek 
(1989) is presented section four. Section five includes the nine indices of 
GCC trade with the Rest of the World, followed by a United Nations 
photocopy indicating a dramatc change in trade in section six, and 
eighteen indices of GCC trade with the Developed and Developing World 
in section seven. The next section displays a list of the SITC revisions 
from Rev. 1 to Rev. 2. provided by the United Nations Statistical Office in 
Geneva through database files. The final two sections comprise two 
sample SPSS programmes and a sample Fortran programme that have 
been employed in constructing the similarity indices. 
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This chapter, which constitutes the first dimension of this 
thesis attempts to provide an overview of Economic Integration. 
Although the GCC is modelled upon the theory and principles of 
integration as practiced by the European Community, it has tailored the 
concepts of integration to its own needs. The GCC, can, at best be 
categorised under Customs Unions, though it has liberally borrowed 
tenets from Free Trade Areas, and Economic Unions. This has 
necessitated a more detailed analysis of Customs Unions than Free Trade 
Areas and Economic Unions which are dealt with only briefly. 
The first part of the Chapter (section 2.2) consists of a brief 
historical sketch of integration which will outline the contributions to 
integration from Quesnay to List. The importance of this section lies in its 
introduction to the material that has played a major role in influencing 
the modern concepts of integration. 
The next section (2.3) will examine the theory of integration. 
This section does not attempt to display erudition in the subject, but 
intends to create a theoretical environment for an espousal of the concepts 
of Free Trade Areas, Customs Unions, and Economic Unions. It also takes 
into account the contributions of various theoriticians to the subject. 
Finally, the empirical methods employed in integration will 
be examined in the last section of this chapter (2.4). This section, not only 
outlines the various quantitative approaches in integration, but also 
attempts to provide a review of new empirical techniques applied by 
various analysts. 
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2.2 A Historical Sketch of Integration: 
14 
The influence of the classical economists on the evolutionary 
process of integration is vital to an analysis of its theory. In the age of the 
classical economists it was difficult to gain acceptance for new theories that 
were not cast in, the mould of traditional economic thought. . 
Thus the 
contributions of Quesnay (1758), Smith (1776), Ricardo (see Saffra 1951), 
McCulloch (1832,1840) and List (1885) to integration must be given strong 
consideration. O'Brien (1976), provides a comprehensive and informative 
espousal of the history of the subject. 
The classical economists grew up in the age of mercantilism. 
The mercantilists believed that the interests of the individual were 
subservient to that of the state. In examining trade between nations, they 
maintained that the one ultimate criterion for judging a commercial treaty 
was by examining the balance of payments. This was in contrast to the 
classical economists who. advocated -individual enterprise, and were 
opposed to trade diversion in commercial treaties. One of the first of the 
prominent anti-mercantilists', Quesnay', founded, the physiocratic school 
of thought. 2 Quesnay attacked the mercantilist system and advocated free 
trade and laissez faire. In espousing free trade and the freedom of 
individual enterprise, he stated: 
"Que l'on n'empeche point le commerce exterieur des denrees du 
cru, car tel est le debit telle est la reproduction" and "Que chacun 
foit libre de cultiver dans son champ telles productions que son 
interet, fes; facultes, la nature du terrein lui suggerent, pour en tirer 
le plus ground porduit qu'il soit possible" (Quesnay 1758: 8-16) 
The emergence of Smith (1776) and Ricardo, who also 
advocated free trade and laissez-faire contributed immensely to the theory 
of trade. Smith's analysis on the effects on foreign trade due to an 
expanding market deserves particular mention. It is from Smith and 
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Ricardo, that. we get the principles of absolute and comparative 
advantage. In supporting laissez-faire, Smith mentions the famous 
invisible hand, the situation in which an individual in seeking to 
promote his own self interest (without governmental interference) 
inadvertently promotes the welfare of the nation as well. 
An example of the commitment of the classical economists to 
individualism and free trade is the Metheun treaty of 1703, which enabled 
low quality Portuguese wines to enter Britain at preferential tariffs in 
comparison to superior quality French wines. Smith (1776) and Ricardo 
(1817) subjected its trade diverting effects to harsh criticism, and even 
supported any inexpedience caused to British merchants engaged in trade 
with Portugal if the treaty was abrogated rather than justify any of its 
provisions. They were of the opinion that, while the merchants would 
suffer a set back fo ra short period of time, they could easily recover. On 
the othýer hand, the -negative effects on the British economy generated by 
the trade diverting effects of the treaty would be much harder to 
overcome. . 
McCulloch (1832; 1840) was in agreement to the abrogation of 
trade diverting treaties, though his subject of criticism was the Anglo- 
French treaty of 1860 - the Cobden treaty. In his opinion: 
"Instead, however, of confining commercial treaties to their 
legitimate and proper purposes - the security of merchants and 
navigators and the facility of commercial transactions - they very 
soon began to be employed as engines for promoting the commerce 
of one country at the expense of another" (McCulloch 1832: 1056). 
Though he commended the German Zollverein of 18333 this was only 
due to the fact that he saw it as a move towards free trade, which is 
illustrated by his description of pre-zollverein Germany which: 
"Instead of being reciprocal, and dependent, everything was 
separate, independent and hostile" (McCulloch 1840: 79) 
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However, the most interesting contribution to the theory of 
integration has been that of List (1885). List who has been called the 
'intellectual founder of the German Zollverein', advocated protectionism, 
and was under the impression that three stages were necessary to obtain 
economic prosperity: 
1. Initially an adoption of free trade with more advanced nations as a 
means of raising oneself from a state of barbarism. 
2. Next, a policy of protectionism to promote the growth of 
manufactures, fisheries, navigation and foreign trade, 
3. And finally, after reaching the 'highest degree' of wealth and power, 
a reversion to free trade and unrestricted competition(List 1885: 127) 
This process is summed up by List in this excellent statement: 
"... the system of protection, in as much as it forms the only means 
of placing those nations which are far behind in civilization on 
equal terms with the one predominating nation (which, however, 
never received at the hands of nature a perpetual right to a 
monopoly of manufactures but which merely gained an advance 
over others in point of time), the system of protection regarded 
from this point of view appears to be the most efficient means of 
furthering the final union of nations and hence also of promoting 
the true freedom of trade". (List 1885: 127) 
List, was not alone in advocating a degree of protectionism. 
Adam Smith himself admitted the occasional need for protectionism, as is 
observed in his statement that: 
"there seem however to be two cases in which* it will generally be 
advantageous to lay some burden upon foreign, for the 
encouragement of domestic industry". (Sn-dth 1776: 463). 
The two reasons he gives here are (a) industries for defence, and (b) the 
imposition of a tax on foreign trade if a tax on domestic industry is 
introduced, which would leave the foreign and domestic industries on the 
same footing as before. Further, Smith condoned reciprocation against a 




"Revenge in this case naturally dictates retaliation and that we 
should impose the like duties and prohibitions upon the 
importation of some or all of their manufactures into ours" (Smith 
1776: 467) 
In conclusion, it may be stated that though the classical 
economists believed economic prosperity could be gained through free 
trade and laissez-faire, they recognised the necessity of protectionism 
when nations did not comply uniformly to the principles of free trade. 
The next section of this chapter will examine the theory of integration in 
greater depth. 
2.3 The Theory of Integration: 
This section examines the theory of iýtegration, and its 
relation to protectionism, political influence, and the Developing world. ' 
Yet, before commencing on a review of the concýpts of integration, the 
reasons behind the desire for integration among individual countries 
must be investigated. Shibata (1967: 174) is of the opinion that the 
attraction of integration lies in the perception that an integration group: 
...... is often designed to provide a new economic environment in 
which the less efficient industries of the participating countries can 
expand at the expense of more efficient non union sources, or more 
simply to provide opportunities for trade diversion". 
Thus an integration grouping creates a system in which each country is 
relegated into regions. 
It is essential before commencing with the empirical methods 
employed in integration that a summation is performed on the pure 
theory of the subject. Robson (1987) provides a simple and comprehensive 
analysis of the subject. In this section, 'some of his well presented 
representations have been included to familiarise the reader with the basic 
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concepts of integration. 
(a) An introduction to the theory of integration: 
Integration is a very broad term, and Robson (1987: 2) 
considers it a 'means' rather than an 'end'. This section will endeavour to 
examine the 'means', which primarily consist of the four broad elements 
of Free Trade Areas, Customs Unions, Common Markets, and Economic 
Unions. If these four elements were to be ranked in their degree of 
sophistication, Free Trade Areas would be at the nadir, and Economic 
Unions at the apex of an ideal integration tree. Although Free Trade 
Areas and Customs Unions allow the tariff free movement of products 
within the area, a Free Trade Area is free to fix its own tariff against the 
Rest of the World, while a Custom Union insists on a joint tariff by all its 
members against the Rest of the World. This joint tariff is called the C. E. T. 
(Common External Tariff). A Common Market is a Customs Union with 
labour and capital permitted to move around without restriction in the 
union, so that factor and product markets are integrated. Finally, 
Economic Unions entail a sophisticated integration process which would 
include the addition of fiscal and monetary instruments to the existing 
Common Market. These different stages of integration are represented in a 
tabular form in Table 2.1 
While it would be expedient for integration schemes to evolve 
from stage I to stage IV, the reality is that many integrational schemes try 
to achieve the sophisticated stages as early as possible. They attempt to 
move from one stage to another without really constructing a solid 
foundation in each stage of integration. This is observed in the 
integration groupings of Developing countries who commence with 
Customs Unions or Common Markets from the conception of the union, 
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without really comitting themselves to integration whole-heartedly. As a 
result, the group's integration tends to be cosmetic and lack long term 
continuity. 
Table 2.1 
INDIVIDUAL FREE TRADE CUSTOMS COMMON ECONOMIC 
NATIONS AREAS UNIONS MARKETS UNIONS 
> 
internal internal same as same as a 
tariffs in tariffs in a customs common 
area area union with market, with 
abolished, abolished, the addition fiscal and 
but nations and common oflabour monetary 
are free to external and capital integration. 




STAGE I STAGE 11 STAGE III STAGE IV 
--> >> --> 
Balassa (1976) is of the opinion that integration schemes 
would have more success if they were larger and more homogeneous. 
According to him, integration could be categorised under the following 
forms; 
a) Trade integration which propounds progress through the freeing 
of barriers to trade. 
b) Factor integration; which brings about the liberalisation of factor 
movements. 
C) Policy-integration which harmonises national economic policies 
and, 
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d) Total integration: which is the complete unification of these above 
mentioned policies. 
Trade integration combines Free Trade Areas and Customs Unions, while 
factor integration is synonymous with a Common market. The last two 
headings (c and d) are the steps towards what could be recognised as an 
'Economic Union'. (Balassa 1976: 17) 
The remaining part of this section will concentrate on the 
theory of Free Trade Areas and Customs Unions which not only constitute 
the bulk of the literature on economic integration, but are also the most 
relevant forms of integration that could be applied to an examination of 
the GCC. 
Free trade areas: 
Free trade areas are similar to customs unions with the 
exception of the common external tariff (C. E. T. ). Myrdal (1957: 141), was 
of the opinion that though the assumption of free competition in Free 
Trade theory was 'awkward', it is difficult for even its severest critics to 
free themselves from the fascination it provides. 
Robson (1987) mentions the 'rules of origin' as one of the 
features of free trade areas. These rules of origin are imposed upon the 
area to confine intra-area trade to products originating in, or produced in 
the area, and to limit 'trade deflection'. Trade deflection takes place when 
the imports are re-directed from the country with the lowest tariff to 
countries with higher tariffs in the area. Trade deflection is dangerous and 
could lead to acrimony and eventual split up of the grouping. 
A simple diagrammatic representation of Free Trade Areas, 
from Robson (1987: 23-26) is given for a single country and two country 
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This diagram shows the effects of Free Trade on a sinale a 
country. Two countries H and P produce domestically an identical product 
X, which has different customs tariff in each country. A lower tariff of PWT, 
is imposed in country P, and a higher tariff of PWT H 
in country H. Further, 
it is assumed that 'rules of origin' were applied and that only the area- 
origin product enjoys free movement in the area. Country H's supply 
curve is S. its tariff is PwTW and its production is Oý at price OTEL Country 
P's tariff is PwTP, and Pw is the world price, and its supply curve is 
horizontally added to that of country H to 
larrive 
at Stip. If a Free Trade 
Area is formed, the price of the area origin product will have to remain 
between Tp and Tjj, i. e. between price of H- (OTH) and P- (OTp). Thus, if 
the demand curve was Djj, for country H, then the price in H would be OT? 
with country P supplying L'R at that price. Here a would represent trade 
creation and c the consumption effect of a reduction of price in product X. 
Instead of DFI, if H's demand were D'jq, the price in country H would be 
OPH and H would be able to supply its consumers much more than it 
a L' NL .7 IV, R, Quancirl 
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could under DH (ON instead of OL') and P would supply country H to the 
extent of 2NIN'. So in a Free Trade Area, P with a lower more efficient 
industry could supply H with goods at any price above OTp, and make up 
any other shortfall in its domestic industry by importing from the rest of 
the world. 
If this framework is broadened to a two country case, two 











In the first situation, figures 2.3a and 2.3b depict the demand and supply 
curves in countries H and P for product X. Pw is world supply price. Prior 
to integration, P's Free Trade Area tariff is PwTj, and price is OTp. In the 
above diagram, both H and P have similar demand conditions, but H is an 
inefficient producer in comparison to P. Prior to Free Trade, P consumes 
OM at price OTp. Its tariff is PwTp. Country H on the other hand with a tariff 
of PwTH produces OL and consumes ON, the difference of LN being 
imported at price Pw from the rest of the world. Customs revenue in H is 
LNxPwTj4. In this situation if both countries form a free trade area, then 
country P being the more efficient producer, would supply H's market 
with LN' at price OTp. Leaving OV for its home market and importing 
L"M from the rest of the world at price OP, In country H trade creationý at 
a and the consumption effect at c would outweigh trade diversion at b. 
a cuancley 
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Thus country H profits from the Free Trade Area. In country P, the same 
amount would be produced and consumed as before, but the government 0 
revenue would be increased due to the lower imports from the world at 
price OPw. Thus country P also profits from the Free Trade Area. The - 
second aspect of this situation in figures 2.4a and 2.4b indicate that: 
figure 2.4a 
r7? ycv 1 
sot 1 
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figure 2.4b 
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In this case, while P is an efficient producer, and its supply 
curve is relatively elastic, P is unable to satisfy country H's demand. So 
country P produces OM and country H, ON. If a Free Trade Area is 
formed, P's supply price (OTp) would be incapable of satisfying the extra- 
demand in country H. This would necessitate an equilibrium Free Trade 
Area price Of OPFrA, but the price in P would not rise above OTp for if it 
did, P would have no gain in joining the Free Trade Area. In this case, H is 
experiencing a trade creation effect (a+c) as prices have reduced from OTH 
to OPFTA . Country P on the other hand, would incur no excess 
loss in 
consumption or production, but would gain from extra governmental Cy 
4 
revenue due to lower imports from the rest of the world. 
As an exponent of Free Trade theory, Gremmen (1983: 278) 
examines the use of the factor price equalization theorem which would 
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ensure that under certain assumptions: 
"... the move towards free trade will lead to unification of factor 
prices, (Le. %vagcs), or In relative terms, that a move toward frtvr 
trade will lead to converging factor prices". 
Concentrating on the consequences of direct trade Involvement for (actor 
price equallsation, his model tests the hypothesis: 
".., whether or not differences In national wage levels of A and 1), 
given their capital/labour endowment ratios, will be smaller when 
their trade involvement Is higher, as the theorem predicts" 
(Gremmen 1985: 281). 
The theorem states that the lower the trade barriers, the lower the 
diffcrencc In product priccs and the greater the convergence In factor 
prices. The model's equation Is: 
In Vi T-C+a In NO +P In 
pýj sT (i, -Vl 
)L/ 
Ll 
where a Is the elasticity of wage differences to trade Involvement, %V Are- 
the labour costs, I Is country 1, J, country J. i the time period, C flie, 
constant, Vij the chosen Index for trade Involvement betwevn I and Le., 
Mil + MO where a\flj the Imports from I to J, and Mil linivrts from to 1. 
K/L is the indication of the amount of physical capit-11 1w %yorLer. The 
Appendix of his article provides an excellent picture of dmzi collection. 
Grernmen's (1985: 284) conclusion Is that: 
"the higher the degret, of trade inicgration t)ct%v", n countries, thvý 
less the (traditional) I leckscher-Ohlin-Sa mcul son Scherne. appears 
to be valid in examining wage differencrs tvt%vk-cn them". 
.A Yet his hypothesis does not doubt the 'empirical relevance' of the F ctor 
Price Equallsation Theorem. 
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The classical economists worked according to a framework 
which included constant costs with occasional allowance for learning of 
scale economies. Prices were determined by regional demand, and welfare 
effects were implied by production. 'Equilibrium' had an important part to 
play. In reality equilibrium did not exist, but according to the doctrine, 
equilibrium was a virtual state of reality or a position towards which 
actual reality tended to move. This was the classical approach towards the 
state of 'equilibrium' and equilibrium played an important part in the 
theoretical analysis of integration. s It was with this as a background that 
Jacob Viner's analysis of trade creation. and trade diversion was 
formulated. Viner's analysis was the first major analysis -on Customs 
Unions. 
A Customs Union is similar to a Free Trade Area with one 
important exception. The characteristic feature of a Customs Union is its 
CET (Common External Tariff). The CET is the common tariff adopted by 
all the member countries against the rest of the world. Harbler (1936) was 
of the opinion that the CET in a Customs Union would be reduced by 
stages than atone stroke'. Viner (1950: 4) defined a Customs Union as: 
1tonly one of a number of possible types of arrangement which 
eliminates or reduces the tariff barriers between two or more 
political units while maintaining tariff barriers against imports 
from outside regions". 
The European Communities Information Catalogue (1977), distinguishes 
between a Customs Union and a Free Trade Area on the basis of 
unhindered movement of goods, which in a Customs Union applies to 
goods of non member states as well once the CET has been paid. However, 
a Free Trade Area only allows the free movements of goods originating in 
member countries. A vast amount of the literature on integration has 
analysed Customs Union theory. The orthodox theory of Custom Unions 
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examined them in terms of trade creation and trade diversion. 
Trade creation refers to a union-induced shift from the 
consumption of products that are produced by the home country at a high 
price, to the consumption of products from the partner country at a lower 
price. This would result in the more efficient producers gaining the entire 
market. Trade diversion on the other hand is the opposite. It occurs when 
a country reduces consumption of low cost products from the rest of the 
world, for high cost products from the partner country (after the customs 
union). Robson (1987.15) is of the opinion that this trade diversion would 
lead to a loss of the consumers surplus resulting from the substitution of 
low cost foreign goods by high cost partner goods. The criterion of trade 
creation and trade diversion has been used considerably in Customs 
Union analysis. Viner (1950: 44) observed that: 
"where the trade creating force is predominant, one of the members 
at least must benefit, both may benefit, the two combined must 
have a net benefit and the world at large benefits; ...... where the 
trade diverting effect is predominant, one at least of the member 
countries is bound to be injured, both may be injured, the two 
combined will suffer a net injury, and there will be injury to the 
outside world and to the world at large". 
Hine (1989: 3) in an an analysis of Custom Union 
enlargement and adjustment, distinguishes between two types of trade 
creation: 
Inter-Industry trade creation; which involves the closure in whole 
or part of the industry in one member, in conjunction with the 
expansion of industry in a partner country. This situation would 
lead to the structure in the two countries becoming more divergent. 
Intra-Industry trade creation; which involves a two way expansion 
of trade, as a nation's industries concentrate on a narrower but 
more complementary range of products. Intra-Industry trade 
creation may be more beneficial to a Customs Union. 
Further, El Agraa (1985: 113) propounds the idea of external 
trade creation, which occurs when expensive domestic production is 
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replaced by cheaper imports from a non partner country because of the 
reduction in the CET. He also mentions supply side diversion which 
occurs when exports to non-partners are replaced by exports to partners. 
Holzman (1985) contributes to the theory of integration by analysing trade 100 
destruction in COMECON. Trade destruction is an extreme form of trade 
diversion which occurs when economic opportunities for trade are 
negligible, and instead of trade creation, trade is reduced. The possibility of 
trade destruction occurring could be brought about by two circumstances: CP 
....... the nation finds either that it is cheaper to produce some 
products at home than to import them from its partner, or that the 
price of some products is so high and income so much reduced 0 
wi . thin the union that consumption (imports) declines" (Holzman 
1985: 411). 
Most studies in integration deal with 'trade data, though a proper aa 
evaluation of the effects of economic integration requires analysis of both 0 
trade and production data. 
The following diagrammatic representation of a Customs 
Union from Robson (1987: 16-19) provides a brief but thorough foundation 0 
in the theory of. Customs Unions. It is a three country case, of which two 
countries form a customs union, while a third case represents the 'rest of 
the world'. This is a 3xl (3 goods and I commodity) analysis with identical 
products and partial equilibrium. 
Figure 2.3 
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country H's demand curve, 
country H's supply curve 
supply curve in country H of the product originating 
in the customs union. It is the combination of the 
supply curve of country H and the supply curve of 
imports from Nhere there is no intra-union tariffs) 
supply price of rest of the world to H and P. 
demand curve in P 
P's supply curve. 
Robson suggests three options: 
i) Prior to integration, if P had a pre union tariff price of PwTr. and 
i 
country Ha pre union tariff of PwTjj, the domestic consumption of each 
country would be entirely satisfied by domestic production. But if a 
customs union is formed on the basis of tariff averaging so that the CET 
would be 1/2 (TH+Tp), the new CET would be PwCET. But the CET would 
be ineffective because at price OCET, supply would be greater than union 
demand. Price would therefore settle at OCE T" where supply would equal 
demand. Domestic consumption in country H would increase to OQ, the 
domestic production would decline from ON to OL, country P would 
produce OT consume OR, and export RT to country H. In this case country 
H would incur trade creation, as a lower source of imports are incoming. 
The total trade creation of H would be ABC. In the case of P, the Customs 
Union would cause a rise in price, from OTp to OCET. Consumers would 
suffer a consumption loss of RS, though there would be a production 
effect of ST, as more resources are drawn towards producing more. All the 
extra costs however will be more than repaid by the extra export to H, and 
so country P would not overall face a loss and may even be in a favourable 
position. 
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ii) If in addition to this situation, country H had a lower tariff rate 
(but higher than P) it would produce what it could, and import the rest 
from the cheapest source of imports (i. e., from the rest of the world). 
However due to existing tariffs, the government would benefit from 
customs revenue. So, if a tariff averaging Customs Union is formed, the 
imports from the world would be replaced by P's imports and this could 
cause trade diversion. But at the same time, part of the domestic 
production would be replaced by P's cheaper production leading to trade 
creation. In this case the trade creation and trade diversion has to be 
compared to determine if a Customs Union will be beneficial or 
detrimental. 
iii) Finally, there would be the case of H and P forming a 
Customs Union with H's tariff being the same as the CET, but P having to 
upgrade its tariff to the CET. H will have no changes in production, but 
would suffer trade diversion as the imports from P are non-taxable, and 
represents a loss of tariff revenue from previous imports from the rest of 
the world. But for P the case is like the second example where its 
domestic production has to contend with higher CET, but is balanced out 
by exports to H at a higher price. 
Further, Robson (1987) provides a simple and comprehensive 
explanation of the effects of economies of scale on Customs Unions. If two 
countries were producing the same good, the Customs Union would lead 
to a capturing of the market by the more efficient producer, and the 
economy of scale would lead to lower costs and benefits for both. This 
effect is called the 'cost reduction effect' of Corden. However, if only one 
country was producing the good, then the Customs Union would insist 
that it be purchased from the partner rather than the rest of the world, and 
this would lead to trade diversion for country one, though Cordens 'cost 
reduction effect', will still apply to the other. Further, if the producer 
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cannot expand, it can still profit by buying from the world and selling to 
the partner. If there is production in neither country, then the 
establishment of a Customs Union may result in production in one 
country - say P, then not only would cheaper imports for the partner from 
the rest of the world be cut off, but P would also suppress imports because 
of costly domestic production. This is what Viner called Irade 
suppression', and country H faces trade diversion. Thus, this union is not 
beneficial to both partners. 
Shibata (1967) developed a3 country model with 'increasing 
cost supply schedules' and 'downward sloping demand schedules' to apply 
to Customs Unions, Free Trade Areas and Economic Unions. Shibata 
categorises Customs Unions, Free Trade Areas, and Common Markets 
under Economic Unions. His classification of integration with respect to 
tariffs consists of 'Simple Economic Unions', 'Customs Unions', 'Free 
Trade Areas', and 'Tax Unions'. His definition of simple economic areas 
is more suited to that of Free Trade Areas. Simple Economic Unions do 
not make provision for trade deflection, though his belief that this stage of 
integration: 
........ is purely an analytical construct, it does not actually exist, and is 
not expected to come into existence in the future" (Shibata 1967.148) 
is because it represents the basic type of Economic Union and addresses 
the main issues involved in all Economic Unions formed with respect to 
tariffs. Shibata terms the sum of the CET of a Customs Union and the 
world price the 'area price'. This area price, which is agreed upon as a: 
"..... result of a consensus of all members on the common external 
tariff, may be said to represent the interests of the union as a 
whole". (Shibata 1967: 159) 
Further, Shibata is of the opinion that a 'real' Free Trade 
Area must be equipped with certain measures like 'rules of origin' to 
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prevent trade deflection. Rules of origin stipulate that products must 
originate or be mainly produced by the participating countries to be 
exempt from a CET. The difference between a Customs Union and a Free 
Trade Area is not the tariffs but the different measures they use to Prevent 
trade deflection (see Shibata 1967: 177-182). He also mentions a 'tax 
union' which though essentially fulfilling the same functions of 
Economic Unions, modifies taxes to include taxes on consumption, 
residence, and location of economic activity, of all countries in the 
Economic Union. 
Johnson (1962) feels that Custom Unions that consist of 
countries that are similar, could enjoy greater scope in complementing 
each other through specialisation. He is of the opinion that a partial 
union is likely to be more beneficial than a complete Customs Union 
because: 
........ the more the restrictions on trade from within the area are 
reduced the less is the remaining divergence between the internal 
and external value of goods traded and the less the probable gain 
from further freedom of trade with the rest of the area. On the other 
hand, the divergence between the internal and external values of 
goods imported from the outside world remains the same; so that 
while the possible gain from trade creation measured in this way 
diminished, the possible loss from diversion of trade away from 
outside sources towards inside sources does not diminish as barriers 
to intra-union trade are lowered". (Johnson 1962: 45) 
The Customs Union is a mixture of free trade and more protection. While 
it provided freedom of trade in the participating countries, it also provides 
more protection for producers in the area against outside competition. He 
states that if supply is not perfectly elastic, the trade diversion effect of a 
Customs Union has two consequences: 
Trade is diverted from foreign to partner sources, foreign supply 
price falls, the country enjoys a terms of trade gain with the foreign 
country. This will reduce any loss it suffers, from trade diversion. 
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Imperfectly elastic supply also leads to a rise in price of, partner 
supply. While the loss to the country is greater due to Trade 
diversion, part of this loss is not a net loss to the domestic and 
partner economies taken together, but simply a transfer from 
domestic consumers surplus to partner producers' surplus. 
(Johnson 1962: 55-57) 
The dissimilarity of different 'structures' of economies joining together 
can be negative for a Customs Union. Thus an economy with an 
agricultural production base, will gain little if it joins a country with'an 
industrial production base. 
Another important aspect of integration is the analysis of 
tariffs. A large number of economists tend to examine the tariff aspects of 
economic integration rather than its welfare or other effects. In the 
opinion of Richard Schuller, a protectionist, tariffs have a twofold effect, 
(1) they hit consumers on one hand and stimulate production on the 
other, and (2) in order to make a complete judgment on the effects of a 
particular tariff, you must weigh the disadvantages of one with the 
advantages of another (see Harbler 1936: 122). Riezman (1985) uses the 
optimal tariff theory to analyse the reasons for Custom Union formation. 
He focuses on 'which' unions form rather than on the 'effects of' or 
'results of' union formation by comparing Customs Unions to Free Trade 
Areas. A3 country 3 good model is used. Riezman modelled this as a2 
stage game. In the first Stage countries made coalition choices according to 
the core theory, 6 and in the second stage, optimal tariffs are determined. 
Thus: 
"countries decide whether to join or not join a customs union 
depending on the payoffs to various customs unions. This is 
realistic in the sense that countries are never forced to enter into 
international agreements, but cannot prevent others from doing so" 
(Reizman 1985: 359). 
Negishi (1969), examines the pareto optimality of a Customs 
CHAPTER 2 33 
Union in context of its size, and with regard to Vanek's (1965) analysis. 
He states that the analysis is necessary because the assumption of infinite 
elasticity of foreign and partner supply and the non-existence of tariffs 
imposed by the foreign and partner is not a 'realistic proposition'. His 
analysis of the welfare effects of Custom Unions and the theory of second 
best consists of a model of the world economy with three countries and 
two commodities. (Negishi 1969: 391-397) 
Bracewell-Milnes (1976) mentions the height of the tariff in 
Custom Union theory. The height of the tariff demonstrates the degree of 
trade liberalisation. 7 The author also speaks about the 'break even level' 
of the common external tariff8to observe the liberalisation changes in 
Customs Union. Interestingly, in analysing Customs Unions, he states 
that: 
....... the trade diversion caused by a Customs Union is not harmful 
to the combined interest of the union partners unless the increase 
in the importing partner's purchase price exceeds the other partners 
gross profit; otherwise trade diversion is helpful" (Bracewell-Milnes 
1976: 74) 
Kemp and Wan (1987) argue that it is always possible for any 
subset of countries in the world economy to abolish tariffs on one another, 
choose an external tariff that maintains trade with the outside world 
unchanged, and improve the welfare of some member(s) of the union 
without hurting any other members welfare by using lumpsum transfers. 
This is a concept that is extended by Grinols (1981). Kemp and Wan 
indicate that as long as perfect competition prevails inside the union, a 
compensation scheme between members can always be found whereby 
every individual is made better off, or no worse off after the formation or 
enlargement of the Customs Union than he was before. Grinols states that 
the obstacle to a suitable compensation scheme propounded by Kemp and 
Wan, can always be defined in terms of observable trade flows and market 
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prices. Each country breaks even. Thus using post union internal prices for 
valuation, member nations may have to pay or receive a net transfer. 
To move on to the welfare effects of Custom Union 
formation, Lipsey (1987) provides an excellent commencing point. He 
states that Customs Unions will face losses if the countries involved in the 
union are complementary in the range of commodities that are protected 
by tariffs. The theory of 'second best' which stipulates that: 
"if it is impossible to satisfy all the optimum conditions, then a 
change which brings about the satisfaction of some of the optimum 
conditions may make things better or worse. " (Lipsey 1987: 359) 
plays an important role in his analysis. Lipsey is of the opinion that inter- 
country and inter-commodity substitution could provide an interesting 
analytical topic. Inter-country substitution leads to trade creation and 
trade diversion, but inter-commodity substitution occurs when one 
commodity is substituted because of a relative price shift. He states that 
given a country's volume of international trade, a Customs Union is most 
likely to raise welfare: 
"the higher is the proportion of trade with the country's union 
partner and the lower the proportion with the outside world. 
Further, a Customs Union is more likely to raise welfare, the lower 
the total volume of foreign trade, for the lower is foreign trade the 
lower must be purchases from the outside world relative to 
purchasers of domestic commodities. This means, that the type of 
countries who ought to form Customs Union are those doing a 
high proportion of their total expenditure on domestic trade. 
Countries which are likely to lose from a Customs Union on the 
other hand are those countries in which a low proportion of total 
trade is domestic, especially if the Customs Union does not include 
a high proportion of their foreign trade" (Lipsey 1960: 369) 
Wooton (1986) attempts to shed light on the welfare 
consequences of the formation of a preferential trading area and to 
provide a useful framework for future research with a general 
equilibrium: 
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'I ..... n good model of trade between three countries that 
has the 
potential to embody any trading pattern whatsoever, while 
remaining easily tractable. The constraint that production of each 
good occurs in a single country, imposed initially by Meade, is 
relaxed - all countries can both produce and consume all goods. The 
formulation also permits export taxes, in addition to import tariffs, 
to be discussed" (Wooton 1986: 82). 
It assumes throughout, that the club formation would not alter the 
specific pattern of trade and that the only distortions in the world 
economy were trade taxes and subsidies. Sufficient conditions under 
which small countries could gain from forming a preferential trading club 
were derived, under the assumption that international transfers could be 
made. When the partners in the Preferential Trading Countries are large 
countries then the benefits of improved intra-club terms of trade will be 
augmented or diminished dependent on the movements in world prices. 
McMillan and McCann (1981) state that most of the literature 
on Custom Unions studies the effect of two commodities on world trade. 
They attempt to examine the welfare effects in the three commodity 
Customs Union (30). The model is based on the assumptions and 
analyzes of Lipsey, Meade, and Vanek. They are of the opinion that 
countries gain from tariff reduction and Custom Unions if domestic 
production and imports from the partner countries are net substitutes. On 
the other hand if they are net complements, the countries should 
subsidise intra-union trade. Yet, they agree that their model does not 
cover: 
........ ways in which a customs union could create welfare gains for 
its members, such as by exploiting economies of scale or terms of 
trade effects or by countering domestic distortions. " (McMillan and 
McCann: 702) 
Makower and Morton (1953) examine the allocation effects of 
a Customs Union to world trade. They use a 3x3 model. Among other 
assumptions, they see part of the allocation problem as a result of the 
universal ad valorem tariff. Two critical values (a minimum point and a 
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maximum point) illustrating the level of protection are distinguished. An 
important assumption of theirs is that the extent of. 
"world gain depends directly upon the extent of the cost difference, 
in respect of each of the three commodities, as between the two 
uniting countries. The greater these differences, the more the world 
benefits from the union" (Makower and Morton 1953: 35) 
They feel that the gain of a Customs Union is greater among 
complementary economies. (i. e., the more complementary the countries 
that form the union are, the more different their costs, the greater the 
gain). 
Corden (1972) analyses the effects of economies of scale in 
Customs Union theory. He introduces two new concepts - the 'cost 
reduction effect', and 'trade suppression. He gives a partial equilibrium 
analysis (static) -3 country model, -2 forming the union, and one not. 
Three cases are taken: initial production of importables in both union 
countries, in one only, and in neither. Corden's 'cost-reduction' effect is 
similar to orthodox trade creation, but here the price for B in the union 
remains the same, though A's producers will gain due to the larger 
market. This effect is: 
....... the result not of a movement to a cheaper source of supply but 
rather of the cheapening of an existing source of supply. (Corden 
1972: 467-8). 
The whole profit goes to the producer. He speaks of production reversal 
which occurs when the union formulates and B first begins to start 
production and then drive A out of business and capture the entire 
market. Corden also analyses Viners trade suppression effect which can 
result from production reversal, Le, expensive domestic production 
replaces cheap world inputs. Thus according to Corden (1972: 474): 
....... customs union theory may not tell us much about the 
reallocation of existing resources, owing to their immobility, but it 




Cordens analysis contributes to a later analysis by Lloyd (1982) who 
reviews four 30 models of Customs Unions theory of Berglas (1979), 
Corden (1976), Meade (1955), and Riezman (1979). Lloyd is of the opinion 
that while 3x2 models are useful, the family of 30 models are more 
effective and consider several effects that are not present in 3x2 models 
(see Lloyd 1982: 41-63) 
Venables (1987) criticizes traditional theory for not providing 
a strong enough framework for including economies of scale in Customs 
Union theory and presents an analysis with increasing returns and 
imperfect competition. He uses a mathematical analysis with matrices, 
and reaches the conclusion that: 
O'... customs unions permit both an increase in firm scale and an 
intensification of competition in member countries. Tariff 
reductions cause firms to expand their production, and free entry 
causes a reduction in price cost margins. However, it is not the case 
that there are unambiguous gains to either customs union 
membership or enlargement. Countries which are net importers of 
the products of imperfectly competitive industries may suffer 
welfare losses from membership, and expansion of the union may 
benefit the joining country to the detriment of existing members. " 
(Venables 1987: 109) 
Riezman (1979) in his paper, develops a R3 model of a 
Customs Union. Starting from Kemp's analysis of a Custom Union theory 
with terms of trade effects, Riezman, however, does not follow Kemp's 
three country two good geometric model, but analyses his model as a three 
good, three country mathematical model with the advantage of the non- 
asymmetry that exists in a two good case. His main result is that: 
"two countries can benefit from a customs union provided that 
their mutual trade is initially small and does not increase too much 
as a result of the agreement" (Reizman 1979: 342). 
The reason for this statement is: that the effect of the Customs Union is to 
reduce the prices of the goods imported by the Customs Union countries 
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relative to their exports, so terms of trade with others improve. Riezman 
analyses terms of trade effects rather than trade creation and trade 
diversion. However, this does not mean that countries whose mutual 
trade is large cannot benefit from a Customs Union, as: 
"To deterrýine if a country gains from a customs union for any 
specific case, one needs to weigh the gain from improvement in a 
country's terms of trade vis-a-vis the nomnember countries against 
the possible loss due to a deterioration in the terms of trade vis-a- 
vis other member countries. " (Reizman 1979: 342) 
Finally, this section must mention compensation to deal 
with the adverse effects of integration. Mead (1968) gives a two country 
case with average cost curves, for an examination of this subject. If two 
countries form a Customs Union, contends Mead, an annual transfer 
from the producing to the consuming member i. e., (PDPW)(C) is a valid 
bare minimum rule of compensation where: 
PD price within the common market 
PW world price 
C purchases by the consuming country from the producing 
member (exports from A to B) 
"This" Mead (1968: 735) states " will not lead to any true sharing of 
benefits of membership, but would only be an attempt to 
compensate consuming countries for losses incurred from 
membership". 
In this rule of thumb proposal, compensation is determined by the excess 
cost of the member country's product over the cost of the same good from 
the rest of the world, multiplied by the volume in inter - partner trade. 
However, Robson (1970) does not find Meade's rule of thumb 
effective as a basis for minimum compensation. He gives two reasons: 
a) The spillover effects that might occur, as a partner may suffer a large 
loss or it may even gain from exporting from the partner. 
b) The problems in having a regular system of ascertaining compensation, 
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as trade between A and B, as well as trade with third parties would give 
rise to a number of complications. The compensation would be easier if A 
exported to B and there was no reverse trade, but this is not always the 
case., 
(b) Free Trade Areas, Customs Unions, and Protectionism: 
Johnson (1960), examines the dispute between Free Trade and 
protectionism. His analysis covers the 'cost of protection' and the 
'scientific tariff. -According to 
him, the cost of protection to a country has 
two elements: 
The gain in real income that could be obtained as a result of 
abandoning protection in favour of unilateral free trade, and, 
The additional gain in real income achieved if protection was 
abandoned for tariff concessions from the rest of the world (see 
Johnson 1960: 229) 
This second gain could be quite substantial for a small country. The effects 
of adoption of free trade are examined in a2 good general equilibrium 
model. For Johnson (1960: 331): 
....... the cost of protection is the sum of the consumption cost and 
the production cost less the terms of trade gain, and, may be 
negative". 
He then translates model into a partial equilibrium analysis on neo- 
Marshillian lines. Thus the total cost of protection for a two good partial 
equilibrium model is 
dP dC 
1/2 T (dP+dQ = 1/2T 
jjp-, T- Tp-7 TI 
1. d 1/21a ap, 
I (P-C) 
= 1/212 ijV 
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Where T is the proportion of tariff protection in the final 
domestic price P', C and P are the quantities initially consumed and 
produced domestically, V= P'(C-P) is the initial domestic market value of 
inputs, and q is the compensated arc-elasticity of demand for imports. 9 He 
has extended the above analysis from the one export, one import good and 
a single tariff rate to a multiplicity of goods. (see Johnson 1960: 332-340) 
Pomfret (1986) commenting on discriminatory trade policies 
states that these policies have perhaps been accepted because empirical 
evidence have indicated that they were moving toward freer trade than 
welfare reducing trade patterns. He contends that this idea is misplaced 
and Preferential Trade Areas are from a global perspective'harmful to the 
efficient allocation of world resources. He vehemently criticises the work 
of Baldwin and Murray (1977) and other empirical studies for indicating a 
lack of concern about the discriminatory trend. 10 
Johnson (1965) in a paper on protectionism states that the 
electorate through government action is willing to spend real resources 
for industrial production and employment. Therefore: 
"In a detailed analysis of a particular nation's tariff policy, the 
nature of the preference for industrial production would be an 
important question ....... (Johnson 1965: 258-9) 
Lawrence and Litan (1987) criticise the advocates of protection 
for resting their argument on two premises, - the competition faced by 
high wage countries from low wage NIC's, and the concept of a world 
dominated by nationalistic economic policies. They state that low wages 
are not a cause for concern as higher wages mean the advantage of 
superior production techniques. For: 
"when an industry producing a standardised product loses its 
comparative advantage, far more than the latest technology will be 
required to regain competitiveness. In fact, the passage of time may 
accentuate the cost differential between domestic and foreign firms. 
With the rapid international diffusion of technology, foreign 
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competitors can also modernise. In such cases the availability of 
protection as an option may divert the industry's attention away 
from eliminating unprofitable operations and towards efforts to 
maintain protective barriers. " (Lawrence and Litan 1987.303). 
Subsidies and tariffs help in the medium run, but will not affect the size 
of the trade balance. Their argument against protection and import quotas 
is well illustrated from the example that: 
"Just as squeezing a balloon will redistribute but not reduce the total 
amount of air in the balloon, so in the absence of exchange in total 
national spending, imposing quotas will change only the 
composition of trade, not the overall current account balance. " 
(Lawrence and Litan 1987: 296). 
Though protection may add to jobs within an industry, it will also raise 
prices of the goods or services produced in that industry. Increased prices 
may lead to fewer jobs for those distributing protected goods and for 
workers using those goods to manufacture other products. So quotas are: 
"... an expensive means of saving jobs because they raise prices paid 
by consumers on both the imported goods subject to quotas and the 
domestically produced goods with which they compete. " (Lawrence 
and Litan 1987: 299). 
Thus, if for example, quotas are fixed restraining Japanese imports, this 
will lead to more expensive Japanese exports being exported than cheaper 
ones. 
Baldwin (1984: 574) distinguishes seven distinct models or 
hypotheses of political behaviour that results in protection for an industry. 
Each of the models have a distinct element or elements that enable them 
to secure protection. They are: 
0 The common interest or pressure group model, which has as its key 
strength the ability of its industry to organise as a political pressure 
group. 
The adding - machine model which is the voting strength of an 
industry. 
The adjustment assistance model which needs subsidies to enable 
workers to adjust to greater import competition. 
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The equity concern model which ensures that low income workers 
are not hurt by economic change. 
The comparative costs model which takes into account the 
international competitive strength of an economy. 
The international bargaining model. which deals with the 
bargaining ability and political importance of countries from which 
competing imports are supplied. 
The status-quo model or historical influences model which 
maintains the status quo either because of avoiding large 
adjustment costs, or due to a conservative respect for the status quo 
as it exists. (for a detailed view of each model see Baldwin 1984: 
574-578) 
Protectionism is observed to generate mixed feelings. While 
it has been accepted as detrimental in the long run, its importance in the 
short run has been accepted. Yet, it is difficult to estimate with certainty 
the duration it should be employed. What cannot be ignored is that the 
existence of protectionism is a reality in modern integration and its 
inclusion in theory is important. 
(c) Free Trade Areas, Customs Unions, and Developing Countries: 
Cooper and Massell (1965) are under the impression that the 
theory of Customs Unions has not taken into account the Developing 
Countries. They believe it should focus on economies of scale, changes in 
terms of trade, balance of payments problems, externalities, capital 
imports, and underemployment, which has received isolated treatment in 
the literature, but has not been treated as a single entity. Further, it is their 
opinion that existing Custom Union theory is a disguised argument for 
Free Trade. In their paper, they suggest that if planners in less Developed 
Countries are willing to accept a fall in the growth of national industry for 
some sort of industrialisation Le, if planners are indifferent to the 
distribution of industrial production between countries, they will choose 
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an 'efficient tariff. " But on the other hand, if planners are solely 
interested in gains to that country (as is more realistically the case), a CET 
to protect the level of that country's industrial production comes into 
being. If the planners c hoose a CET that is pareto-optimal, then it is to 
their benefit, but if the efficient tariff is not pareto optimal then the 
scheme will face difficulties. Cooper and Massell also discuss the efficient 
tariff being quasi pareto optimal. In their analysis, tariff is regarded as an 
'instrument for policy', rather than an 'exogenous variable'. In their 
model trade creation and diversion can be either beneficial or detrimental. 
Lizano (1976) is of the opinion that the focus of attention 
among the Developed and Developing Countries on integration is 
different. Developed countries are interested in the static effects, while 
Developing countries in the dynamic effects of integration. For 
Developing countries, integration is a mid path between autarkic policies 
and the 'outward looking paths of development'. 12 Lizano states that 
when dealing with Developing Countries, less emphasis should be given 
to the discussion of trade creation and trade diversion and more to the 
dynamic effects of integration. He also feels that integration can make 
initial disparities worse. The effects of polarisation are also emphasised 
from the statement: 
"economic units, especially industrial enterprises, are not located 
evenly throughout the integration area; on the contrary, there is a 
strong tendency towards concentration and the formation of 
development poles". (Lizano 1976: 279) 
. Mead (1968) in, another analysis of Customs'Unions in 
Developing countries feels that the reasons behind the formation is 
because: 
"On the political side, it is thought of as a means of countering the 
divisive tendencies inherited from the colonial past ....... on the 
economic side the Customs Union proposal is offered as a solution 
to problems of limited markets and deteriorating terms of trade of 
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primary producing countries" (Mead 1968: 713) 
Kaldor (1970: 337) in a paper on regional policies mentions 
the existence in the modem world of regional problems, and especially the 
problem of different regions growing unevenly with certain regions 
growing faster than others. This is certainly a problem faced by integration 
schemes because of the greater mobility of labour and capital between 
countries in the scheme. To explain the reason behind this polarisation, 
Kaldor, cites Mrydal's (1957) principle of 'circular and cumulative 
causation'which is the cumulative advantages accruing to the growth of 
industry - development of skill and know how, communication, infra- 
structure, and specialization. As inter-regional mobility of labour is greater 
than international mobility of labour, integration helps. 
(d) The Political implications of Free Trade Areas and Customs Union. 
Viner (1950) also mentions the political implications of 
forming a Customs Union. In many cases of Custom Union formation, 
the economic desire for integration is secondary to political unity. This is 
especially the case of a small state pitted against large neighbours. For as 
Viner (1950: 102) aptly states: 
where the pull of national sentiment in a counter direction is 
strong, it is remarkable how little avail the most powerful economic 
incentive can have". 
De Beers (1942) mentions a federal union involving both 
economic and political union. He constructed a framework for the 
formation-of a federal union which could be attributed to one of a 
Customs Union. De Beers felt that a Customs Union was a more 
committed scheme than a federation. 
In contrast to many writers before him who felt that 
economic union was essential for political union, Bye (1950) was of the 
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opinion it was political union that was the most 'practicable' way toward 
economic union. Mann (1987) in analysing the trading patterns of the 
United States, poses the questions of: if trade problems have common 
foundations, the possibility of them escalating into broader based conflicts 
involving more products or more countries, and whether historical 
records would shed light on the causes and consequences of such trade 
arguments. She proceeds in her analysis by examining a simple game 
theory payoff matrix in which two countries can choose to negotiate and 
open markets, or retaliate and close markets. For example, the political 
and economic benefits of pursuing an open markets trade policy may 
change due to microeconomic stress. Thus, when one country changes its 
established behaviour by threatening to impose penalties, its trading 
partners must decide whether to believe the threat. The effect of this 
behaviour is to reduce the confidence of the trading partner in the payoffs 
in the old matrix verses the payoffs in the new matrix. This magnitude of 
change in the matrices, and the possibility of the change also reflecting 
new strategy, is important in determining whether the two countries end 
up in a trade war with closed markets or decide to negotiate and open their 
markets to each other (see Mann 1987: 313) 
Another interesting aspect of Shibata's (1967) analysis is the 
political implications of Customs Union formation. He states that even if 
,a country's consumers would gain tremendously from an integration 
scheme, no government can act solely on its consumers interests. It has to 
take its manufacturers interests into account too. The manufacturers could 
be kept happy if- 
....... the direct losses of some manufacturers may have to be 
accompanied by direct gains of other manufactures in each country 
so that the governments of the respective countries can obtain 
enough political support for their participation in the 
union ...... technically, this means that downward movements of 
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prices of some groups of products should be accompanied by 
upward movements of prices of some other groups of products in 
the domestic market of each participating country" (Shibata 1967: 
156) 
Hine (1989) mentions the 'political economy' aspects of 
countries that intend to join a Customs Union. The governments of the 
states joining a Customs Union has to assist potential losers from their 
entry into a union. This could be done by three ways: 
The rules of the Customs Union can be changed to exclude certain 
products from removal of tariffs from internal trade, so that 
adjustment might be avoided. 
Adjustment could be delayed by a transition period, where 
adjustments could gradually be phased in. The length of the period 
will depend on the severity of adjustment needed. Temporary 
safeguards could also be imposed on imports for sensitive products. 
The restrictions could be quantitative which would ensure the 
producers in the importing countries that imports will develop in 
an orderly fashion. 
Aid could be channelled through to those adversely affected by 
Custom Union formation. This aid could be funded either 
nationally or by local unions, and could be used toward 
modernisation, improvement of infrastructure or to attract new 
enterprises. (see I-line 1989: 6-7) 
Finally, prior to an examination of the empirical techniques 
involved in integration, the concluding paragraph of this theory section 
(2.3) must consider the opinion of Pelkmans (1980). Pelkmans feels that 
integration theory has too often traded 'practical relevance for theoretical 
elegance'. He states that there is a dichotomy of economic integration 
theory which is a mixture of pure market integration, consisting among 
its elements Free Trade Areas, Customs Unions and Common Markets, 
and policy integration consisting of Economic Unions and Total Economic 
Integration. The Customs Union, Free Trade Areas, and Common 
Markets seem to be derived from classical laissez-faire economics. Policy 
and market integration should not be separated but are, and this 
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separation results in the dichotomy. This dichotomy has biased available 
theory for many years. The way to overcome this dichotomy is to: 
0 "... redress the balance by concentrating on policy integration 
within the traditional sequence on integrative stages .... and study the 
accompanying forms and substance of policy integration for given 
stages of market integration" (Pelkmans 1980: 341) 
or ii) by total economic integration, i. e., a federal state, or iii) through the 
'public choice' approach which would include protection of industrial 
policy, international cooperation, and the international coordination of 
policies as well as international organisations. 
2.4 Empirical Studies of Integration: 
Prior to embarking upon the empirical methods involved, it 
is first necessary to define the static and dynamic effects of integration. 
Kreinin (1975: 335) defined the 'static' effects of integration as: 
"changes in output and income resulting from reallocation of a 
fixed amount of productive resources". 
For member countries, static effects would lead to trade creation, the 
consumption effect, and improved terms of trade. For non member 
countries, it could lead to trade diversion, and worsening of terms of trade. 
The 'dynamic' effects on the other hand, lead to 
"changes in growth rate resulting from expansion in the size of the 
market and the attendant addition of productive resources" 
(Kreinin 1975: 335). 
For members, the dynamic effects could lead to scale economies and 
competitive effect, investment creation, and other policies intended to 
protect growth. For non members, it could lead to spillover effects, 
investments diversion, etc. 
The 'dynamic' effects include economics'of scale and external 




....... the body of theory developed for economic integration in the 
advanced world is more appropriate for developing countries" 
He states that while there is no theoretical difference between economic 
integration in the advanced world and the developing one, there is 
difference in the type of integration politically feasible, especially in issues 
like the equitable distribution of gains from industrialisation and the 
location of industries. 
Pelkmans (1980) in commenting on the dynamic effects of 
integration states that they have been 'ill analysed' and have resulted in 
'the enforced increase in efficiency of sheltered or other wide protected 
firms'. This trend is called the 'cold shower thesis', a sophisticated version 
of which was developed by Leibenstein, (1966; 1969) and Comanor and 
Leibenstein (1969) who called it the 'x-inefficiency. X-inefficiency was a 
situation in which production was to be carried out not on, but within, the 
production possibility surface. Pelkmans states that: 
"a necessary condition for economic integration is the publicly 
avowed preparedness, in principle to transfer some elements of 
jurisdiction to a common centre, in contrast to the mere limitation 
of domestic policy instruments or the ad hoc acceptance of 'thou 
shalt' agreements in ordinary economic co-operation" (Pelkmans 
1980: 350) 
Zaki (1978) mentions the 'primary and secondary export 
effects'. The primary export effect is a result of the expansion of the home 
country's exports due to the reduction in the import barriers of member 
countries. The secondary export effect results from the increased income 
in the other members earnings, arising from output or price changes or 
from earnings from increased imports by home country. He attempted to 
estimate the 'maximum potential import leakage effect', Le, a decrease in 
the multiplier for output, income and employment for a country by 
joining a trading bloc. An input-output model was used. 
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Having defined the 'static' and 'dynamic' effects of 
integration, it is essential to note that many empirical estimates of the 
effects on trade creation and trade diversion in an integration scheme are 
based on ex ante and ex poste studies. In measuring the effects of 
integration on trade flows, the rise of intra (extra) area trade as a 
proportion of the total intra (extra) area imports and exports can be used 
for trade creation. (see Balassa 1967: 2) 
Mayes (1978) provides a critical analysis of the models which 
have been used to estimate the effects of economic integration on trade 
and suggests more fruitful lines of further development. He states that 
most assessments of integration: 
flestimate, ex-poste the effects of integration to be the residual 
between what actually occurred and the trade predicted on the basis 
of the continuation of previous economic relations" (Mayes 1978: 2). 
Mayes states that models incorporate four types of variables: 
Economic variables explaining behaviour in the importing 
country, (economic activity, population, prices, pressure of demand, 
etc) 
Economic variables explaining behaviour in the exporting country 
(economic activity, population, prices, pressure on supply, etc) 
Variables explaining specific characteristics of trade between two 
countries (geographical separation, trading preferences, etc) 
Variables explaining relevant behaviour in third countries 
(imports, exports, prices, economic activity, etc) 
The types of models used, are the following: 
(1)'Residual Models: 
which form the bulk of the estimated models. "residual models have the 
common characteristic that they seek to quantify the hypothetical situation 
(often referred to as the anti monde) of what would have happened had 
the trading agreement not been implemented" (Mayes 1978: 4). Ex ante 
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and ex poste approaches consist of a majority of residual models, they 
have been analysed under: 
a) Import models: which have explanatory variables drawn from the 
importing country alone. 0 demand for imports: the demand for 
imports which would have increased over time without the trading 
agreement at exactly the same rate as they did before the agreement 
came into effect. ii) shares in apparent consumption: which 
considers the relative shares of the various suppliers in total 
consumption, rather than absolute value of imports iii) changes in 
income elasticity of demand for imports. 
b) Supply variables: Mayes states that trade between any pair of 
countries is a function of variables within both of them. So we 
should look at supply conditions too. The gravity models perform 
well in this atmosphere and incorporates variables from importing 
or exporting countries. "The gravitational model suggests that the 
trade flow between any pair of countries is a multiplicative function 
of their respective national incomes, populations and the distance 
between them. " (Mayes 1978: 11). Verdoorn and Schwartz (1972) 
models provide a link between residual and analytical models. 
C) information from third countries. 
d) estimation of the anti-monde. 
In residual imputation the validity of the assumption can be increased by 
disaggregating markets by products and by commodities. 
(2) Analytic Models 
attempt to prove explanations of the actual post integration situation. 
Analytical approaches are essential for ex ante approaches, as the actual 
values of future trade flows are unknown. 
(3) Dynamic Effects 
are part of an approach that does not concentrate on total price effect of 
price but also includes income, rate of economic growth or the need for 
expenditure switching policies to accommodate movements in the balance 
of payments, etc.. 
Verdoorn and Van Bochove (1972) conduct a survey on the 
ex poste studies done on the impact of trade integration on the flows of 
trade. They give three approaches: 
CFIAI-YrER 2 51 
Survey approach yes no 
Residual imputation no yes 
Analytical models yes yes 
It is their opinion that the survey approach relies heavily on judgement 
forecasts by firms and other report information, while the two other 
approaches on statistical analysis: 
"Residual imputation estimates the total effect of integration for a 
given post-union year, t, as the difference between the actual level 
of the variable studied say tz, and its expected 'normal' level, i. e., 
without trade integration, tz*11. (Verdoorn and Van Bochove 1972: 
337) 
zz So the integration effect is the difference between t and t 
Further, the empirical method to be used should depend on whether you 
want to measure: 
The Primary effect of tariff changes on trade flows, while unit 
production costs still remain unaffected. 
The Secondary effect which analyses exchange rate corrections 
required so as to maintain the status-quo ante on the current 
account. 
Tertiary effects, which notes changes in the pattern of production 
due to the primary effects, or due to the primary and secondary 
effects, the unit costs still unaffected. 
Finally the resulting changes in unit costs due to economies of 
scale, the manufacturing progress curve, and other factors (see 
Verdoorn and Van Bochove 1972: 338) 
While the authors state that the analytical ex-ante forecasts 
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can estimate the primary and secondary effects, (consequently or 
simultaneously) the tertiary effects follow, and is in turn followed by the 
final changes. As a result: 
...... four effects appear as so many separate, although interrelated 
consequences of trade integration" (Verdoorn and Van Bochove 
1972: 338). 
An ex poste analysis based on residual imputation lumps the four effects 
together. 
Williamson and Bottrill's (1971) model consists of 3 
countries, and a world trade matrix in year t in comparison to the anti-' 
monde. 13 In addition to the traditional concepts of trade creation and 
trade diversion they define the effect of 'external trade creation', which is 
the replacement of domestic production by imports from a non-partner 
country as a result of the change in the external tariff, 'supply side 
diversion', which is the replacement of exports to non partners by exports 
to partners, (here it is assumed diversion takes place, due to the exports 
being sold at a cheaper price in comparison to the price charged to the rest 
of the world) and finally, the effects of balance of payments reactions 
induced by payments imbalances from the above concepts. In commenting' 
on ex ante and ex poste analysis, 14 Williamson and Bottrill (1971: 326) feel 
that ex ante methods are: 
...... of rather limited interest, however, because it does not provide 
a method of enabling one to improve previous estimates on the 
basis of new historical experience". 
They are of the opinion that ex poste are superior though the major 
problem is the construction of the anti-monde. The methods they list as a 
means towards this approach are; ' 
1. Shares analysis: which consists of the examination of market shares 
over a period of time. Under share analysis, they give Verdoorn and 
Meyer zu Schlochtern's (1964) formula for the measure of the 'apparent 
effect of integration. "S. 
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2. Import propensity: which would calculate a value of hypothetical 
imports in the anti-monde, by assuming that each members hypothetical 
import propensity from its partners in year Xt, could have been inferred 
from the actual behaviour of its import propensity over the preceding 
years. (Xt-l' )ý-2r ..... Xt-n 
) 16 
3. Share in total apparent consumption: the authors cite a detailed analysis 
of Truman (1969) who assumed that in the absence of integration the 
shares in total apparent consumption of domestic production, imports 
from other members, and imports from the rest of the world would have 
been constant. The changes that would result due to integration are then 
examined. 
4. Constant import elasticities: the authors state that Balassa (1967) could 
supplement Truman's approach by calculating ex-poste income elasticities 
over a period of time for intra-member and extra-member trade. While it 
is assumed that these elasticities remained unchanged without 
integration, integration then would lead to developments which could be 
analyzed. 
5. Extrapolation: by which the rate of change of share of imports in total 
apparent consumption that was observed prior to the start of integration is 
extrapolated in order to construct the anti-monde 17 
6. Import functions: by which a hypothetical position to estimate a set of 
import functions is constructed, which could then be used to generate 
production of the X Matrix. 
7. Import and export elasticities: which is calculated on the basis of the 
work done by Waelbroeck (1964) who developed the work of the Finnish 
economists Poyhonen and Pulliainen to explain a world trade matrix. The 
assumption is in the anti-monde exports from i to j would have increased 
in proportion to Y, where Y is GNP with constant tariffs. 
a 
Balassa (1967) states that to measure trade creation and trade 
diversion in a customs union, one should: 
1. Abstract from the effects of economic growth on trade flows. 
2. Ensure the comparability of the estimates of trade creation and trade 
diversion 
3. Provide for a disaggregation of the results according to the main 
commodity categories. 
Indicate the effects on individual supply areas. 
CHAPTER 2 54 
The first two points could be overcome by a comparison of ex 
poste income elasticity of import demand in intra-area and extra-area trade 
for periods preceding and following integration. For as Balassa (1967: 5) 
states: 
it under the assumption that income elasticities of import demand 
would have remained unchanged in the absence of integration, a 
rise in the income elasticity of demand for intra-area imports would 
indicate gross trade creation, while an increase in the income 
elasticity of demand for imports from all sources of supply would 
give expression to trade creation proper". 
Balassa (1975) further propounds the idea of ex post income elasticities of 
import demand in intra-area and extra-area trade for periods preceding 
and following integration. 
"Ex post income elasticities of import demand were defined as the 
ratio of the average annual rate of change of imports to that of GNP, 
both expressed in constant prices". (Balassa 1975: 80) 
Trade diversion (a shift from foreign to partner country 
sources) would be indicated by a decline in the income elasticity of 
demand for extra area ý producers. The advantages of this method is its 
ability of deal with disaggregated data. 
"To gauge the probable magnitude of trade creation and trade 
diversion one would further need information on substitution 
elasticities between domestic and partner country goods and 
between partner country and foreign goods". (Balassa 1975: 105) 
The static gains and losses from integration are obtained under the 
assumption of unchanged production and investment. It is customary to 
analyse these gains by the use of 'welfare triangles' referring to production 
and consumption effects (see Johnson 1960). Balassa also mentions trade 
creation resulting in intra-industry. specialisation in manufacturing which 
brings benefit through the exploration of economies of scale. This is in 
contrast to what was commonly assumed; that trade creation caused inter 
industry specialisation. 
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Sellekaerts (1973) is of the opinion that the static effects of 
Customs Union are divided into trade creation, trade diversion, and 
changes in the terms of trade. The theory of integration states that a 
Customs Union will increase overall world welfare if trade creation 
outweighs trade diversion. In examining ex-ante models which forecasted 
imports of a group in the post- integration period, but on the assumption 
the group would not have been established (in contrast to forecasting 
imports of the group in the post-integration period, but on the assumption 
that the group had been formed), Sellekaerts criticises the approaches (in 
this case those used in the analyses of the EEC) for having made: 
a crucial but perhaps unrealistic assumption ..... that in the Zsence 
of economic integration, the relative price elasticities, 
income elasticities, elasticities of substitution or any parameter of 
the demand for imports in the post integration period will have 
remained the same as in the pre-integration period" (Sellekaerts 
1973: 521). 
The empirical studies reviewed by him mainly focus on changes in trade 
flows. In analysing the effects of integration on extra area suppliers, 
Sellekaerts uses Balassa's method of 'average yearly income elasticity' and 
chooses two different integration periods. This method also attempts to 
estimate the amount of external trade creation and trade diversion. While 
the basic model for the demand by extra area imports in the pre and post 
integration period is: 
Mi ` (Xl + (X2 GNPi + ui 
where Mi = imports in constant prices and exchange rates of the year to be 
estimated, say t, GNP= Gross national product in constant prices and 
exchange rate of t-1, i= integration 1 or integration period 2. 
The effect of the formation of the groups demand for extra area imports is 
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measured by a dummy variable: 
Mk ý 01 + 02X + P3GNPk + P4XGNPk + Mk 
where X=a dummy variable, and 
X=o if k= integration period 1 Pre-integration 
integration period 2 period 
X=1 if k integration period 1 Post-integration 
integration period 2 period (Sellekaerts 1973: 544-545) 
Choi and Eden (1984) examine the traditional Customs 
Unions theory under the assumption of 'variable returns to scale. ' The 
model consists of a three country two commodity case (3x2) with factors of 
production of capital and labour. A, B, &C are the three countries, where 
A is the home country, and B and C its potential partners. They 
differentiate between two types of trade creation and two types of trade 
diversion for the home country A; 
Trade creation I (TCI) where a country switches its 
consumption of the importable good from the highest cost domestic 
producers to the lowest cost producers in country C; Trade Diversion I 
(TDI) - when A switches its consumption of importables from lowest cost 
producers in C to medium cost producers in B by removing tariffs on B 
only; Trade Creation II (TCII) - where A switches consumption of the 
importable from medium cost producers in B to least cost producers in C; 
and Trade Diversion H (TDII) - where A switches consumption of the 
importable good from C to B producers by levying tariffs against C only. In 
conclusion, they state that under variable returns of scale TO and TCII 
may be welfare decreasing while TDI and TDII may improve welfare. In 
short there are three crucial factors in determining the welfare change 
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associated with trade creation and trade diversion. They are, i) types of 
trade creation and trade diversion, ii) the price output responses, and iii) 
the ranking between the elasticities of the returns scale. An indicator of 
elasticities shows that: 
TO occurs if el>e2 welfare improving as welfare change determined 
solely by reduction in tariff rates 
el<e2 welfare effect is indeterminate and TO need not 
improve welfare 
TDI occurs if el>e2 reduction of tariff raises welfare while deterioration 
in terms of trade reduces welfare. welfare effect is 
ambiguous 
el<e2 reduction in tariff need not increase welfare and 
worse terms of trade not necessarily welfare 
decreasing, So TDI not positive or negative for 
welfare 
f 
TCH occurs if el>e2 welfare depends on terms of trade improvement 
el<e2 the terms of trade undeterminable and welfare 
positive 
TDIII occurs if ei>e2 
, 
worsening of Trade worsens welfare 
1. el<e2 Terms of trade ambiguous and may or may not 
improve Welfare (Choi and Eden 1984: 201-202) 
Haaland et al (1987) proposes a model called VEMOD which 
is a six region, general equilibrium model of the world economy 
developed to explain and predict the pattern of comparative advantage 
across main world regions. VEMOD is a CGE (computable general 
equilibrium model) of world production of trade and unlike, the existing 
I 
models, which rely on the Armington assumption that goods of different 
origin are qualitatively different, VEMOD, considers this a short term 
approach and instead attempts to explain structural change. It classifies 
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goods according to input characteristics rather than using standard 
industrial classifications. It concentrates on net trade, and makes no 
attempt to describe gross trade flows or bilateral trade. Vemod is a long 
term model attempting to define structural change 
Haaland et al divided the theory of international trade into 
two parts: 
0 the theory of comparative advantage and its ramifications 
the more recent theory of trade in particular products or industries 
with a particular market structure. 
Part one is a general equilibrium phenomenon, while part 
two is primarily a partial equilibrium model. They suggests that: 
"the interpretation of trade theory suggests that it is premature to 
attempt comprehensive modelling of international trade in a 
general equilibrium framework. Instead, general equilibrium 
modelling should be restricted to a level of aggregation which is 
consistent with an interpretation of comparative advantage in 
terms of broadly defined activities. Detailed analysis of markets for 
particular products is best done in partial equilibrium models 
applying all available sectors specific information for the industry in 
question" (Haaland 1987: 254). 
This is what VEMOD does. It is a theoretical rather than an empirically 
based model of world trade, and attempts to examine issues like 
'determination of income levels', 'factor prices', and the broad 'pattern of 
production and trade' (see Haaland et al 1987.254-269). 
Cordoni et al (1971) in an empirical study on world trade 
flows and integration, use an expanded model of a two country, two sector 
linear expansion model. Their study attempts to identify the 
interrelationships between the level of output, the rate of growth, and the 
exports. 18 
Verdoorn and Schwartz (1972) estimate the effects of 
integrational groupings 19 on the patterns of trade through the use of two 
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approaches. One, an extension of the 'weighted-share approach' followed 
at a previous occasion by Verdoorn and Meyer zu Schlochtern (1964), and 
two, an analytical approach combining by regression analysis the 
gravitational model used by Waelbroek (1964). The Weighted Share 
analysis takes into account the law of diminishing elasticities, for as the 
elasticities diminish, market shares increase. 20 Their analytical approach 
uses the gravitational model. 21 In addition, they also examined the 
approaches used by various economists towards elasticity in import 
demand. 
Resnick and Truman (1975) present an econometric model of 
bilateral trade flows for 10 western European nations, with the idea of 
developing a trade model that yields a reasonable set of direct and indirect 
price effects while endeavouring to avoid the problem of multicollinearity 
of price. Adal2ting heir model for a general integrational grouping, it can 
be stated as below that the system for a 'particular importing country' is 
schematically described 22 
TOTAL IMPORT STAGE I 
IMPORTS FROM THE REGION STAGE HA IMPORTS FROM THE REST OF 
WORLD 
II 
IMPORTS FROM THE STAGE 1111 IMPORTS FROM NON GROUP 
INTEGRATIONAL GROUP MEMBERS IN THE REGION OR IN 
THE REGION FROM SECOND INTEGRATIONAL 
GROUP IN REGION 
IMPORTS FROM COUNTRIES STAGE III IMPORTS FROM COUNTRIES IN 
WITHIN INTEGRAT10NAL INTEGRATIONAL GROUP 11( AS 
GROUP NON MEMBERS IN GROUP 2 DID 
NOT EXIST, WOULD ALREADY 
BE REPRESENTED IN STAGE IIB 
This model postulates a two good world, with home and imported non 
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food goods. They state that the model has a family resemblance to 
Armington's (1969a; 1969b; 1970) approach. The equations in the model 
are estimated by OLS. The authors also examine the framework in the 
form of partial price elasticity of demand for imports. 23 Their model is 
able to indicate trade creation and trade diversion. Trade creation is shown 
as the total increase in imports replacing domestic production, and trade 
diversion is shown as reduction if any in imports from the rest of the 
world, or other regional groups. 
On reviewing literature on the welfare effects of integration, 
Waelbroeck (1976) states that there is an enormous amount of literature 
based on the classical trade model that assumes given techniques, non- 
increasing returns in production, convex social welfare functions for 
countries, and perfect competition. The more realistic theory of 
international trade under assumptions of imperfect markets, increasing 
returns, hazards of invention, etc, are given (according to Waelbroeck) by 
Vernon's (1966) - product-cycle hypothesis, Linder's (1961) - monography, 
and Negishi (see Waelbroeck). Waelbroeck has called this the VLN model. 
Pelzman (1977) developed an 'ex poste cross sectorial trade 
flow model'. Cross sectional and time series data is pooled for both 
aggregate to disaggregate trade flows. In disaggregate commodities he tests 
his hypothesis with Quandt's (1958) maximum likelihood technique and 
likelihood ratio test, rather than the use of dummy variables to determine 
the first year in which effects occurred. Pelzman has used a modified 
gravity trade flow model. 24 
Brada and Mendez (1983) study regional economic 
integration where they examine through a gravity model the effect of five 
regional schemes on the volume of intra member trade. The model 
encompasses observations on bilateral trade flows among 46 Developed 
and Developing countries from the time period 1954 to 1977. Their 
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"the ability of integration schemes to increase intra-member trade is 
shown to vary directly with the per capita incomes of the 
integrating countries and inversely with the distance between 
them. " (Brada and Mendez 1983: 602) 
Further, integration of either very large or distant Developing countries is 
unlikely to be effective in promoting intra-member trade. Their gravity 
equation is structured as follows: 
a2 a3 a4 aS 
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where Xjj is the value of exports from country i to country j, A is the 
constant, Yj Yj are income in the exporting and importing country 
respectively, N, Nj is the population in the exporting and importing 
country respectively, Dij the distance between countries i and j, and Pij a 
dummy variable equal to 2 if countries i and j both belong to the kth 
preference area, 1 otherwise, eij lognormal error term. In addition to this 
normal equation the authors add the term: 
ID. - JL IF 
Y'y 
yjy 
N, y Njy 
which measures the effect of per capita income and implicitly the division 
of output between tradables and non tradables on integration. The reasons 
for this addition is that they examine two extra hypothesis to explain the 
'differences in the trade augmenting effects of preferential trading 
schemes'. 0 integration fails as the intra member trade have a structural 
bias against trade and limit the effect of integration (due to predominance 
of agriculture and services which is in contrast to developed countries). ii) 
the second hypothesis is distance between countries. Taking these 2 criteria 
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into consideration, the term will now be 
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where Pijy measures the effect of distance on the trade augmenting power 
of a Customs Union. As a result: 
"The greater the distance between the integrating countries, the 
smaller, ceterus paribus, is the augmentation of their trade" (Brada 
and Mendez 1983: 597) 
In yet another analysis, Brada and Mendez (1985) in yet 
another paper examine, 'six integration schemes and decompose their 
ability to increase inter-member trade into environmental policy and 
system effects. ' Though the traditional gravity equation is used here again, 
this analysis has been included to indicate the numerous applications of 
the gravity equation. Brada and Mendez quote Bergstrand for the 
equations theoretical foundation. When using this approach, two paths 
could be taken: 
a) To employ a set of dummy variables to measure the effects of 
integration on intermember trade. 
b) To use the Pelzman (1977) approach which chooses a pre-integration 
period and estimates the model. The influence of environmental factors 
(physical and economic characteristics of integrating economies), the 
effectiveness of integration on the economic system, and the element of 
policy on integration is noted. The gravity equation here is modified to 
take into account environmental effects and the effectiveness of 
integration. According to empirical results, it was found that 
environmental factors caused the greatest variation in ability to promote 
trade with inter-member distance the most important environmental 
factor. 
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The following model of a gravity equation is essentially the same as the 
previous one, but it is a simpler version. 
log Xij =A+ allog Yj + (X2 109 Yj+ a3 log Ni+ a4 log NI+ a5log + Dij+ eij 
where Xjj is the value of exports from country i to j, A is a constant, YjYj is 
income in the exporting and importing countries, Ni Nj is the population 
in the exporting and importing countries, Dij is the distance between 
countries i and j, and Ejj is the lognormal error term. 
The distance variable represents resistance to trade. 
"This resistance has an economic element, consisting of 
transformation and information costs, a structural element 
reflecting differences in consumption patterns and resource 
endowments as, for example, between temperate and tropical 
countries, and a policy element including the effects of economic 
integration" (Brada and Mendez 1985: 550) 
The equation re-written to measure environmental influences on trade 
flows (the environmental variables are distance among integrating 
countries and their level of development) is: 
log X. A+a, log Y, + a2 log YJ + 'X3 log Ni +a log N +a iog D,, ii 415 







IN? +'Y2 pij log Dij + log eij 
where Q ii is 2 and PI, 
is 1 if countries i and j belong to the same preference 
area and 1 and 0 if different or no preference area. yj measures the effect of 
per capita income on the effectiveness of integration. A -positive coefficient 
indicates that integration increases intermember trade and the level of 
development of integrating countries, 
I 
the higher the proportion of 
tradables their output. Y2 measures effect of distance on trade 
augmentation power of a Customs Union. The ratio of post to pre 
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Y* and N* are average income and population of the integrating 
countries, and D, the average distance among them. 
"This number represents the amount of inter member trade 
creation expected in a cu among countries of a given level of per 
capita income and inter member distance assuming that the policies 
adapted to promote integration were of the same effectiveness as 
that of the average of those. adopted by the five integration 
schemes". (Brada and Mendez 1985: 553) 
Bikker (1987) states that the traditional gravity model 
has often been applied to international trade flows, especially to analyse 
trade creation and trade diversion. However, there are two fundamental 
objections to the model; it cannot describe substitutions between flows, 
and it lacks a cogent theoretical foundation. These drawbacks are ironed 
out in the EGM - Extended Gravity Model, which according to the author 
is empirically superior. I 
Bikker states his EGM is derived from a supply and demand system as 
follows 
S 
supply E, = (o CI Pý" i= ....... n 
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where X,, is the demand from country j for products of country i, El 
is the total foreign supply of country 1, 'C, is the potential foreign supply, Pi 
d 
the domestic price of its exports, Ii is the total foreign demand for country 
j, Bi the potential foreign demand, Pi the price level of domestically 
produced tradable goods, q, an index indicating the attractiveness of the 
whole commodity mix offered by all the exporting countries, D ii distance, 
Pij preferential relations with other nations, q, j the extent to which 
producers satisfy consumers of j. The index qj can be regarded as a foreign 
price index where 
Del and Pe2 for k=1 .... n are proxies for transportation costs and lower kj kj 
tariffs rates for Preferential Trade Areas. 
the EGM is 













where X ii is the value of trade between countries i and j, Yk Ný are the 
GNP and size of population, Dij is the distance between countries i and j, 
Pij is the possible special preference relationships, 0i is the index of the 
attractiveness to country j of the goods offered by exporting countries 
weighted by the distance to the importing countries. The co-efficients 1-yl, 
and 1-81 are interpreted as the degree of substitution between flows of 
similar origin and similar destination. 2S 
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Finally, mention must be made of the similarity matrix 
technique originated by Finger and Kreinin (1979), '. and further developed 
by May, Schumacher and Malek (1989). This technique analyses the 
similarity of trade flows in a pre and post integration situation. The extent 
of trade creation and diversion will depend on how similar or dissimilar 
the compared countries are. This technique which has been employed in 
this thesis to examine trade flows in the GCC countries is further 
elaborated upon in the Technical Appendix. 
2.5 Summary: 
This chapter, which consists of the first dimension of the 
thesis, attempts to provide a detailed background to the theory and practice 
of integration. It commences with a historical sketch of integration in 
which it outlines the contributions of Adam Smith, Ricardo, Quesnay, 
McCulloch, and List to the evolution of trade and integration. The theory 
of integration reviews the concepts of integration - Free Trade Areas, 
Custom Unions, Common Markets, and Economic Unions. Greater 
emphasis is given to the concepts of Free Trade Areas and Custom Unions 
due to their applicability to the GCC. Further, as the GCC countries are at 
best categorised under Custom Unions, Custom Union theory is examined 
in greatest depth, and covers trade creation, trade diversion, tariffs, welfare 
effects, allocation effects, economies of scale, terms of trade effects, and 
compensation. The political implications, the influence of protectionism, 
and the relationship between Free Trade Areas and Customs Unions with 
Developing countries conclude the theory analysis. 
The Empirical section of this chapter which constitutes the 
practice of integration, examines the contributions of various applied 
analysts in the field of integration. It defines the static and dynamic effects 
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of integration and the types of models used in the area. This sections 
exposure to the different interpretations and analysis of models 
constructed by numerous analysts is intended to indicate the empirical 
research being conducted in the field. 
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3.1 A Brief Introduction to the Middle East and Arab North Africa: 
The term 'Middle East' was coined by Britain during the First 
World War to refer to those Asian and North African lands that lay west 
of India. It is, a complex region that not only harbours different cultures, 
races, and religions, but is also dominated by the cultural and religious 
heritage of Islam. It is beyond the scope of a single chapter to present an in 
depth historical and political analysis of -the Middle East, as such an 
analysis would necessitate a book of several hundred pages. The intention 
rather, is to provide a concise outline of the development of pivotal 
events in the Middle East, a cognizance of which is necessary to construct 
a solid foundation towards the understanding of subsequent events 
covered in this thesis. 1 
The Middle East experiences climatic conditions which 
renders over ninety percent of the region arid and uncultivatable. 
Generally, the region is poor in natural resources other than petroleum, 
and water is the scarcest and most valuable natural resource. There are 
two major river systems in the area; the Nfle, - fed by sources in Ethiopia 
and Central Africa, and the Shatt el Arab, - fed by the Euphrates, Tigris and 
Karum rivers. Further, there are smaller rivers which create small fertile 
areas like the Kizil Irmak in Turkey, and the Jordan, Litani and Orontes 
which irrigate Syria, Jordan, Lebanon and Israel. The non-arid lands give 
the Middle East the topography of, a fertile crescent that: 
It... stretches along the levantine coast of the Mediterranean up ý to 
the foothills of the Taurus mountains in Turkey and down again 
through the Tigris and Euphrates valleys in Syria and Iraq to the 
Persian Gulf. There is also the great alluvial strip in the Nile valley, 
enclaves of fairly rich agricultural land in Iran and fertile coastal 
regions in Yemen in Southern Arabia and in Eastern Turkey along 
the Mediterranean. Lofty mountain ranges like the Taurus in 
Turkey, the Elburz and Zagros in Iran, and the highlands of Yemen 
cut the region into many isolated units" (Peretz 1983: 4) 
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The principal Middle Eastern crops are olives, citrus fruits and dates. 
The people of the Middle East could be broadly categorised 
into three major linguistic groups. The, largest are the Semitic people, 
whose principal living tongues are Arabic and Hebrew. 2 The Turkish 
speaking peoples who constitute the second largest group, are descended 
from tribes that swept out of Central Asia in the eleventh and twelfth 
centuries. Finally, there are the Persian speaking Iranians who belong to 
the Indo-Europeans. Any other sub-groups are linguistically related to one 
of these major three. Though the people refer to themselves as 'Arabs', 
the word Arab itself is a very loose term encompassing the souls' of the 
diverse populations of the Middle East. The Arab identity includes 
Egyptians, Saudi Arabians, and others, who anthropologically are not a 
homogeneous race. In fact: 
ltso great is the variety in hues of skin colour, head shape, facial 
features, type of hair, and body build throughout the Arab East that 
the term Arab cannot be understood to indicate race" (Peretz 1983: 
12) 
The geographical location of the Middle East as the key to 
trade between Europe and the Oriental East has resulted in it being the 
home of monumental ancient civilisations. These civilisations were 
concentrated in Egypt, Mesopotamia (modern Iraq), Persia, and to some 
extent modern Turkey (Hittites). The rise of Islam in the seventh century 
A. D. led to the emergence of the power of the nomadic Arabs, who driven 
by their devotion to the new religion, converted the entire Middle East to 
the religious creed of the Prophet Mohammed. From the seventh century 
A. D. to the First World War, the Middle East was the home of a number of 
Islamic Empires' whose military, cultural and religious prowess had a 
major effect on Europe, Africa, Asia and the Far East. The last such empire 
- the Ottoman empire, 3 endured for over six hundred years in an area that 
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encompassed most of the Middle East (except Iran), Arab North Africa, and 
parts of todays Eastern Europe in its sphere of influence. 
Arab North Africa is the western portion of the Islamic 
world. Arab invaders in the seventh century A. D. named it jazirat al- 
Maghrib (island of the west), and the term 'Maghrib' has been used at 
times to refer to the region. The Maghrib has been described as: i 
......... a virtually self contained region bounded by the Mediterranean 
sea on the north, the Atlantic ocean on the west, the Sahara on the 
south, and by the three hundred miles of desert running to the 
Mediterranean between Tripotlitania and Cyrenaica on the 
east"(Entelis 1980a: 381). 
The Maghrib includes the countries of Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and 
Libya. 
The Arab North African region has had its fair share of 
ancient empires as well. The indigenous Berber society has been subjected 
to seven major foreign invasions commencing with the Phoenicians, 
Carthaginians, Romans, Vandals, Byzantines, Arabs, and ending with the 
Europeans. However, the strongest impacts on Berber society have come 
from the influences of the Arabs and Europeans. The Arabs transformed 
the region into an integral part of the Arab-Islamic world. 
"In terms of culture, language and religion, the 
* 
Arabs profoundly 
and permanently affected North African Society" (Entelis 1980a: 386) 
The Europeans who arrived in the Maghrib around the late eighteenth 
century, also had a major cultural influence on the region. It is estimated 
that over ninety percent of the population of the Maghrib was colonised by 
France. French rule lasted 132 years in Algeria (1830-1962), 75 years in 
Tunisia (1881-1956) and 44 years in Morocco (1912-1956). In the brief period 
between the First and Second World War, northern Morocco was 
administered as a Spanish protectorate, and Libya'was under Italian rule. 
However, with independence, significant numbers of Europeans, Jews, 
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and non-indigenous non-Muslims departed, leaving the area relatively 
homogeneous. 
3.2 The Islamic Antecedents of the Middle Eastern States: 
An understanding of Islam is vital to any Middle Eastern 
analysis. This section of the chapter sketches the birth and growth of 
Islam, and examines the segregation of the 'umma' (community) into the 
Sunni and Shi'a sects. An analysis of Islam is a subject in itself. This 
review cannot be considered as an in-depth examination into the subject, 
but rather as yet another link in understanding the events that guide the 
economic and social efforts of the Middle Eastern countries toward 
integration. 4 
Islam's conception was the result of the visitation by the 
Angel Gabriel to a member of the Meccan clan of Hashim, Mohammed, 
while he was in solitary retreat in a cave on Mount Hira, a hill just outside 
Mecca. Consequently, Mohammed began to preach the doctrine of one 
God, with him as the last in a long line of Prophets to the Meccans, who 
not only scorned him, but also drove him out of Mecca in 622 A. D. 
(Hijira). Mohammed took refuge in Medina, a neighbouring city which 
accepted his religious ideas. The period 622-628 consisted of minor 
skirmishes between Mecca and Medina, in which Mohammed's Muslims 
emerged with the upper hand. In 630 A. D. he marched upon Mecca with 
10,000 men and received the submission and conversion of the city to his 
religion. By the time of his death in 632 A. D. Islam had been consolidated 
in the Hejaz, and was spreading rapidly over the whole of Arabia. 
In the aftermath of the Prophet Mohammed's death, his best 
friend and trusted lieutenant Abu Bakr was elected by the Umma 
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(community) as the Kalifa or Caliph, a term which at the time meant 
'successor to the prophet'. In 634 A. D. Abu Bakr issued summons to all the 
tribes of Arabia to take part in a holy war iihad to propagate the ideals of 
Islam. The advent of this 'holy war' was to result in the territorial 
destruction of two great empires of the day - the Byzantine or Eastern 
Roman empire and the Sassanid empire of the Persians. The military 
forces of Islam in the century after the Prophets death overcame Arabia, 
Syria, Iraq, Persia, Egypt, parts of Afghanistan, North Africa, and most of 
Spain. Abu Bakr was succeeded by Omar who was elected Caliph in 634 
A. D. Omar's death in 644 A. D. brought into the open the controversy 
surrounding the succession to the Prophet between the supporters of Ali 
and the rest of the Umma. 
This controversy which had been simmering since the 
Prophet's death, was the result of Ali's undisputed family and blood links 
to the Prophet by being not only a paternal cousin, but also his son-in-law. 
In a controversial election, the Umma elected Othman of the powerful 
Ununayid clan in preference to Ali. Othman's reign from 644-655 A. D. 
gave vent to accusations that he favoured the placing of his powerful 
family in important positions in the empire and culminated in his 
assassination. The election of Ali in 655 A. D. was contested by Othman's 
cousin Mu'awiya who accused Ali of conspiracy in Othmans murder. The 
assassination of Ali in 661 A. D. resulted in, the unopposed election of 
Mu'awiya as Caliph, and the creation of the Ummayid dynasty. According 
to Arab tradition, leadership was not hereditary but based upon the 
election of a senior as well as capable person. However, Mu'awiya was 
able to persuade the reluctant leaders of the umma that election of his 
successor would lead to civil war, and ensured hereditary succession by 
installing his son Yazid, as Caliph. Thus, the Ummayids ruled as the first 
Islamic dynasty in the Empire from 661-750 A. D. 
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The fall of the Urnmayids was the result of the growing 
power of the Mawali - non Arab Muslims, the largest contingent of whom 
were the Persians. Their support for a new enemy of the ruling dynasty, 
the descendants of the Prophet's uncle, Abbas, led ý to the overthrow of the 
Ummayids and the creation of the Abbasid dynasty. The Abbasids lasted 
from 750 to 1258, when the Caliph was killed by Ghengis Khan's grandson, 
Hulagu, when he ransacked Baghdad. Even then, a Shadow Caliph existed 
under the Fatimid dynasty in Egypt, until the Ottoman Sultan Selim I 
(1512-1520) conquered Egypt and assumed the title of Caliph, which was to 
remain with the Ottomans until 1924. 
The period under the first four Caliphs of Islam is considered 
the golden age of Islam, when the interests of the Caliph and the Umma 
were at one. With the demise of Ali, the capital of Islam moved from 
Arabia to Damascus, Baghdad, and other important cities of the age. The 
Arabian heartland which created Islam, faded into the mists of time as a 
region of pilgrimage and sanctity rather than the focus of power. The 
Ummayids were accused of turning the office of the Caliph into a mulk 
which in this context is 'kingship'. The evolution of the interpretation of 
the office of caliph, under the Ummayids and Abbasids gradually 
underwent change from being the 'successor to the Prophet' to a 'vice- 
regent for god'. The religious importance of Caliphal powers is noted after 
900 A. D. when the Abbasid caliphs ceased to be defacto rulers and 
effectively became dejure heads of Sunni Islam. Power rested in the hands 
of different dynasties whose 'Sultans' claimed to derive power from the 
Caliph. Even in the early years of Ottoman expansion, Bayezid 1 (1389- 
1402) sought to obtain recognition from the Caliph in Cairo as the 'Sultan 
of Rum', i. e., Sultan of the (East) Romans. 
While in the course of this history a wide range of religious 
sects were springing up, the ideals of which had a tremendous effect on 
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later and present day fundamentalist groups from the Wahhabis in Saudi 
Arabia to the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the scope of this section only 
allows mention of the Shia. The Shi'a refers to the party of Ali, the 
fourth Caliph, and they believe that Ali should have been the successor of 
the Prophet, as he was his closest male relative. However, Ali's 
descendants were unable in their lifetime to gain effective power. His 
eldest son, through the Prophet's daughter Fatima, Al-Hasan accepted 
Mu'awiya as Caliph, but the second son Al-Husain refused to accept 
Mu'awiya's successor, and in the conflict that ensured was killed by 
Ummayid troops at Kerbala. His death caused consternation throughout 
Islam, for not only was he the Prophets grandson, but he had only a small 
entourage of around 75 people with him when he died. Al-Husain's 
death provided the Shi'a with a martyr. He was followed by nine other 
members of his family, and the Shi'a who consider Ali and his eleven 
descendants as 'Imams' are known as the 'Twelvers'. Further, conflict 
arose with regard to the selection of the seventh Imam. The sixth Imam 
Jafar As-Sadiq disinherited his eldest son Isma'il in favour of his second 
son Musa al-Kazim. However, while the majority of Shi'a accepted this 
decision, a section of them refused to accept this decision, and their sect 
has been called the 'Seveners' or the Isma'ilis. 
Shi'a political thought and ideology was influenced by the 
Persian concept of divine kingship, and their ideology gradually evolved 
into the infallibility of the Imam. The twelfth Imam, Mohammed al- 
Muntazar disappeared in 873 or 874 A. D. at Samarra, and this resulted in 
the concept of him being the 'Mahdi' or 'guided one', who would 
reappear in the last days. It is also certain that Shi'a political and religious 
theory developed after 874 A. D. It was given impetus by the establishment 
of the Fatimid dynasty in Egypt and the Safavids in Persia. The Safavids 
made shi'ism the official religion of Persia. However, Shi'ism in spite of 
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constituting a potent force of Islam is overshadowed by Sunnism (the 
Islamic thought and practice followed by the Ummaydis, Abbasids, and 
other dynasties) which has 90 percent of all Muslims in its cause. 
Figure 3.1 (p. 90) provides a 'diagrammatic representation of the 
Urnmayids, Imams, and the'early, Abbasids. 
3.3 The Decline of the Ottoman Empire: 
The Ottoman Empire was undergoing a period of decline 
from the 17th century onwards, though the atmosphere prevailing in it 
from the 18th century was especially turbulent. In the 16th century, the 
Ottomans were strong enough to threaten Europe, a threat they 
maintained until the earlier half of the 17th century. In the heyday of 
Ottoman conquest, i. e., during the reign of Suleiman the magnificent 
(1520-1566) they attempted to adapt technological changes from Europe to 
their advantage. The use of gunpowder, naval navigation, and other 
technological innovations from Europe was instrumental in their 
conquering Egypt and Syria, and paintaining a grip on their empire. 
However, the technological advances of the Western European powers 
from the 17th century gave them a mastery in arms over the Ottomans, 
whose dynamism was less evident in the 18th and 19th centuries. 
The death of Suleiman ushered in a period of decline. This 
decline, which was evident by the 17th century, proved advantageous to 
the European powers who were interested in extending their influence 
over the vast Ottoman provinces. During the 18th century, territorial 
advances were made in the Ottoman's European provinces by Austria and 
Russia, while Britain and France contented themselves with commercial 
and diplomatic privileges. The first attempt to stem the decline was 
undertaken by Selim 111 (1789-1808), who introduced reforms in the 
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military and educational fields. Although Selim was deposed in 1808 by 
conservative elements of the court who worked in conjunction with the 
corrupt Praetorian guard of the Empire - the Janissaries, he had instituted 
reforms which were consolidated by his brother Mehmet 11 (1808-1829). 
This period of reform in the 19th century is given the Turkish word of 
Tanzimat. Nevertheless, these reforms were unable to either curtail the 
increasing influence of the European powers, or the decline of the 
Ottoman government in the region, as they were too superficial. 
3.3 The contributions of reformers in the age of Tanzimat. - 
In the 1860's the desire to re-structure the Ottoman empire 
became more intense. This section lists the contributions of a few leading 
personages of the era, commencing with Rifaa Badawi Rafi al-Tahtawi 
(1801-1873). Tahtawi entwined Ottoman Islamic liberalism with Egyptian 
nationalism, and can be considered an important element that contributed 
to the growth of reform and nationalism in the 19th century. Tahtawi 
was a religious scholar of Al Azhar university who was sent by 
Mohammed Ali of Egypt to France for a brief spell. In his book Manahij, 
he emphasises the pivotal role of the Ulema in the state. The Ulema 
should not be restricted to established tradition, but must adapt the shari'a 
to new circumstances. Thus, if the Ulema are to interpret the Shari'a in 
the light of modern requirements, they must be aware of the modern 
world. Their best hope in educating themselves thus, is either through 
the study of, or collaboration with, the sciences created by human reason. 
So, the contributions of doctors, engineers, or other Masters of Sciences 
useful to the state must be encouraged. (see Hourani 1962: 67-76) 
The attempts of Khayr al-din Pasha (1810-1889) to reform the 
internal political systems of Tunis as Prime Minister, and the Ottoman 
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Empire as Grand Vizer deserve mention. Other important contributions 
were made by Faris al-Shidyaq (1801-1887), a Maronite, who launched in 
1861, a major Arabic newspaper al-lawa'ib in which Sultan Abdel Hamid II 
defended his policies,, and Butrus al-Bustani (1819-1883), ' another 
Maronite. Bustani was a scholar who tried to revitalise the Arabic 
language with modern thought. He was of the opinion that, as in the 
heyday of Arab civilisation the Europeans had gained knowledge from 
them, now that the Arabs were in-need of innovation, they should have 
no hesitation in learning new ideas from the Europeans; Bustani's 
emphasis was on religious freedom, equality, mutual respect between 
those of different faith, and patriotism. (see Hourani 1962: 99-102). 
The last quarter of the 19th century commenced with the 
advent of a remarkable man, - jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1839-1897). It was 
in this period that Britain and France were 'no longer content with 
economic and diplomatic privileges from the Ottomans, but, were 
interested in tangible benefits, as was seen by France's occupation of Tunis 
in 1881, and Britain's occupation of Egypt in 1882. - Afghani knew that the 
West was technologically superior and that the Muslim world needed 
innovation. He was of the opinion that: 
"The acquisitions of men for themselves and their governments are 
proportional to their science. Thus, every government for its own 
benefit must strive to lay the foundation of the sciences and to 
disseminate knowledge. Just as an individual who has an orchard 
must, for his own profit, work to level the ground and improve its 
trees and plants according to the laws of agronomy, just so rulers, 
for their own benefit must strive for the dissemination of the 
sciences. just as, if the owner of an orchard neglects to tend it 
according to the laws of agronomy, the loss will revert to him, so, if 
a ruler neglects the dissemination of the sciences among his 
subjects, the harm will revert to that government" (Afghani, in 
translation in Keddie 1968: 103) 
Afghani believed that blind imitation of the West was 
harmful and superficial, as behind the technology lay an entire basis of 
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thought and morality. Afghani's emphasis was on Islam as a civilisation, 
and not as a religion. The decline of the Muslim world was due to its 
disunity. If the unity of the Umma (community) were to be restored, the 
decline would be halted. Differences in doctrine or sect should be 
reconciled in the face of a common danger. Afghani's Pan Islamic ideas 
also envisaged a reconciliation between Shi'a and Sunni Islam. When in 
Constantinople, he presented a plan in which the Shah of Persia would 
recognise the Sultan of the Ottomans' as Caliph, the Shah would not only 
be recognised as an independent ruler, but also as the guardian of the 
Shi'a holy places, and a general conference of Islamic leaders would be 
held in Constantinople to decide questions of common concern and 
declare a jihad against western aggression. 
Afghani's Pan Islamism gave greater importance to the 
interests of the Umma, than to those of the ruler or the state. In Islam, 
religious solidarity was essential for progress and neither patriotism nor 
nationalism could substitute the bond created by it. Further, if the Koran 
is in contradiction with what was known, it must be interpreted 
symbolically. Because it is a book in which: 
"... each word, and even in each letter, so many mysteries and secrets 
are hidden that if all the sages of the past and present had the 
lifetime of Noah, and each one solved a thousand mysteries and 
uncovered a thousand secrets each day, nonetheless they would 
remain incapable of fathoming it, and would confess their inability. 
Thus if someone claims that with two or three old sheets that he 
has in hand he has achieved a perfect comprehension of the world 
and has understood all its secrets, of course he is suffering from 
compound ignorance or madness, and the latter is more 
likely ............ Since man's perfection in reason and life is in accord 
with the extent of his knowledge of the book of the world and his 
own state, it is clear that human perfection can have no limit or 
end. Therefore, it is incumbent on each individual separately and 
on each people collectively to set up for itself that universal 
exemplar in order to ascend the degrees of intellectual and 
existential perfection and, penetrating with the eye of insight, to 
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obtain each day a fresh share and new portion of it" (Afghani, in 
translation in Keddie 1968: 114-115) 
The door to iftihad (the process of reasoning applied by those of the 
necessary intellect toward a situation confronting the community that is 
not in the Koran, or not a hadith [tradition]) is not closed, and men must 
apply the principles of the Koran anew to their time. To refuse to do so 
would encourage jumud (stagnation), or taqlid (imitation) as: 
"Is it not a fault for a percipient sage not to learn the entire sphere of 
new sciences and inventions and fresh creations, when he has no 
information about their causes and reasons; and when the world 
has changed from one state to another and he does not raise his 
hand from the sleep of neglect? Is it worthy of an investigator that 
he speak in absolute ignorance and not know what is definitely 
known? He splits hairs over imaginary essences and lags behind in 
the knowledge of evident matters. "(Afghani, in translation in 
Keddie 1968: 122) 
Thus a Muslim who imitated the Europeans would gain superficial 
benefits, just as he would not gain the true spirit of Islam by just repeating 
the words of his predecessors. This was the essence of Afghani's ideology, 
a true Muslim revival through the spirit of Islam. Islam would provide 
the moral and ethical basis for the rapid transformation of a society 
confronted with the technological innovations of the 19th and early 20th 
centuries. 
The next figure of importance in the age of Tanizimat was 
the famous Egyptian disciple of Afghani, Mohammed Abduh (1849-1905). 
While Abduh was a proponent of modernisation, he was concerned about 
the chasm that would occur in a society, that is subjected to modernisation, 
especially if that society's whole essence was not secular in nature. Abduh 
wanted to bridge this gap, and in doing to strengthen its moral roots. He 
felt that the mark of an ideal Muslim society was not only law, but also, 
reason. The true Muslim will use his reason when confronted with affairs 
of the world on religion, while the real infidel is one who ignores rational 
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truth. Finally, the contributions of Christian secularists like Shibli 
Shumayyil (1860-1917) and Farah Antun (1874-1922) to the age of 
Tanzimat must not be forgotten, though they were in conflict with the 
advocates of Pan Islamism. (see Hourani 1962: 103-160) 
3.4 The emergence and evolution of Arab nationalism and integration 
in the 20th century: 
The next era of Middle Eastern history that was instrumental 
in the construction of todays political boundaries is perhaps its most 
important, and commences with the reign of Sultan Abdel Hamid 11 (1876- 
1909). Under the influence of his reformist Grand Vizer, Midhal Pasha, 
the Sultan proclaimed a constitution in 1876. The constitution stipulated 
a constitutional monarchy, equality among ail subjects and a two chamber 
parliament to approve legislation of the Sultan's council of ministers. 
The Sultan had the power to suspend civil liberties and the parliament in 
the case of emergencies which he did in 1877-78. The resulting despotism 
of Abdel Hamid terminated when he was deposed by a group of young 
Turkish revolutionaries in 1909. 
These revolutionaries, who termed themselves the 
Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), started their administration 
well, but in the aftermath of a counter-revolution in 1909, ruled 
dictatorially, and embarked upon an intense Turkification programme 
which alienated the Empires' diverse population. The defeat of the 
Ottomans in the first World War resulted in its collapse. The Empire lost 
all its European provinces, and most of its Middle Eastern provinces 
became either protectorates or nominally independent under British or 
French influence. Syria and Lebanon were under direct French mandate, 
Palestine and Iraq under British mandate, while Arabia succumbed to the 
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desert power of Abdel Aziz al Saud. The Second World War saw the 
demise of French and British power and the emergence of the modern 
Middle Eastern states. 
In the period of Ottoman decline, and the emergence of Arab 
states after the Second World War, Arab nationalism was a reaction to 
European dominance, and the rise of Sa'ad Zaghlul and Taha Hussein in 
Egypt, and the formation of the Ba'ath party in the 1940's were testament 
to this. However, the Ba'ath party was primarily concerned with social 
revolution concerning redistribution of wealth, free trade unions, and a 
guarantee of a minimum standard of living as its main aims. 
Sultan Abdel Hamid II attempted to prevent the 
disintegration. of Ottoman authority by reviving the title of 'Caliph' and 
manipulating the Pan Islamic movement of Afghani to his credit., During 
the First World War, the Allied powers encouraged Sharif Hussein of 
Mecca to rebel against Ottoman rule with the promise of support for the 
amalgamation of the Arab territories of the Ottoman Empire (Saudi 
Arabia, Syria, Iraq, Palestine and Lebanon) under his rule. However, the 
twin factors of the rise of the Wahhabi kingdom of Saudi Arabia under the 
Al-Saud dynasty, and the dissent of the French, thwarted Sharif Hussein's 
efforts in uniting Arabia under one king. With the collapse of the 
Ottoman Empire in 1918, the Middle East was divided into'zones of 
influence by the Allied powers with Britain securing the lions share, and 
France receiving Lebanon and Syria. 
During the Second World War, Britain tried to ensure Arab 
support for the Allied powers, by rekindling the idea of 'Arab unity', and 
promising an end to colonisation. King Abdullah of Jordan was the first 
to respond to this in April 1943, when he called for a plan to unify Syria, 
Lebanon, Palestine and Jordan under his rule. Iraq on the other hand, 
wanted a Pan-Arab league in which it. envisaged itself in the forefront. In 
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1942, Iraq proposed a unification scheme, called the fertile crescent, which 
failed because it excluded the countries of the Arabian peninsula and 
Egypt. In 1945, the Arab Leagues was formed under the auspices of Britain. 
The league, formed on March 22,1945, had as its members Egypt, Saudi 
Arabia, Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen, Transjordan and a representative for 
Palestine. Article 2 of its March 22 charter states that its objective is: 
"... the strengthening of the relations between the member states; the 
co-ordination of their policies in order to achieve co-operation 
between them and to safeguard their independence and 
sovereignty; and a general concern with the affairs and interests of 
the Arab countries. It has also as its purpose the close co-operation 
of the member states, with due regard to the organisation and 
circumstances of each state on the following matters: 
a) Economic and financial affairs, including commercial relations, 
. customs, currency, and questions of agriculture and 
industry. - b) Communications: this includes railways, roads, aviation, 
navigation, telegraphs and posts. 
c) Cultural affairs. 
d) Nationality, passports, visas, execution of judgements, and 
extradition of criminals. 
e) Social affairs. 
f) Health problems. " (Middle East and North Africa 1990: 245) 
- At the present time, theArab League consists of Algeria, 
Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, 
Morocco, Oman, Palestine (which is represented by the PLO), Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen. 
The next milestone in the history of Arab nationalism began 
with the advent of the charismatic Arab leader - Gamal Abdel Nasser. 
Nasser, due to his attacks against colonialism, his socialistic approach to 
the economy (especially after 1955), his advocation of Arab unity and the 
nationalisation of the Suez canal in 1956, was a hero in the Arab world. 
Nasser's influence was so enormous in the Middle East that he was able to 
isolate Iraq from the rest of the Arab world in 1955 when it joined the 
Baghdad pact with Turkey, Pakistan, Iran, and Britain. In 1958, as a result 
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of Nasser's personal prestige and popularity, Egypt was able to integrate 
with Syria to form the United Arab Republic. In a referendum that was 
taken in Syria on the unification, 99.8 percent of the population voted for 
the union and for Nasser as President. The Republic was terminated in 
1961 when Syria withdrew from it because of internal differences. Nasser 
included Yemen in the unification with Syria in 1958, and the federation 
of these three countries was called the United Arab States, though each 
state remained a separate entity, and the federation was not in an 
advanced state. This union was terminated soon after the break up of the 
United Arab Republic. In addition, Nasser was involved in numerous 
attempts to oust conservative monarchies. He believed that these 
monarchies were using repressive means to forcibly prevent their states 
from joining the community of Arab nations under his leadership. 
The formation of the Organisation of the Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC) in 1960, was an attempt by the oil producers 
of the world to increase their political effectiveness through the use of oil 
production. Although OPEC also includes non Arab countries like 
Ecuador, Venezuela, Gabon, Nigeria, Indonesia, and Iran, the majority of 
its reserves are held by the Arab members of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, 
Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Libya, and Algeria, who amalgamated into 
the Organisation of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) in 1968. 
Other important organisations of the 1960's were the Tehran based 
Economic Co-operation Organisation (ECO), formed in 1964 by Iran, 
Pakistan and Turkey, and the Amman based Council of Arab Economic 
Unity or the Arab Common Market, (ACM) formed in 1964 by Egypt, Iran, 
Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Mauritania, the Palestine Liberation Organisation, 
Somalia, Sudan, Syria, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen. 
The 1970's commenced with the formation of the United 
Arab Emirates (UAE) in 1971 which combined the small Emirates of Abu 
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Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ras al Khaimah, Ajman, Fujairah, and Umm al 
Qayarn into a federated unit. The Organisation of Islamic Conference 
(OIC) in 1971 joined most of the Islamic nations of the world, and the Gulf 
Co-operation Council (GCC) in 1981 fused together the Arab Gulf states of 
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain and Oman. 
The continuity of the recently formed Arab Co-operation Council (ACC) 
in 1989, by Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, and Yemen, must be in serious doubt as a 
result of Gulf War of 1990-91. Figure 3.2 provides a diagrammatic 
representation of these eforts 
3.5 The Implications of Unification and Integration in the Middle East 
and Arab North Africa: 
An examination of these various attempts at integration 
outlined in this chapter provides us with an interesting picture. The 
attempts by reformers to restructure the Ottoman Empire failed. The 
reason for this failure could be observed in the superficiality of the 
reforms which did not reach the base of the populations. Afghani's Pan 
Islamism visualised reform through Islam which constitutes the essence 
of the Middle East. But, corrupt political systems and the personal 
ambitions of rulers ensured that his efforts came to naught. Antonius 
(1969: 32), summed up this period of decline in the Arab world as a result 
of: 
"Centuries of decadence and misrule which had debilitated the 
collective spirit of its population and loosened its former cohesion. 
The unifying force generated by the genius of the Prophet 
Mohammed had remained a force so long as Arab power had 
remained supreme. As that power waned, its cohesive influence 
weakened, and the diverse people it welded together into a cultural 
whole fell gradually asunder to form separate entities, regional and 
sectarian, according to the district, clan or creed to which they 
belonged" 
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Sharif Hussein of Mecca's Arab revolt was successful against a corrupt 
empire, but his very success was his undoing. To the allied powers that 
supported him, particularly Britain and France,, his efforts at Arab 
unification were reminiscent of Mohammed Ali's attempts at the creation 
of an Arab Empire in the 19th century. The division of the Arab states 
into units in the aftermath of the First World War (with British or French 
protection) was a more acceptable option than the creation of an integrated 
Arab kingdom with the capability of upsetting the status quo in a sensitive 
region. 
In the period following theSecond World War, with the 
exception of the Arab League, OPEC, the United Arab Emirates and the 
Gulf Co-operation Council, Middle Eastern efforts at unification have 
achieved little success as cohesive economic and political groups. Even 
the success stories suffer from major deficiencies. In its early years, the 
Arab League was used by Nasser as an instrument of Egyptian foreign 
policy. Not only was a majority of its staff Egyptian, but it was based in 
Cairo, and Nasser used it as a forum to isolate and attack his opponents. 
Since Nasserjt has proved to be an ineffectual organisation. Nasser's 
creation of the United Arab Republic was popular with the people, but the 
scheme lasted for just three years. The Syrians after breaking away from 
the union accused the Egyptians of'trying to dominate their country. 
Another problem was the Egyptian socialist programmes -which were 
unfamiliar and unpopular to the Syrians who were upset by Nasser's 
nationalisation. of important commercial enterprises. (See Hasou 1985; 
Hopwood 1990). 
OPEC had a major impact on the world during the 1973 Arab- 
Israeli war, but since then has been plagued by dissent and disagreement in 
its ranks, while the UAE and GCC still have to give precedence to the 
priorities of individual states when they are in conflict to those of the 
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group. The states comprising the ECO, ACM, and ACC have not 
endeavoured to commit themselves to integration other than by 
providing lip service. They still remain as distinct individual states, and 
though efforts toward integration have been well charted on paper, 
tangible results have yet to emerge. Even the successful banding of so 
many Middle Eastern military forces in the coalition army that evicted the 
Iraqi army from Kuwait in the Gulf War of 1990-91, owe more to the 
United States's efforts and enthusiasm for the conflict, than to any 
singular Middle Eastern initiative. 
Arab North Africa, in spite of its Islamic and, Arab culture, 
has not shown much enthusiasm for Arab unification. These countries 
had secured freedom from colonisation in the 1950's and the idea of 
giving up independence for Arab unification and domination by, larger 
Arab nations did not seem to be an attractive proposition. The exception 
to this case, has been Libya. It was eager for closer politico /economic ties 
with the Middle East. In 1964, it was a member of the Council of Arab 
Economic Unity, which was also known as the Arab Common Market. 
When Colonel Qaddafi came to power in a coup in September 1969, he 
pursued an active unification policy. 
Libya's first step in this direction was to approach Egypt. 
While Nasser, (who had experienced the failure of federation with Syria) 
was wary of Libyan efforts, his successor Sadat, enthusiastically welcomed 
the idea. On November 8,1970, an agreement was signed by which Egypt, 
Libya and Sudan were to federate. Egypt would provide manpower and 
technical skills to the federation, Libya, the oil money to fund 
development, and Sudan with its great agricultural potential, would be 
the granary of the federation. Syria wanted to join the federation, and so 
on 17 April 1971, Libya, Egypt, and Syria announced the formation of a 
federation. (Sudan opted out). However, in 1972, only Libya and Egypt 
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actually moved to a federation by which both countries were to be merged 
by September 1,1973. The federation never took place, as economic and 
political differences between the two countries proved to be too great to be 
reconciled. This failure, was followed by another attempt on January 1974 
between Libya and Tunisia to form an 'Islamic Arab Republic' with a 
single constitution, flag, president and army, legislative, judicial and 
executive authorities. But internal opposition within Tunisia to the plan 
derailed it in 1975. 
However, in 1989, the Magrib states announced the 
formation of the Union of the Arab Magrib, with the aim of encouraging 
joint ventures and a single market. The agreement announced the 
establishment of a permanent Secretariat in 1990, and the creation of a 
Customs Union by 1995. The states involved in the federation are Algeria, 
Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia. Though this effort is a positive 
development for the region, it is still too early to gauge the sincerity of 
these states toward integration. 
The verdict on Arab unification attempts since the Second 
World War must be negative. If the problems that plagued the Ottoman 
Empire, and hindered its efforts at reform are recalled, they will be found 
to have similar connotations with the problems that plague present day 
Arab states. The existence of undemocratic governments which in many 
Arab states are corrupt as well, the suppression of their people, and the 
lack of efficient economic policies have resulted in unproductive societies. 
There is, at present, not a single democratically elected government in the 
Middle East or Arab North Africa. A few of the states have resorted to 
limited democratisation of their institutions, but this attempt is more due 
to the unrelenting pressure they face from their populations than due to 
any desire for democracy. Further, their populations are turning to the 
only avenue open to the freedom of expression - the Islamic institutions. 
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Thus increased fundamentalism in Egypt, Morocco, and Algeria have 
proved that though Islamic movements can be suppressed by 
undemocratic regimes, there is the possibility of their erupting beyond the 
control of such regimes, as the example of the Iranian revolution 
indicates. The best hope for these regimes is the democratisation of their 
societies, and the establishment of stable political systems. 
3.7 Summary: 
This chapter initiates the second dimension of the thesis by 
attempting an introduction to the Middle East. An understanding of the 
factors that influence the Middle East is necessary to any analysis of the 
GCC, and none is more important than the influences of its past history. 
As a result, after the introduction to the geographical and topographical 
aspects of the region, an exposition of the birth and formation of Islam has 
been undertaken. The decline of the Ottoman empire and the age of 
Tanzimat provide an adequate introduction to the emergence of Arab 
nationalism in the 20th century. Finally, the last section examines the 
attempts of present Middle Eastern regimes at integration and unification, 
and observes their degree of success to vary considerably between 
organisations. 
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The Middle East has occupied a significant position in world 
history. It has always been the link between East and West. For Eastern 
empires from the Persian to the Ottoman, it had been the launching pad to 
greater territorial conquest in Europe, while for the west, the Middle East 
was the vital passage to the once enormous riches of Egypt, Persia, India, 
and China. 
The Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) countries (Bahrain, 
Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the U. A. E. ), are unique not only 
in their geographical location in the Middle East, but also because of their 
cultural heritage. As the guardians of large oil reserves, their 
amalgamation in 1981 has evoked the interest of scholars and academics 
around the world. This chapter attempts to examine the political 
economies of these countries. The analysis attempts to provide a 
background to the GCC economies, which will highlight the problems as 
well as the achievements of these countries, and will contribute to a 
stronger understanding of the trade similarity matrices in Chapters 7 and 
8. This chapter commences with the elements involved in the formation 
of individual countries, and goes on to examine demography, economic 
indicators, the role of the government, and the structure of industry, 
agriculture and fisheries. 
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4.2 An Overview of the Establishment of Individual GCC States: 
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The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia occupies around four fifth of 
the G. C. C. land area. Its total area is 2,149,690 sq km. It shares its 
international boundary of 4,589 sq km with eight neighbours, - in the 0 
north; Jordan (744 km), Iraq (895 km), and Kuwait (163 kin); in the east the 
Arabian Gulf, Bahrain, Qatar (67 km), and the U. A. E. (586 km); in the 
south, Oman (676 km), the Peoples Democratic Republic of Yemen (830 
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km), and the Yemen Arab Republic (628 km); and finally in the west by 
the Red Sea. 
Topographically, the kingdom is a gently tilled plateau which 
slopes eastward from a coastal mountain range along its western edge 
bordering the Red Sea. Geographically, Saudi Arabia is divided into five 
regions; (1) the NaLd a vast eroded plateau in the heart of the kingdom 
containing the royal capital of Riyadh. Most of the Najd is arid, with a few 
oases in the north around Buraydah and Onaizah, (2) the HHaz the region 
which lies on the Red Sea coast, and which contains the major business 
centre of the kingdom - the busy seaport of Jeddah, as well as the holiest 
cities of Islam, Mecca and Medina., (3) _Asir 
in the southern Red Sea - 
Yemen border area, which is a relatively fertile area with ample rainfall 
for cultivation and mountain peaks that rise to 10,000 feet, (4) AI-Hasa 
the sandy and stormy eastern part of Saudi Arabia, which contains most of 
the country's massive petroleum and natural gas deposits, and finally, (5) 
the Rub'al-Khali, (the empty quarter) which constitutes a massive, 
trackless expanse of shifting sand dunes and desert. 
Saudi Arabia has no permanent rivers, and is one of the 
hottest regions in the world. In the interior, the summer temperature 
averages 44.411C (1121F). Frost and freezing weather occur in the winter, 
while coastal areas retain high humidity and the country suffers from 
severe dust storms. Rainfall is not only infrequent but is also erratic, and 
averages 101 mm (4 in. ) a year except in Asir where it is 304 mm, (12 in. ). 
Rain generally occurs in sudden torrential outbursts, and, in some regions, 
several years may pass between rains. 
Saudi Arabia, until the rise of Islam was a fragmented nation 
consisting of nomadic tribes and a few trading towns. Islam, provided the 
country with the unifying force that engulfed the entire Middle East and 
shook the world. However, when Islam moved north in the seventh and 
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eighth centuries, its center moved to Damascus, and then to Baghdad, and 
the birth place of the religion lost its predominant influence. The Arabian 
peninsula was isolated for a thousand years. The country was governed by 
a myriad of tribal leaders and the holy cities of Mecca and Medina were 
ruled by local aristocrats - Sharifs, who for long periods of time submitted 
to the authority of Muslim leaders in Syria, Iraq, Egypt, and finally the 
Ottomans. 
The rise of Mohammed Abdel Wahhab in the 18th century 
upset the status quo. Wahhab propounded a return to the strict Islam of 
monotheism that existed in the golden age of Islam during the first four 
Caliphs. He condemned the developments taking place in Islam towards 
polytheism, 1 and with the assistance of the ruler of Dariya Mohammed al 
Saud, he commenced on a path of Arabian adherence to his ideology of a 
'revival of Islam'. - Their campaign was extremely successful, but their 
capture of the holy cities of Mecca and Medina, brought out the might of 
the Ottoman Sultans viceroy in Egypt, Mohammed Ali, whose army 
defeated the Sauds, and destroyed their capital Dariya in 1818. Although, 
with the execution of Mohammed al Saud in Istanbul the Wahhab-Saud 
kingdom came to an end, al Saud power did not entirely disintegrate until 
1865, when the al Saud dominions were conquered by a rival tribe, - the al 
Rashids, and the remaining al Sauds were sent into exile in Kuwait. 
In 1902, Abdel Aziz Ibn Saud, a descendant of Mohammed al 
Saud, returned to the Najd from exile in Kuwait, and captured Riyadh 
from the Rashidi governor. From Riyadh, he embarked upon a campaign 
of Arabian conquest. His conquests were facilitated by his creation of the 
Ikhwan (brotherhood), a religious grouping of fanatically dedicated 
Wahhabi followers, whose fierceness in battle enabled Ibn Saud to wrest 
Asir, Hail, and the Hejaz from Sharif Hussein of Mecca. In 1929 the 
Ikhwan, finding Ibn Sauds political and religious attitudes towards the 
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subjugated provinces too flexible, rebelled. Ibn Saud destroyed the Ikhwan 
with British help in a campaign lasting from 1929-31, and with them, the 
last real threat to his rule came to an end. In 1932, Ibn Saud unified his 
territories and was -crowned 'King' of Saudi Arabia. 
The 1930's were uneventful years in the political sense, but 
were important for the discovery of oil. A concession agreement with 
Standard Oil of California was signed in 1933, and in 1938, commercial 
quantities of oil were discovered. By 1945 Saudi oil production began in 
earnest. 
Ibn Saud was succeeded by his son Saud in 1953. Saud proved 
to be a weak king, and his political and economic mismanagement 
eventually led to his deposition and replacement in 1964 by his brother 
Prince Faisal. Faisal (until his assassination in 1975), was responsible for 
pushing Saudi Arabia to the forefront of the Arab nations of the Middle 
East. With the power of the countries oil resources and enormous wealth, 
(especially after 1973), he effectively combined a domestic policy of strict 
Wahhabism with a liberal foreign policy allying Saudi Arabia to the West. 
His successors Khalid, and Fahd, have in turn attempted to maintain 
Faisals' policies in the face of increasing fundamentalism and instability in 
the region. 
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Kuwait: 
SOURCE: MIDDLE EAST REVIEW 1986 
The state of Kuwait is located at the head of the Gulf close to 
the Shatt al Arab estuary which masks the frontier between Iraq and Iran. 
It covers 17,818 sq km, and includes nine offshore islands, - Bubiyan, 
Nfaskan, Auha, Warbah, al-Kubr, Umm al-N[aradim, Umm al-Nami, 
Qaru, al-Sagirah, and Failaka, of which only Failaka is inhabited. Kuwait 
enjoys a common border with Iraq and Saudi Arabia. Only 2 percent of 
Kuwait's land area (around 3600 hectares in 1981) is given over to 0 
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agriculture, and only 10 percent could be converted to agricultural use, 85 
percent of which, is suitable for pastoral purposes only. The reason for 
this state of events is the poor quality of desert soils, and, the lack of 
adequate water resources. Kuwait, as it lies in the semi- and zone enjoys 
only about 150 mm. of annual rainfall. There is virtually no surface water, 
and what there is, is saline. 
The majority of the native born Kuwaiti's are descendants 
from Arabs of the Anaiza tribe who had migrated from the Nejd in Saudi 
Arabia in the 18th century. They converted Kuwait from an obscure 
fishing village into a port of some significance. Among their early settlers 
were the al Sabah family who became the ruling dynasty. Though Kuwait 
was nominally under Ottoman rule, the rulers had almost total 
autonomy. The rule of Sheikh Mubarak (1896-1915) was an important part 
of Kuwait's history. Mubarak, in order to attain his objective of 
maintaining Kuwaits independence against the Ottomans, decided to ally 
himself with the British. He was able to convince the British of the 
importance of signing an agreement with him in 1899, by playing on its 
fears of Russian and German expansionist designs in the Gulf. The treaty 
made Britain responsible for Kuwait's defence and foreign affairs. 2 The 
discovery of oil in the kingdom in 1932 further ensured British support, 
and by the Second World War, the British were firmly entrenched in the 
Kingdom. In 1961, when Britain decided to leave Kuwait, Iraq laid claim 
to the country. But Kuwait with Arab and international support, was able 
to successfully reject Iraqi claims, and join the Arab League in 1961, and 
the United Nations in 1963. With independence, Kuwait attempted to 
pursue a neutralist foreign policy. Until the Iraqi invasion of 1990, Kuwait 
attempted a skillful game of playing one important power against the rest. 
It had not only done this to Middle Eastern states, but to the superpowers 
as well. Further, in contrast to other conservative Gulf monarchies, 
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Kuwait had a national assembly and a relatively free press. However, 'he 
national assembly was dissolved in 1986 and censorship and civil rights 
suspended, when the government faced increasing political instability 10 
from political events in the Middle East. As the impact of the Ira(ýi 
invasion of 1990 on Kuwait has been enormous, it has been covered in an 
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Oman, the second largest country in the Arabian peninsula is 
situated at the south eastern corner of that peninsula facing the Gulf of 
Oman and the Arabian Sea. Its area is estimated at 212,457 sq km. Omans 
boundaries are only partially surveyed and defined. Its boundaries with 
Saudi Arabia, have been the subject of intermittent dispute, with the focal 
point being the Buraimi oasis in northern Oman which was forcibly 
occupied by the Sultans levies in 1955, and part of which belongs to the 
UAE today. The total length of the international land boundaries is 
estimated at 1,374 km and is divided as follows; Southern Yemen 288 km, 
Saudi Arabia 676 km, and the U. A. E. 410 km. The total length of the coast 
line is 1860 km. 
Geographically, the country is divided into the following 
regions; (1) the tip of the musandam peninsula, the Ras al-jabal which 
touches the straits of Hormuz and is separated from the rest of the 
Sultanate by a belt of U. A. E. territory. It consists entirely of low 
mountains. (2) the fertile and populous coastal plain known as Batinah, 
sloping gradually on the landward side to the foothills of the western 
Hajar, (3) the'Muscat Matrah coastal region, bounded almost throughout 
its length by cliffs, (d) the tableland of central Qman,., west of the coastal 
area. The tableland consists of two ranges; the Hajar al-Gharbi (western 
Hajar) and the Hajar al-Sharqi (eastern Hajar) divided by the wadi Samail 
which forms the traditional route between Muscat and the interior. (4) the 
barren and forbidding coastline south of Dho-far, (5) the virtually 
uninhabited and inhospitable is land of Masirah, and (6) Dhofar province 
with a coastal plain-noted for rich vegetation and natural beauty. Oman 
has an arid subtropical climate. The summer months average a 
temperature of around 461C (115*F) and humidity is in excess of 90 
percent. Winter temperatures average between 221C (71*17) to 33"C (92'F). 
CHAPTER 4 102 
Average rainfall stands at around 5 cm (2 in) to 10 cm (4 in) with wide 
regional variations. 
Oman is one of the few G. C. C. countries with a tradition of 
independence dating back several centuries. There is archaeological 
evidence of a pre-historic settlement in Oman. In the 4th century B. C., 
Persian forces invaded and imposed suzerainty on northern Oman for 
1200 years. In 630 A. D., envoys from Medina converted the Arabs to Islam, 
and the Persians were driven out of power. In 1508, Oman fell under 
Portuguese occupation which lasted till 1650 when Arab tribes expelled the 
Portuguese. Persia briefly occupied Oman between 1741-44, but in 1744, 
Muscat-Oman emerged as an independent country under the Al Bu Said 
dynasty. At the peak of the Said dynasty reign, Le, during the rule of 
Imam Said bin Sultan (1804-1856), Oman also ruled Zanzibar. However, 
after Said's death the kingdom was split between his sons. It was during 
the rule of Said bin Sultan, that Oman began its interaction with the west, 
and with Britain which was the most powerful and established western 
nation in the Gulf. 
Oman faced internal dissension in the form of two rebellions. 
The first one started in 'Inner Oman', in the province west of the Jabal el- 
Adhdar when tribes rebelled against the Sultans authority in 1913, and 
established their own 'Imam'. This problem was aggravated under the 
rule of Sultan Said bin Taimur (1932-70), an extremely conservative ruler 
who kept the country underdeveloped, and under harsh control. Though 
the Sultans forces were successful in stamping out the rebellion, the 
problem was not resolved until 1963, when a specially appointed United 
Nations Commission of Inquiry rejected the exiled Imams charges of 
oppression practiced by the Sultans government. 
In July 1970, Sultan Said bin Taimur was deposed by his 
reformist son Qabus bin Said who was interested in modernising Oman. 
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-0 However, Qabus had t contend with the Dhofari rebellion which was 
supported by South Yemen. As the Sultans iorces were unequal to the task 
of subduing the rebels, the Shah of Iran was appealed to, and a joint 
Ornani-Iranian expeditionary force started operations against the rebels in 
1973. By 1976, the rebellion faced with strong government advances, the 
offer of an amnesty to any surrendering rebels, as well as Qabus's 
successt: ui modernisation and development programmes, disintegrated. 
Oman has followed under Qabus a strict non-aligned foreign 
policy. Its relations with other 'big-power' Middle Eastern states remain 
stable and it is an important member of the GCC. British officers are 
involved in its armed forces, and in 1970, it granted naval facilities to the 
United States on the island of Masirah. On the domestic front, the Sultans 
rapid modernisation programmes, financed by oil revenues, have 
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Qatar is located on a peninsula projecting northward into the 
Persian Gulf from the Arabian mainland. It comprises an area of 11,000 sq 
km, and its landward frontiers are 112 km in length, of which 67 km are 
with Saudi Arabia and 45 km with the U. A. E. The total length of its 
Arabian gulf coastline is 378 km. The terrain is flat, barren, stony and 
sandy. The land rises from the east to a low plateau in the centre and 
north pitted with scores of shallow depressions. The southern base of the 
peninsula is covered by extensive salt flats. Temperatures range from 6*C 
(42.8'F) in January to 48*C (1181T) in July. Annual rainfall ranges between 
25mm (1 in) to 212.4 mm (8.5 in) 
Qatar, until the 19th century, was dominated by the Khalifah 
family from nearby Bahrain. In 1872, it became part of the Ottoman 
empire. By the time Britain came to dominate the area in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the Thani family were in the 
process of establishing a reigning dynasty on the peninsula. Wahhabism 
is the dominant religious force in the Emirate. In 1882, Britain, signed a 
treaty with Qatar's sheikh, which made the British responsible for foreign 
policy and defence. 
The discovery and production of oil after World War Two, 
made the country prosperous. When Qatar regained its independence 
from Britain in 1971, it was on the road to wealth. After the oil prices 
boom in 1973, Qatar became an enormously wealthy country. 
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The U. A. E. is a confederation of seven absolute monarchies. 
Formerly known as the Trucial States, Trucial Sheikhdoms, Trucial Coast, 
or Trucial Oman, the Emirates consist of seven states: Ah Dhaýi (67,340 sq 
krn), Dubai (3,885 sq krn), Ras al-Khaimah (1,683 sq kin), Fufarrah (1,166 sq 
km), Umm al-Qaiwain (777 sq krn), Sharfah (2,590 sq krn), and Ajman (259 
sq krn). The total length of its international boundaries are 1,163 km. The 
border with Oman runs at 513) km, with Saudi Arabia 586 km, and that 
with Qatar 64 km. The Persian Gulf coastline stretches for 777 km. 
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The U. A. E. is an axid and inhospitable desert. The Trucial 
coast is characterised by shallow seas, coral reefs, sand bars and islets. T"he 
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U. A. E. has a subtropical climate. Average temperature in the summer 
m. orAs run over 48'C (118.4"F), while winter temperatures are between 
101C (501F) and 14"C (57F). 
The Trucial sheikhs were until 1971, under the protection of 
Britain. In 1971, when Britain announced its withdrawal from the region 
as a result of defence cuts, the independent Emirates were not at all 
enthusiastic to see the British leave. They had become used to the 
umbrella of British protection against larger Middle Eastern States. 
However, when British withdrawal seemed imminent, the seven 
Shiekhdoms, Qatar, and Bahrain formed a federation committee. Though 
Qatar and Bahrain eventually opted out, the fact that the federation came 
into existence, was largely due to the efforts of the rulers of Dubai and Abu 
Dhabi. 
The federation has endured in spite of rivalries between 
Emirates as well as inter-family dissension in Emirates. The present 
president of the federation, Sheikh Zayed, attained power in 1966 after 
deposing the ruler who was his brother. Unity among the ruling families 
of the U. A. E., is held together, by a thin thread. As recently as 1987, the 
Emir of Sharjah was overthrown by his brother, though the coup was 
eventually settled peacefully, and the Emir reinstalled. (see Observer 21 
June 1987). Nevertheless, the U. A. E. 's association with the GCC, has 
strengthened the federation. The GCC has assisted in alleviating the 
threat of belligerent neighbours who covet the wealth of these small 
Sheikhdoms, and has been firm in dissuading dynastic and succession 
squabbles. Although the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 was an example 
of the inability of the GCC to prevent with certainty the threat of 
belligerent neighbours, there can be no doubt that the assistance that 
Kuwait received from the GCC, and Saudi Arabia in particular, was due to 
it being an integral part of the group. As long as the present loose 
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confederation continues, the U. A. E. looks secure, but cracks will appear if 
the federation attempts to centralise its powers, as it seems likely that 
individual Emirates will resist transfer of their independent powers from 
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The Bahrain archipelago covers a total area of 622 sq km and 
lies at the entrance of the Gulf of Salwa between Saudi Arabia's Hasa 
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province and the Qatar peninsula. The group includes six principal 
islands Bahrain, Muharraq, Sitrah, Umm al-Nassan, Jidda, and Nabi Salih, 
as well as 27 minor islands. -Except for a narrow strip of land along the 
northern coast, Bahrain is a desert. However, Bahrain is blessed with a 
number of freshwater springs or artesian wells, whose source is still a 
mystery. These springs are numerous along, the northern coast of Bahrain 
island and they make permanent cultivation possible on a narrow strip of 
land. The climate is and with a maximum average reaching 440C (1110F). 
Winters are cooler with temperatures of 100C to 200C (50OF to 680F). 
Average rainfall is only 76mm (3 in). A dry, southwestern wind, known 
locally as Qaws periodically raises desert storms. 
Bahrain was converted to Islam within two years of the 
Prophet Mohammeds death. But, as it lies in close proximity to Iran, it has 
continually been subjected to influences across the Gulf. Between 1507 
and 1602, it was under the Portuguese occupation. In 1603, it was ruled by 
an Iranian Shia dynasty, but in 1783, the dynasty's Arab governor was 
overthrown by tribes from the mainland. From amongst them the al- 
Khalifah gained power and rule to this day. When Britain established 
itself as the primary power in the gulf, it established a protectorate in 
Bahrain in 1892, which was consolidated in 1923, when a British advisor 
was appointed to assist the Sheikh of Bahrain. 
Though Bahrain's oil reserves proved to be modest, it was 
the first country on'the Arab side of the gulf where oil was produced. Iran, 
given its historical association with Bahrain, claimed the island repeatedly 
until 1970, when it abided by a United Nations resolution to grant the 
island independence. 
Bahrain has a sizable Iranian population, and this has been a 
major source of concern to the rulers. Iran, as stated above claimed 
Bahrain until 1970, and in 1957, went as far as to proclaim Bahrain an 
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integral part of Iran and even allocated the island seats in the Iranian 
parliament. 3 Since 1979, the Iranian revolutionary government has 
renewed its claim to the island. There were rumours of an unsuccessful 
Shi'a coup attempt in 1981, and in 1984, arms caches were found that were 
assumed to be part of another Shi'a coup attempt. Thus Bahrain's 
inclusion in the GCC was significant. In September 1980, when the Iran- 
Iraq war commenced, it signed a formal defence agreement with Saudi 
Arabia, which has always vehemently insisted that it would not tolerate 
radical political change in Bahrain. 
4.3 Demographic Features of the GCC States: 
(a) Natural Resources: Availability and Consumption: 
An examination of the natural resources of the GCC is an 
important part of any economic analysis, as it depends upon oil revenue 
for its sustenance. Oil reserves in figure 4.14, indicate that the GCC has 
40.1 percent of world oil reserves. Further, if a larger regional view is 
taken to include Iran and Iraq, the regional ratio increases to 61.1 percent 
of world oil reserves. Saudi Arabia has the largest reserves in the Middle 
East, followed by Iraq, Kuwait, Iran, Abu Dhabi, Oman, Dubai, and Qatar. 
The length of time their reserves are expected to last (calculated on a 
reserve/ production ratioS) are 89.9 years for Saudi Arabia, over a 100 years 
for Iraq, Iran, Kuwait, and Abu Dhabi, 18.4 years for Oman, 28 years for 
Dubai, and 24.1 years for Qatar. 6 However, these reserves are subject to 
continual revisions as a result of the regular technological improvements 
in oil exploration which enables the discovery of new deposits. In 
addition, it must be noted that the standard of living in the GCC is higher 
than Iran and Iraq due to the minuscule size of its populations. Oil 
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production and consumption in figures 4.2 and 4.3,7 display fluctuations 
as a result of higher oil prices in the 70's/early 80's and lower ones in the 
later 80's. While the major oil consumers in figure 4.3 display higher 
consumption values during the years the oil prices were decreasing (1980- 
1988), the GCC displays a drop in production values in figure 4.2 during 
this same period because of the reduced prices. These two figures are 
intended to indicate the dependence of the GCC on the consumption 
patterns of the major oil consumers. 
The GCC countries are also rich in natural gas. GCC reserves 
in figure 4.4 9 are observed to be 13.7 percent of total world reserves. 
Further, Iran and Qatar have joint access to a gas field which is considered 
to be among the largest in the world. If Iran and Iraq's gas reserves are 
added to the GCC total, the regions reserves increase to 28.6 percent of 
world reserves, a substantial total. However, the GCC countries cannot 
sustain their economies on the sale of gas alone. Qatar has made enquiries 
to this effect, and found that most buyers are reluctant to commit 
themselves to the purchase of large quantities of gas much before the year 
2000 (Financial Times, 22 February 1990). This is borne out by figure 4.5 9 
which do not indicate any large increases in natural gas consumption 
among the major consumers during the 1977-1988 decade. The exception 
of the USSR is not significant, as it also has the largest gas reserves in the 
world (37.9 percent of total world reserves - see Table 4.4, Technical 
Appendix, section 2: 12). 
(b) Population and the Rural-Urban Divide: 
The GCC countries are underpopulated. Even Saudi Arabia 
whose population is almost three times the rest of the GCC's, suffers from 
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a numerically deficient population. The population imbalance between 
Saudi Arabia and the other GCC countries is observed in figure 4.610. In 
1989, GCC population stood at 490,000 for Bahrain, 2.05 million for 
Kuwait, 1.42 million for Oman, 420,000 for Qatar, 14.43 million for Saudi 
Arabia, and 1.55 million for the UAE. (see Table 4.7, Technical Appendix, 
section 2: 14) While this should give the GCC countries a collective 1989 
total of 20.36 million people, the figures do not subtract the enormous 
expatriate population in these countries. Expatriates in Bahrain are 
estimated at around 155,000, in Kuwait at 1.1 million (pre 1990 invasion 
figures), in Qatar at 300,000, in Saudi Arabia at 5 million, and the UAE at 
800,000 (The Military Balance 1990: 100-120). Consequently, the GCC 
countries are involved in intense efforts in increasing the size of their 
population. Their annual rate of population increase during 1980-87 was 3 
percent for Bahrain, 4.5 percent for Kuwait, 4.3 percent for Oman, 5 percent 
for Qatar, 4.3 percent for Saudi Arabia (1980-85), and 5.1 percent for the 
U-A-E (Table 4.8, Technical Appendix, section 2: 14). The effect of these 
high growth rates can be noted in figure 4.7,11 where GCC population is 
observed to have in the space of 14 years nearly doubled, i. e., from 10.57 
million in 1976 to 20.36 million in 1989. 
A clear picture of the rural-urban divide in the GCC 
economies is not as easily discernible as in other Developing Countries. 
As observed in section 4.2 of this chapter, the GCC countries have 
inhospitable climates with large tracts of desert. Agriculture is limited and 
constrained to a few areas which have natural oases. Further, a substantial 
number of GCC natives do not habit settlements and are involved in 
nomadic migrations - the Bedouins. However, since the influx of oil 
revenue since the end of world war II, the GCC has endeavoured to 
urbanise its countries, encourage agriculture and settle the nomadic 
communities. These efforts were given an added impetus by the revenues 
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received from the 1973 oil price rises. While statistics on the bedouins are 
difficult to secure, those on urban population are observed in Tables 4.9 
and 4.10 (Technical Appendix, section 2: 15). Though, the statistics are 
(especially in the cases of a few GCC countries) a few years behind, a few 
derivations can be made from them. The UAE and Bahrain are observed 
to have urban populations of over 80 percent in the early 80's. The 
percentage in 1991 can be expected to remain high, as Bahrain, the UAE, 
Qatar, and Kuwait are primarily city states whose entire development 
revolves around their cities. In addition, around 98 percent of Qatar's 
population is located in its capital city of Doha (International Herald 
Tribune, 22 February 1985). The only GCC countries with agricultural 
capability are Oman and Saudi Arabia. Oman, because of its agricultural 
province of Dhofar, and Saudi Arabia, because of its intense efforts in 
agriculture and dairy farn-dng. However, the majority of Saudi Arabians 
who are not nomads are based in the cities or industrial free zones. Saudi 
farms are capital intensive and employ modern machine based 
agricultural techniques, with most of the manual labour consisting of 
expatriate labour. Oman, is an exception. In 1984, over 80 percent of its 
workforce was involved in agriculture or fisheries (South, December 1984: 
77). However, it is facing an increasing migratory trend to the cities, 
especially to the capital Muscat. 
4.4 -A Review of the GCC's Economic Indicators: i. e., Gross Domestic 
Product, Capital Formation, International Reserves, and Trade: 
An analysis of the financial indicators of the GCC must 
commence with the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). However, as the GCC 
countries are oil reliant economies, GDP fluctuates sharply. The variance 
in GDP value's from 1979 to 1986 is observed in figure 4.8 12 which is a 
CHAPTER 4 113 
stacked bar graph intended to simultaneously portray the fluctuations 
occuring among individual members, and the group as a whole. The 
irregularity in GDP growth from the previous years of comparison is 
primarily due to the fluctuations in oil prices and revenues. The GDP of 
the group in figure 4.8 is observed to decrease in conjunction with the fall 
in oil prices from 1980 onwards, and except for a brief resurgence in 1984, 
has not returned to its 1979 levels. This is also noted in Table 4.12 
(Technical Appendix, section 2: 17), where the growth of GDP in post-1979 
years is observed to be unstable and contain large negative values for 
government final consumption expenditure as well as industrial activity. 
The GCC countries GDP by industrial activity for 1979-1986 
(average) is observed in figures 4.9 to 4.14.13 The figures indicate the 
sizable contributions of mining and quarrying in comparison to other 
sectors. Bahrain, with its lack of major oil reserves displays its acumen by 
exploiting other sectors to its advantage, but the rest of the GCC countries 
remain oil dependent. All their non-oil sectors ultimately remain 
dependent upon their oil revenues. International Reserves (SDR's, 
position in the IMF, and foreign exchange) in Table 4.14 (Technical 
Appendix, section 2: 21), are noted to have increased significantly from 
their 1970's level in the 1980's, while gold reserves have remained stable 
over the same period of time. 
Trade with the GCC is examined by commencing with 
imports in figure 4.15, and exports in figure 4.16.14 The figures indicate 
the large increases in imports in the 1975-1982 period in response to large 
export increases in 1973-1982 due to higher oil prices. The effects of lower 
oil prices in the mid 1980's is also observed in the decrease in both imports 
and exports. Figures 4.15 and 4.16 also indicate an interesting 
phenomenon - the imbalance between imports and exports. While in the 
1970's, export revenue far outweighed imports, the difference has vastly 
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decreased in 1980's, and in a few years imports outweighed exports. Thus, 
GCC exports were at their apex in 1981 at around 170 billion dollars, while 
imports at their apex in, 1982 were only around 65 billion dollars. This is 
in stark contrast to the 1980's, where at their nadir,, GCC exports (1987/88) 
were at around 37 billion dollars while imports were at around 35 billion 
(1986). This decrease in the imbalance is the result of increased 
consumption patterns for both the governments and the private sectors in 
the 1980's. If the view of exports and imports are magnified to examine 
the type of imports and exports from Tables 4.16 and 4.17 (Technical 
Appendix, section 2: 23-24) it is observed that the range of GCC imports is 
very wide. They import practically everything from food, industrial 
supplies, machinery, transport, consumer and other goods. However, 
exports are primarily in mining, with the exceptions of Bahrain and Oman 
whose exports in industrial manufacturing are oil related exports. 
Finally, imports, and exports with trading partners are 
examined in Tables 4.18 and 4.19 (Technical Appendix, section 2: 25-26). 
The general picture that emerges is that the Developed Market economies 
account for the majority of GCC trade. GCC exports are concentrated in oil 
and though their trading partners are more diversified, the Developed 
Market Economies still account for a large share of the trade. However, as 
one of the aims of this thesis is to examine trade in detail at a later stage, it 
will not be covered here extensively. 
4.5 The Role of the Governments of the GCC: 
(a) Government Receipts and Disbursements: 
A general overview of government receiPts and 
disbursements is obtained from Table 4.20 (Technical Appendix, section 2: 
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27). The countries whose statistics are available for analysis are Bahrain, 
Kuwait, and Oman. As can be expected from oil based economies, receipts 
are observed to be higher than disbursements. The interesting aspect of 
this table is the public debt of Oman and Bahrain which is observed to 
increase over a period of five years. This trend is in tune with these 
countries dynamic development policies. As their development needs far 
outweigh their revenues, the increasing debt causes no surprise. If 
government receipts are magnified to examine the major contributors to 
receipts (Table 4.21, Technical Appendix, section 2: 28). it is observed that 
the governments of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman and the UAE derive their 
receipts from a variety of sources. The primary ones are receipts from 
property and entrepreneurial income, current and capital transfers, and tax 
fees and contributions. While the two former sources - 
property/ entrepreneurial income and transfers are heavily influenced by 
the oil market, the latter factor of taxes, fees, and other contributions 
provide cause for contemplation. One of the benefits the GCC countries 
offered expatriate labour in the early years of their development in the 
1970's, was a tax free salary. However, the decreasing oil prices in the 
eighties, had forced these countries to draw upon their reserves to finance 
budget deficits. As a result tax revenue has begun to look extremely 
attractive. The UAE provides the exception, as it is still a tax free 
economy. 
Finally the disbursements by functional categories are 
examined for Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman and the UAE in figures 4.17 to 
4.20.15 These figures reflect the development policies of these states. 
Kuwait and Bahrain, whose development policies are geared to the 
welfare of their citizens, channel a high percentage of government 
disbursements towards public services, health, education, social security, 
housing and welfare. In spite of their vulnerable regimes, defence 
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accounted for an average of only 12.2 percent of total government 
disbursements during 1980-84 for Kuwait and 16.6 percent for Bahrain. 
Oman and the UAE with equally vulnerable regimes, (though not 
neglecting welfare benefits) chose to spend more on defence. Oman's 
defence expenditure during 1980-84 was an average of 50.6 percent of total 
government disbursements, and the UAE's 52.3 percent. Thus, the GCC 
states face a contradiction of maintaining extensive and expensive welfare 
as well as defence projects in the face of fluctuating oil revenues, a 
contradiction in policy that they are finding increasing difficult to manage. 
Specific Expenditure (Education, Research and Development, and 
Health) 
The wealth accruing to the GCC states also presented them 
with major development problems. The indigenous population were 
largely illiterate and were unable to fully participate in the rapid economic 
growth their economies underwent during the 1970's. The modernisation 
of the GCC economies was primarily carried out by expatriate labour. In 
recognition of this problem, the GCC countries have devoted a significant 
amount of their revenue (see Table 4.23, Technical Appendix, section 2: 30 
for the level of expenditure) to the education and welfare of their 
indigenous population. As figures 4.21 to 4.26 16 indicate, educational 
expenditure for, the GCC increased sharply from 1975-1980, and has 
retained a similar pattern since 1980. The magnitude of GCC efforts can be 
observed in the range of difference in educational expenditure of its 
members in 1975 to that of 1987/1988. Bahrain's expenditure increased 
from 10.5 million Bahraini dinars in 1975 to 59.5 million in 1988, a 467 
percent increase; Kuwait, from 112 million Kuwaiti dinars in 1975 to 383 
million in 1987, an increase of 242 percent; Oman, from 9.4 million 
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Omani rials in 1975 to 110 million in 1987, an increase of 1070 percent; 
Qatar, from 177 million Qatari riyals in 1975 to 995 million in 1988, an 
increase of 462 percent; Saudi Arabia, from 13 billion Saudi riyals in 1975 
to 23 billion in 1987, an increase of 77 percent, and the UAE, from 347 
million Dirhams in 1975 to 2 billion in 1988, an increase of 476 percent 
(Table 4.23, Technical Appendix, section 2: 30). Further, a breakdown of 
education from first level education to third level education (universities, 
etc., ) in Table 4.24 (Technical Appendix, section 2: 31) indicates the 
manpower pool available for expatriate labour replacement. From the 
figures, it can be surmised that the GCC countries efforts at creating an 
educated indigenous labour force is showing significant success. However, 
given the infancy of the education projects, most of the pupils enrolled are 
still at first or second level institutions, and their contributions to the 
economies are still a few years away. 
Tables 4.25 to 4.27 (Technical Appendix, section 2: 34) indicate 
literacy, research and development. Illiteracy figures available for 
Bahrain, Kuwait, and the UAE are observed to be high, but if GCC efforts 
in education noted in previous paragraphs are taken into account, 
illiteracy should be steadily receding. Further, the figures available 
(though from the latest published UN yearbook) are a few years behind, 
and present illiteracy figures can be expected to be much lower. The efforts 
of Qatar and Kuwait towards research and development in tables 4.26 to 
4.27 are still minuscule in comparison to countries like Japan and have a 
long way to go before their impact on economic development is felt. 
Health and hospital establishments, and life expectancy are 
portrayed in Tables 4.28a and 4.28b (Technical Appendix, section 2: 35-36). 
The increased health facilities provided to GCC citizens is noted in the 
increase in the number of hospital beds. Oman and the UAE benefit the 
most from health expenditure with large increases in facilities. Oman's 
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hospital beds increased from a total of just 207 in 1966 to 2041 in 1982, and 
the UAE's increased from 682 in 1977 to 3239 in 1982. While Oman's 
success was largely due to Jts reformist Sultan Qabus's welfare and 
modernisation programmes, the UAE's success must be a result of the 
largesse granted to poorer members of the federation (Ras al Khaimah, 
Fujairah, Ajman, and Umm al Quayam) by the richer ones, (Abu Dhabi, 
Dubai, and Sharjah). These health and welfare schemes have been 
responsible for the increase in the life expectancy of GCC countries in table 
4.28b. 
Finally, in spite of these impressive achievements in the 
economy, welfare, and income, the GCC countries have still a long path to 
tread before they have achieved real development. The use of income as 
an indicator of wealth has its limitations. A recent study by the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has employed income, life 
expectancy, adult literacy, mean years of school, educational attainment, 
and purchasing power parity to calculate a Human Development Index 
(HDI) which indicates a country's progress. (Table 4.28c, Technical 
Appendix, section 2: 37). This interesting technique has interesting 
implications for the GCC. Though the HDI for all GCC nations are 
significantly lower than their GNP rankings, the scale of difference is 
notable. In a scale of 160 countries, with 160 indicating the highest level of 
poverty, Kuwait declines from a GNP ranking of 18 to an HDI ranking of 
48 (pre-invasion values), Qatar from a GNP ranking of 24 to an HDI 
ranking of 50, Bahrain from 30 to 51, the UAE from 13 to 56, Saudi Arabia 
from 32 to 69, and Oman from 37 to 86. These enormous declines across 
all GCC countries indicate the difference between their incomes and actual 
development. 
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4.6 The Structure of the GCC Economies: 
(a) Industry, Infrastructure and Energy: 
Industry in the GCC countries is dependent upon 
government expenditure. In addition, given the nature of these countries 
economies, industry is also oil dependent. Moreover, heavy industry is 
concentrated in petrochemicals or heavy metals and is managed with 
foreign collaboration. One of the sectors that has become increasingly 
important is oil refining (Table 4.29, Technical Appendix, section 2: 38). 
The GCC countries have realised that the sale of refined oil is much more 
profitable than crude oil. In fact, revenue from Bahrain's 250,000 barrel a 
day refinery constitutes a majority of the country's revenue. Kuwait, has 
increased its refining capabilities to a capacity of 745,000 (1988) barrels a day, 
and Saudi Arabia has doubled its refining capacity from 630,000 barrels a 
day in 1977 to 1,375,000 in 1988. These achievements, though impressive, 
are small in comparison to the refining capabilities of Japan (4,325,000 
barrels a day in 1988), the USA (15,915,000 barrels a day in 1988) and 
Western Europe (13,965,000 barrels a day in 1988). Further, the scope of 
refining is limited as industrial powers with established refineries will 
resist GCC attempts at increasing its refining capacity. This resistance 
could prove to be effective, as the GCC countries are dependent on these 
nations for the sophisticated technology necessary in maintaining or 
expanding refining and industrial manufacturing activities. 
A glimpse of GCC manufacturing industry is provided in 
Tables 4.30a and 4.30b (Technical Appendix, section 2: 39-41). The 
manufacture of nitrogenous fertilizers, cement, aluminium and steel for 
the decade 1975/76-1985/86, and copper, gypsum, salt, silver, and sulphur 
and pyrites during 1979-89 indicate increasing production in all the 
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industries. However, the range of percentage increases are larger for the 
production of cement and steel. These larger increases could be the result 
of the increased consumption of these products by the GCC countries in 
the pursuit of enormous development programmes. On the other hand, 
the consumption of aluminium, nitrogenous fertilizers, copperf gypsum, 
salt, silver, sulphur and pyrites in the local market is limited. The excess 
capacity has to be exported, and in the face of international competition, 
the growth of production of these products is more restrained. 
Infrastructure in the GCC is examined with the help of Tables 
4.31 to 4.34 (Technical Appendix, section 2: 42-44)., To commence with 
communication in Table 4.31, the tremendous advances in infrastructural 
development is visible in the increase in the number of telephones in 
GCC nations during the years 1975-1986. Bahrain's telephones increased 
from 26 thousand in 1975 to 119 thousand in 1986; Kuwait's, from 129 
thousand to 310 thousand; Oman's, from 5 thousand to 74 thousand; 
Qatar's from 21 thousand to 115 thousand; Saudi Arabia's from 443 
thousand to 1.4 million; and the UAE's, from 44 thousand to 358 
thousand. These tremendous increases are not just restricted to 
communication, but are noticed in most sectors of the economy. When 
transportation in Table 4.32 (Technical Appendix, section 2: 42) is 
examined, the increases in the 1975-85 decade for 'thousand gross 
registered tons' of merchant shipping or oil tankers for Kuwait, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, and the UAE is observed to be equally dramatic. Further 
analysis of maritime transport in Table 4.33 (Technical Appendix, section 
2: 43), indicates that the majority of 'goods loaded' in the GCC countries 
consist either of crude petroleum or petroleum products, while the 
majority of 'goods unloaded' primarily consist of dry cargo. Civil Aviation 
in Table 4.34 (Technical Appendix, section 2: 44) mirrors the trend noted in 
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previous paragraphs in that it displays significant increases for all GCC 
countries in the passenger, freight or mail kilometres flown. 
Energy consumption per capita during 1983-1987 in Table 4.35 
(Technical Appendix, section 2: 45) displays higher GCC consumption for 
electricity per capita in contrast to world consumption per capita. 
However, with inexpensive oil and gas at its disposal, this consumption 
trend is healthy and positive to overall development, as GCC electricity 
consumption for self-producers and the public is mostly obtained from 
thermal energy (see Table 4.36, Technical Appendix, section 2: 46). In 
addition, in order to utilise the GCC countries' oil and gas reserves to the 
maximum, the production and consumption of commercial energy (see 
Table 4.37, Technical Appendix, section 2: 47) is primarily in liquids and 
gas. Thus, the GCC countries have no cause for concern in energy as long 
as their oil and gas reserves are abundantly available, and even when 
these non-renewable resources run out, there is ample scope for the 
development of solar power. 17 
(b) Agriculture and livestock: 
Agriculture in the GCC countries is an important policy 
consideration. With the exception of Oman, the topography of the GCC 
countries does not allow significant agricultural production. This 
vulnerability in food has galvanised GCC countries in general, and Saudi 
Arabia in particular, towards increased agricultural production. Saudi 
Arabia has devoted enormous revenue and energy towards the 
construction and maintenance of massive capital intensive farms, which 
are literally to be found in the 'middle of the desert'. To examine the 
subsidies a Saudi farmer receives, the following quotation from The 
Economist (6 April 1985: 74) is appropriate: 
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10 .......... a Saudi farmer is usually given the land he wants to farm by the government. He then receives a cash subsidy of between 20-50% 
of the cost of all machinery (except irrigation equipment) brought to 
till the land. If he still needs extra cash, the farmer can raise an 
interest-free loan repayable over 10 years from the Saudi Arabian 
Agricultural Bank (SAAB) ............. SAAB or the Saudi Ministry of Agriculture and Water offer the farmer extra help in producing his 
crop - eg., by airlifting milking cows from abroad, by supplying free 
seed potatoes, free pesticides, and paying for half the cost of most 
fertilisers and animal feeds. " 
In addition, agricultural prices are heavily subsidised. To give the 
example of wheat, in 1984, the Saudi government bought local wheat at 
around 1 billion dollars, while the cost of importing the same amount 
would have been a mere 160 n-dllion dollars (The Economisi, 6 April 1985: 
74). Saudi efforts in agriculture are examined in Tables 4.38 and 4.39 
(Technical Appendix, section 2: 48-49 ). Its index numbers of agricultural 
production in Table 4.38 display enormous increases over a period of five 
years. If 1979-81 is taken as the base year (i. e., = 100), Saudi index numbers 
increase from 124 in 1982 to 260 in 1986. Corresponding indexes of two 
other Middle Eastern countries Syria, and Israel, and one Asian 
agricultural producer China, do not display such large increases. Further, 
its production in cereals and wheat, shown in Table 4.39, also increase 
tremendously over a period of ten years; - cereals increase from 303,000 
metric tons in 1979-81 to 2.064 million metric tons in 1986, and wheat from 
160,000 metric tons to 2 million metric tons in the same period. However, 
these increases have been achieved at a price. The produce is not cost- 
effective and has been heavily subsidised by the government. Further, 
these farms use scarce water resources, and in the wake of dwindling 
government revenues as well as water resources, it is doubtful if a long 
term agricultural sector is viable in Saudi Arabia. 
To return to the GCC countries, their efforts in livestock in 
Table 4.40 (Technical Appendix, section 2: 50) are observed to be mostly 
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engaged in cattle and sheep which provide them with the major source of 
their meat consumption. Oman has a few thousand head of asses, and 
Qatar horses, but, Saudi Arabia is the largest livestock producer in cattle, 
sheep, horses, asses, and mules. Fertilizer consumption in Table 4.41 
(Technical Appendix, section 2: 51) is low for all GCC countries except 
Saudi Arabia whose efforts in agriculture (especially after 1980) have been 
noted from the previous paragraphs to be an important aspect of 
government policy. 
(c) Fisheries: 
Fishing in the GCC countries is an underdeveloped sector. 
The Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea are rich in marine life. However, as 
indicated in Table 4.42 (Technical Appendix, section 2: 51) Oman, Saudi 
Arabia, and the UAE are the only countries which seem to be exploiting 
the fishing industry. Oman, with direct access to the Arabian Sea, has the 
advantage, and is the largest GCC procurer of fish. However, in spite of 
governmental efforts in subsidising fishing, younger men are found to be 
drifting away from fishing villages towards more lucrative jobs in urban 
areas. 18 
4.7 The GCC Economies Since 2 August 1990: 
The invasion and occupation, of Kuwait by Iraq from 2 
August 1990 to 27 February 1991 had a significant effect on the Middle East. 
The GCC countries most affected by the occupation were Kuwait and Saudi 
Arabia, though the political turmoil and uncertainty that the Iraqi 
invasion created in the region were shared by all GCC members. This 
section examines the effects of the occupation on the GCC countries. It 
- 
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examines Kuwait and Saudi Arabia individually and the other GCC 
countries in a group. 
(a) Kuwait: 
The Iraqi occupation of Kuwait from 2 August to 27 February had 
disastrous consequences for the Emirate. The occupation authorities not 
only systematically plundered the country, but also indulged in rampant 
destruction of the economy. In the aftermath of Kuwait's liberation, the 
United Nations sent a 'fact finding' mission under the leadership of 
Abdulrahim A. Farah, a former Under-Secretary General to ascertain the 
damage sustained by the Emirate. The mission visited Kuwait between 16 
March to 4 April 1991, and: 
"It found itself obliged to begin its task in a country where the 
electric power, telecommunications and transportation systems had 
been wrecked, government buildings and other public institutions 
heavily damaged and most official records and equipment either 
destroyed or looted. Moreover, very few civil servants had 
resumed duty, and the vast majority were still outside the country" 
(United Nations 1991: 13-14) 
Excerpts from the mission's summarised assessment of major damage to 
the Emirate were as follows: 
"The rehabilitation of the oil industry, including the capping and 
control of oil wells, the repair of gathering centres and the 
reconstruction of refineries is expected to exceed US $5 billion. In 
addition, nearly 4 million barrels were being lost daily at the time of 
the mission's visit. This loss will accumulate until the wells are 
controlled and capped". By 14 August 1991, a Financial Times report 
indicated that firefighters in Kuwait had extinguished only 293 of 
the 732 wells set ablaze. 
"Critical parts of the electrical generating capacity and also part of 
the distribution grid were destroyed during the occupation. The 
cost of restoring the electrical system to the standard prevailing 
before the invasion will be of the order of US $1 billion". 
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"The damage suffered by the transport infrastructure was heavy in 
the case of ports and harbours. The national airport also suffered 
major damage. Air transport services not only sustained damage to 
their facilities they also experienced a major theft in equipment. 
The overall losses sustained by ports, the airport and the national 
airline amount to more than US $2 billion" 
"The occupation resulted in at least half of the country's transport 
fleet (buses, long-haul vehicles, tankers, trucks, cars, etc. ) being lost, 
either by their appropriation and removal from the country or by 
destruction. Restoring the fleet to its former level of 560,000 
vehicles is estimated to cost over US $5 billion". 
The countries satellite systems and internal telephone and 
telecommunications network will need replacement equipment to 
the tune of US $1 billion. 
Radio, television, and press services will require US $500 million 
"... to rebuild damaged transmitter stations, to replace the powerful 
transmitters that were either removed or destroyed and to re-equip 
studios, control rooms and printing establishments". 
The Housing sector was the focus of much vandalism and looting, 
............... at a conservative average figure of US $15,000 per dwelling 
unit, it is estimated that total losses to 170,000 housing units will be 
approximately US $2.5 billion". 
"The reconstruction and refurbishing of 800 rooms in damaged 
deluxe and first-class hotels will exceed US $500 million. The group 
of hotel owners contacted has made an estimate of US $100,000 per 
room, which includes the restoration of restaurant and catering 
areas., equipment and all other facilities". 
"To restore government buildings, including the National 
Assembly, and to repair the waterfront, reconstruct the 
International Trade Fair and rehabilitate the sporting clubs and 
other recreational facilities, at least another US $500 million will be 
required". 
"In the banking sector, Kuwait will need to recover valuables taken 
from a very large number of commercial banks. Moreover, 1.3 
million troy ounces of gold valued at close to US $500 million were 
removed from the Central Bank". However, the Iraqi's have since 
returned the gold under UN supervision (Financial Times, 19 
August 1991) 
"The looting of wholesale and retail establishments was massive 
and spared virtually no commercial centre, warehouse or large 
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store. Estimates in this area can only be very tentative, yet losses 
(excluding vehicles) could easily approach US $1 billion" 
"The damage done to the petrochemical industry and other large 
manufacturing activities was large and often characterised by the 
complete removal of modern machinery and equipment and the 
looting of inventories (raw materials, spare parts and finished 
products). Owing to the very large number of affected industrial 
establishments, an accurate quantification will take considerable 
time. However, an amount of damage bordering on US $1 billion 
appears reasonable". 
The report also mentions destruction in other sectors like 
education, health, road network, maintenance equipment, water 
supply and garbage disposal systems, agricultural stations and 
fisheries which it was unable to estimate. 
The report mentions 'hidden losses' which could ......... include 
damage resulting from inadequate care and maintenance, the 
rusting and disintegration of metal components, the solidification 
of liquids or extraneous materials obstructing or blocking popes and 
ducts in refineries, industrial plants and public utilities. Among the 
most important of the unassessed losses is the damage to the oil 
reservoirs". 
Finally, the report includes 'unquantifiable losses' which could 
arise from ............. the down-grading of health facilities, the 
depletion of the national cultural heritage, the irreplaceable school 
year lost to all students, and of course, the degradation of the 
environment. Not one of these can even remotely be assessed in 
finite figures but their impact will be felt by Kuwait for generations 
to come" (see United Nations 1991: 21-23). 
This totals to a conservative estimate of US $20.5 billion. 
Prior to the Iraqi invasion, Kuwait had substantial foreign assets, though it 
has decided to rebuild its country with the help of foreign loans (see 
Financial Times, 26 June 1991). However, it remains to be seen if Kuwait 
will be able to secure such a large sum of money from international banks. 
Further, the cost of the War to Kuwait was enormous. It pledged US $16 
billion to the United States for its support and US $1.1 billion to the 
United Kingdom. By 2nd August 1991, it had paid US $12 billion to the 
USA and US $900 million to the UK. The cost of supporting other Gulf 
economies affected by the crises cost US $2.5 billion, while supporting 
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Kuwaitis' in exile is estimated to have cost US $5 billion. This has 
resulted in it withdrawing around US $22 billion of its cash and quasi cash 
reserves, and has left Kuwait with foreign reserves of around US $70 
billion (The Independent, 2 August 1991). This vast expenditure towards 
evicting the Iraqis out of Kuwait may be yet another reason for its efforts at 
borrowing, as its cash reserves must be heavily depleted. 
(b) Saudi Arabia: 
Saudi Arabia did not" emerge from the war unscathed. 
Although, it did not face any serious structural damage, the cost of the'war 
to it was enormous. By the end of 1990 it had spend US $27.9 billion on 
the war, which has expanded by August 1991 to around US $64 billion on 
the war and associated costs, and the estimate may rise as high as US $80 
billion (Washington Post, 3 April 1991, cited in Sadowski 1991: 5-6). These 
costs would include military costs like the Saudi/British al-Yamamah 
military project which is expected to cost at least E15 billion (Financial 
Times, 8/9 June 1991), and other substantial military agreements as the US 
$10 billion arms purchases from the USA (The Economist 3 August 1991: 
55). Although Saudi Arabia may have benefitted from increased oil 
production and prices in the war, the expense bill is still substantial. This 
has led to the unprecedented situation of Saudi Arabia borrowing US $4.5 
billion through syndicated loans at a margin of 
ý 
over LIBOR (Financial 8 
Times, 8 August 1991). 
(c) Qatar, Oman, Bahrain, and the UAE: 
Qatar, Oman, and Bahrain did not suffer much from the Gulf 
War of 1990-91, though Chase Investment Bank which launched a US $110 
million loan facility for Aluminium Bahrain (ALBA) in June 1991, is 
CHAPTER 4 128 
facing difficulty in raising the money (Financial Times, 8 August 1991). 
The UAE's economy was not greatly affected by the war either, though it 
has suffered a set back from the Bank of Credit and Commerce 
International's (BCCI) liquidation. The Abu Dhabi government and 
members of the ruling family hold 77 percent of BCCI. Liabilities of BCCI 
in the UAE are estimated to be about US $2 billion, with US $1.4 billion 
attributed to the goverment and the rest to 35,000 private depositors. The 
government is expected to write off its own deposits, and compensate 
other depositors from its own resources (Financial Times, 2 August 1991). 
The bank is supposed to have raised more than US $20 billion from 
depositors and creditors by lying about its financial condition and hiding 
the identity of its owners. It created fictitious transactions to hide losses of 
more than US $5 billion (The Economist, 3 August 1991: 21). The 
following diagrammatic representation of the BCCI's customers (The 
Independent,, 16 July 1991) is interesting: 
BCCI's Luxembourg Holdings 
that indicate troubled loans as 
identified by the auditors Price 





The Gulf Group 405 
Sheikh Kamal Adham 313 
Ghaith Pharaon 288 
Offshore Companies 212 
Sheikh of Fujairah 186 
Bin Mahfouz Family 153 
Abdel Raouf Khalil 150 
Ibrahim Family 132 
Sheikh Mohammed bin 
Rashid al-Maktourn 121 
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Mohammed, M Hammoud 110 
Sheikh of Ajman 86 
1 
These loans from these creditors alone add up to US $2.156 billion dollars. 
The list is significant, as it contains three royal family members of the 
different UAE Emirates, of which two are outright rulers. With the 
exception of the Gulf Group whose owners are Pakistani in origin, the rest 
of the group consist of prominent Saudi Businessmen. 
The Abu Dhabi government injected about US $1 billion of 
new finance into the bank (Financial Times 20/21 July 1991). Further, on 
22 May 1991 it agreed to re-finance US $3.061 billion of BCCI's troubled 
loans (Financial Times, 3/4 August 1991). The liquidation of BCCI by the 
Bank of England on the Sth of July 1991 incensed the Abu Dhabi 
government so much that it inserted a full page statement in the Financial 
Times on 22 July 1991, condemning the Bank of England's action. 
However, the repercussion of the closure is still being felt. In the United 
States, two sons of Sheikh Zayed, the ruler of Abu Dhabi and two of his 
advisers have been implicated in an indictment on the BCCI 
investigations. There can be no doubt that the BCCI affair has had a major 
effect on the UAE. 
4.8 Summary: 
This chapter endeavours to examine the political economies of the 
GCC countries in the light of a number of factors. It commences with the 
establishment and consolidation of individual GCC states during the rapid 
decline of Ottoman rule in the Middle East in the late 19th and early 20th 
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centuries. The economies of the GCC are analysed with the help of data 
in forty four tables and twenty six figures. The economic analysis seeks to 
examine natural resources, population, ý the rural-urban divide, and 
financial indicators which include GDP, capital formation, international 
reserves and trade. Further, GCC governmental receipts and 
disbursements are examined, and their involvement in expenditure in 
education, research and development, and health. The achievements of 
manufacturing industry, infrastructure, energy, agriculture, livestock, and 
fisheries during the years of GCC development (1975-1989) is examined as 
well. Finally, the GCC economies are examined in the aftermath of the 
Gulf war of 1990-91, and the effects on Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the other 
GCC countries is noted, with mention being made of the losses incurred by 
the UAE as a result of the BCCI liquidation. 
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This chapter which consists of the second dimension of the 
thesis, is intended to provide an overview of the labour market in the 
GCC. Its structure has three tiers - labour in the GCC prior to 1973, labour 
in the post 1973 era, and the effects of migration on the indigenous 
population. Prior to 1973, British influence on labour policy and the 
influx of Arab labour is observed. In the post 1973 period, the decline of 
Arab migration, the entry of South Asian and East Asian labour into the 
market, as well as the effects of this migration on Arab and Asian labour 
exporting countries is examined. Finally, a brief review of the structure of 
indigenous labour is performed. This review covers the role of women, 
nationality and residence laws in the GCC. 
5.2 An Overview of the Labour Market in the GCC Prior to 1973: 
(a) The Situation of Labour in the GCC prior to the Second World War: 
Migration in the Middle East is not a recent development. It 
existed in the 'pre-modern' Islamic world, and in the opinion of Abu- 
Lughod (1983: 238) could be bracketed under three groups - the migration 
of the ulama or religious bureaucracy whose skills as judges, civil servants 
or educators were appreciated throughout the Muslim world, the periodic 
movement of armies or tribal groups related to military crises, and the less 
organised movement of pilgrims toward Mecca. The discovery of oil in 
the beginning of the 20th century kindled European interest in the 
Arabian Gulf. European efforts, at expanding their Gulf interests were 
hindered by Britain which had ensconced itself in the Gulf since the late 
19th century, and maintained its preponderance among all the major oil 
producers - Iran, Iraq, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and the Trucial 
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States MAE). The only country not in the British sphere of influence was 
Saudi Arabia, which granted oil concessions to the Americans. The oil 
market was dominated by giant oil companies which had to adhere to 
British interests. As a result, labour inflows during 1900 to 1945 were: 
"determined by political and strategic, rather than commercial 
concerns" (Seccombe and Lawless 1986: 548). 
During this period, the composition of labour was 
characterised by two aspects; the need for professional and managerial staff 
in oil exploration or management, and labour for administrative and 
construction work related to oil production. Whilst the first category had 
to be imported from Europe or America, the second could have been 
procured from local labour. However, as the local labour was involved in 
traditional activities of pearl diving, fishing and seasonal labour 
migration, the oil companies concluded that it would have been less time 
consuming and financially expedient to import labour from outside the 
Gulf states. Ideally, labour from Iran, Iraq or other Arab countries would 
have been satisfactory for clerical or construction work, but British 
political interests had to be taken into consideration. 
Over the years 1820-1916, Britain had concluded a series of 
treaties with local rulers which gave it control over the 'external affairs' of 
these Gulf countries. British authority was vested in the office of the 
'Political Resident' who was the British government's representative in 
these states. Thus, the British government only allowed the oil 
companies to bring in managerial and technical staff from Britain, and 
clerical staff, artisans, and semi-skilled labour from British India. The 
British had two objectives; they wanted to limit the influence of the 
Americans in the area; and not upset the delicate balance of the local 
population by importing a large Arab Iabour contingent. In a few cases 
where the oil companies successfully employed American professionals - 
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as in the case of the Kuwait Oil Company's employment of an American 
geologist in 1935, the British government's reaction was to insist that in 
future: 
"the company submit a monthly list of all non-British and non- 
Kuwaiti employees in order that they might monitor the 
level"(Seccombe and Lawless 1986: 555) 
The exception to Britain's domination of Gulf labour policy 
was Saudi Arabia, where the British government had minimal influence. 
The Saudi government insisted on Saudi labour being used in any 
possible capacity, and was reluctant to allow British Indians into the 
country. Further, in cases where Saudi labour was unequal to the task, the 
Saudi's insisted on their replacement by Arab labour. In the 1940's a strict 
quota was imposed on British Indian immigration into Saudi Arabia. In 
addition, the Saudi's directly controlled labour immigration to the 
kingdom, by making the employment of foreign workers subject to the 
approval of the Ministry of Finance in Jeddah. 
(b) The Structure of Labour in the GCC between the Second World War 
and Oil Boom (1945-1973) - The influx of Arab Labour: 
The culmination of the Second World War resulted in the 
decline of British influence in the Middle East. In contrast to the royalties 
they were paying in the 1940's, by the 1950's, the oil companies were 
induced upon by local governments' to share around 50 percent of their 
profits. In addition, the GCC countries began to take greater interest in 
their internal affairs, especially in labour immigration. Nevertheless, 
labour inflows into these countries were still modest and did not warrant 
active governmental interference. 
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During 1945-1973, migration between Arab and the GCC 
countries consisted primarily of commerce, nomadism, family links and 
pilgrimages. Further: 
"politics in the form of traditional autocracy and stagnant economic 
conditions also played their part in smaller migrations"Malliday 
1984: 4) 
particularly in the flow of the Yemenis in the north in the 1950's and the 
Omani's during the long rule of Sultan Said bin Taimur. However, two 
major migratory flows took place in this period. The first was the 
consequence of the first Arab-Israeli war of 1948, when the Arab states in 
general and Kuwait in particular, were the recipients of a large influx of 
Palestinian refugees. The second took place in the aftermath of the 1967 
Arab-Israeli war, when Israel's annexation of the west bank of Jordan led 
to the migration of yet more' Palestinians. In addition, the 1967 war 
radically affected Egypt which lost its Sinai oil-fields and canal. As a result, 
the government eased restrictions on migration and 'outmigration' from 
Egypt began, not only of skilled and professional workers, but also of 
unskilled workers (see Abu-Lughod 1983: 239-243). The post 1973 period 
led to a scale of migration unprecedented in modern migratory history. 
The scale and composition of this migration will be covered in the next 
section. 
5.3 The Post 1973 Years: 
(a) A Brief outline of Labour Migration since 1973: 
The Arab-Israeli war in 1973 is an important landmark in the 
turbulent history of the Middle East. An Arab oil embargo against the 
Developed World during the war, resulted in dramatic increases in oil 
prices. Oil prices continued to remain high during the mid 70's and 
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further price increases were assisted by the Iranian revolution in 1979. 
Thus, between the years 1973 to 1982, the GCC countries were recipients of 
enormous sums of money which they used in modernising their 
infrastructure and economies. The period between 1982-1988 has been a 
period of recession in the GCC, with oil prices and demand at a low level. 
Since 1988, the recession had been improving, but the Gulf War of 1990 
has destablised prices, though Saudi Arabia's decision to compensate the 
world oil market for the loss of Iraq and Kuwait's oil by increasing its 
production has had a soothing effect on oil markets. 
Since 1973, the GCC countries have been the destination of 
labour from a large number of countries around the world, with the 
largest contingents arriving from other Arab countries, South Asia and 
East Asia. The labour market in the GCC states has been very diverse, and 
consists of a wide range of skilled and unskilled labour. In the early years 
of the boom, the GCCs investment in infra-structural and industrial 
modernisation led to the construction sector's pre-eminence among other 
sectors. Between 1971 to 1977, it has been estimated that construction 
absorbed between 11 and 58 percent of the non - agricultural labour force 
in the labour importing states of Bahrain, Kuwait, Libya, Oman, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia and UAE (Shaw 1979: 590). 
The GCC countries immediate response to the boom in 1973 
was to continue to import large contingents of labour from the traditional 
Arab sources of Egypt and Jordan. But, though Arabs constituted the 
majority of migrant workers, the proportionate increase of Asian'labour in 
the post 1973 era was dramatic. A study performed by Kuwait's Central 
Statistical Office in 1987, found that the Asian labour force in the Gulf 
which grew at the rate of less than 5 percent of the total work force in 1975, 
had grown to nearly 30 percent in 1980. Arab labour decreased from 69.1 
percent of the total workforce in 1975 to 58.1 percent in 1980, while the 
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Asians, increased in the same period from 27.9 percent of the total 
workforce to 38.5 percent (Arab Times, 1 February 1989). The primary 
reason for this increase in Asian labour could be observed in Birks and 
Sinclair's (1983: 197) assertion that: 
"in the mid-1970's, just when Arab labour was becoming short in 
supply, expensive and of less predictable quality (as the potential 
maximum level of Arab exports was neared), Indian and Pakistani 
labour of known skill and capability became available quickly and 
easily. This regularisation of the Asian-Arabian labour flow by 
agents, who could above all supply labour speedily, encouraged the 
rapid increase in utilisation of Indian and Pakistani labour in the 
capital rich states during the period of their most frenetic 
development". 
By the end of the 1970's, the GCC's increased appetite for 
industrialisation and establishment of a basis for a future non-oil 
economy further increased the inflow of foreigm labour into their 
countries. At its peak in 1981, the number of foreign workers in the Gulf 
stood at 7.5 million, with the majority in Saudi Arabia (Emirates News, 11 
June 1985). However, this period was distinct in two unique aspects - the 
influx of East Asian 'labour from South Korea, Taiwan, Philippines, 
mainland China, Indonesia and Thailand, and their development of the 
'enclave approach'. The 'enclave' approach consisted of contracting firms 
who entered the Gulf market by undertaking immense projects. These 
firms brought their ý own labour, established work camps and maintained 
their own basic services. Nevertheless, as Ling (1984: 22) observes, it was 
not the above mentioned East Asian countries who started the 'enclave' 
approach, but the Japanese in the mid 1970's. The Japanese were not very 
successful as a result of a 'residual anti-colonist' feeling from their East 
Asian and notably South Korean employees. The South Korean's on the 
other hand experienced phenomenal success in Saudi Arabia. 
"Although small in size, late to enter the market, and relatively 
inexperienced, a number of South Korean firms effectively 
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penetrated the market (in Saudi Arabia) and emerged as the leading 
contractors in the early 1980s in an area formerly dominated by the 
US and other Western industrial nations" (Moon 1986: 614). 
Moon, attributes this success to the 'dynamic interplay' of 
three factors; a large and diversified contract market, effective market 
penetration strategies, and the supportive and co-ordinating role of the 
Korean government in facilitating market penetration. The Koreans 
combined 'price competitiveness, 'aggressive risk taking', and 'effective 
handling of commissions' with hard work and efficiency. An example 
could probably be more illuminating. To secure the contract for the 
construction of the Jubail Industrial Port project in Saudi Arabia, the 
Korean company Hyundai's bid of US$ 931 million was said to be almost 
US$ 500 million less than the second lowest bid by a West German firm. 
In addition, Korean firms paid larger commission fees for agents who 
secured the projects for them. While Saudi laws state that commission to 
an agent should not exceed 5 percent, Korean firms initially paid up to 30 
or 40 percent commission. Finally, when the contract was secured, Korean 
firms used a variety of methods (like incentives for 3 eight hour shifts a 
day) to complete the work ahead of time and enjoy a large profit. Thus 
Hyundai made substantial profits from the Jubail Industrial Port project by 
completing it two years ahead of schedule (See Moon 1986: 617-620). 
The positive experience of Saudi Arabia encouraged the other 
GCC countries to adopt the 'enclave approach'. Ecevit (1981: 264) sums up 
the popularity of the 'enclave approach' well, when he states that: 
"The work camp approach to labour recruitment became 
exceedingly attractive to the host countries primarily because it 
provided physical separation of the expatriate labour from the local 
community, lowered recruitment costs and alleviated pressures on 
housing and other basic services". 
The 1980's has been a decade of decline for the fortunes of expatriate 
labour in the Middle East. The world economic recession resulted in a 
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decline in oil prices, and a reduction in government expenditure. 
Between 1986 and 1990, it is estimated that around 2 million expatriates' 
working in the GCC will have been repatriated to their own countries 
(Arab Oil and Gas 1986: 24). The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 led to the 
exodus of hundreds of thousands of expatriate workers from Kuwait. Its 
population on 1 July 1991 was 1.2 million (Financial Times, 8 July 1991), 
which if subtracted from a preinvasion of 2.1 million accounts for an 
exodus that almost reaches a million. However, as the economy recovers, 
the inflow of expatriate labour is expected to resume. 
(b) The Economic, Political, and Social Effects of Labour Migration on 
the Sending Countries: 
While the previous section intended to provide an overview 
of the situation of the labour market existing in the GCC nations since 
1973, this section examines the effects of the labour inflow into the GCC on 
the sending countries. ' Most recruiting agents in labour exporting 
countries are based in urban areas, and in the Arab labour exporting 
countries, emigration to the GCC for employment is one of the primary 
factors involved in rural-urban migration. Berouti (1976: 171) observed 
that: 
"while the emigration of skilled personnel often aggravates 
manpower imbalances in sending countries, rural-urban migration 
leads to various forms of labour underutilisation and poverty in 
urban areas". 
The effects of temporary emigration of labour in the non Arab world does 
not play as vital a part in rural-urban migration as in the Arab world. 
The social composition of the Arab labour force has a 
significant effect on the indigenous population and as a result will be 
examined in a later section covering the effect of qXpatriate labour on the 
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local population. On the other hand, the composition of the Asian 
workers merit further discussion. The Asian labour force though 
differing in the origin and destination of the workers, exhibit certain 
synonymous characteristics: 
"The majority of migrants are married males who are 
predominantly of rural origin. Largely because of the long hours 
and often harsh working and living conditions, the majority are 
young (more than two-thirds are 20-35 years old). They tend to be 
better educated than the original population as a whole" (Arnold 
and Shah 1984: 294). 
While a large number of these Asian workers are employed in 
construction and transport, the most 'distinct feature' among them is their 
concentration in certain blue-collar occupations - carpenters, masons, 
electricians, plumbers, lorry drivers, mechanics, and heavy equipment 
operators (see Abella 1984: 492). In many cases their vulnerability to 
deportation or their need of money has resulted in their exploitation by 
unscrupulous employers. MacShane (1991: 16) is of the opinion that: 
"The entire economy of the region is based on an abuse of foreign 
labour, with a wholesale denial of labour rights for which there are 
few parallels, and about which there continues to be a conspiracy of 
silence". 
Further, with the exception of sport, their recreational 
facilities are limited, and there are few places of worship for non-Muslims. 
(see Owen 1985: 12). An excellent example of the boredom expatriate 
workers face is observed from the reply given by a Pakistani worker to a 
query by a journalist as to how long he had been in Saudi Arabia. He 
replied: 
" 10,456 hours, 627,360 minutes, or 37,641,600 seconds. Take your 
pick. This is the only country in the world where you count every 
second and minute" (Financial Times, 12 December 1990). 
Moreover, the application of double standards to the treatment meted out 
to indigenous and expatriate Iabour is strikingly evident. The example of 
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Kuwaits complaint to the Brussels based International Confederation of 
Free Trade Unions for assistance in publicising the murder of Kuwaiti 
union officials during the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait in 1990 is one such 
case. The irony of the situation was that Kuwait is a member of the 
Moscow based World Federation of Trade Unions, which was never 
critical of the suppression of labour rights by its affiliated members. 
(MacShane 1991: 16) 
However, though the treatment of expatriate labour in the 
GCC is not commensurate with that meted out to indigenous labour 
whose every need and desire is pandered unto, expatriate labour prefer to 
seek employment in these countries. The primary reason for this state of 
affairs is the tremendous wage differentials between the GCC countries 
and their home countries, which enable thern'to remit home large sums 
of money. These remittances have become an important source of income 
to most labour exporting countries and warrants further discussion. 
The GCC countries are not reliable sources of information on 
expatriate labour in their countries. This is a result of expatriate labour 
constituting a major segment of the workforce. The GCC nations are 
extremely sensitive of their vulnerability to the presence of a large foreign 
workforce, and tend to disguise statistics on the extent of foreign labour. 
The major studies on remittances from the GCC countries have primarily 
been carried out on segments of the population of labour exporting 
countries. Most studies have been performed on Asian labour exporting 
countries because Asian central banks attempt to monitor earnings 
remitted by their overseas workers, and in most cases provide incentive 
schemes for labour to invest in their home countries'. Arnold and Shah 
(1984: 301), estimate that Asian labour remit over 50 percent of total 
earnings, with South Korea in particular requiring overseas workers to 
remit 80 percent of their earnings, which is deposited directly by the 
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companies that employ them in their bank accounts at home. (Stahl and 
Arnold 1986: 901) According to a World Bank (1981: 495) estimate, 
remittances to Asia increased from US$ 200 million in 1968 to US$ 3.9 
billion in 1978. Since the early 1980's annual Asian worker remittances 
are estimated at around US$ 8 billion (Stahl and Arnold 1986: 899). 
While statistics on other expatriate labour is difficult to 
ascertain, it can be assumed that remittances to their home countries is 
substantial. However, though remittances contribute significantly to most 
labour exporting countries, their effects are not always positive. Most of 
the studies discovered that remittances were primarily directed to the 
improvement of the level of household expenditure on basic needs rather 
than towards investment or productive activity. This would include the 
purchase of land, house, consumer goods, debt repayment, or education. 
Stahl (1982: 875-876), concedes that though the marginal propensity to 
consume out of remittance earnings is very high, remittances provide an 
'uniquely inexpensive' source of foreign exchange. Finally, though the 
inflow of remittances have been criticised for their lack of investment and 
long term instability, it must be remembered that: 
"most migrants are workers, not risk-taking entrepreneurs, and they 
feel a need to be cautious in their investments. Once they return, they 
do not have substantial resources to fall back on if they undertake an 
investment which proves to be a failure. In such a case, everything 
would be lost, and two, three, or more years of loneliness and drudgery 
would have been endured for nothing. Under the circumstance it is 
naive to expect that the overseas work experience will transform a poor 
working peasant into an industrial entrepreneur" (Stahl and Arnold 
1986: 914). 
The role of the governments in the labour exporting states is 
crucial to the migration of labour. Prince Hassan Talal of Jordan (1984: 
610) is of the opinion that the market forces of demand and supply should 
have no control over manpower migration if the extent of the migration 
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in the labour importing countries reaches 50 percent of its total labour 
force. However, the reality of the situation is that most Asian and Arab 
governments adopt a laissez-faire policy to emigration. This is 
compounded by the fact that even when labour exporting countries 
endeavour to monitor the welfare of their citizens in the Gulf countries, 
their officials are hampered by local bureaucracy, the lack of labour laws, 
labour courts, and the enormous power of the local sponsor. Further, 
labour exporting countries have to take into account the sensitivities of 
Gulf governments' to the accusation of expatriate labour exploitation in 
their countries which they vehemently deny. When the Philippine 
government suspended exit visas for maids and nannies to Saudi Arabia 
because of rampant abuses on them, the Saudi government forced it to 
withdraw the restrictions by threatening to stop all Philippine nationals 
from entering the Kingdom (Financial Times, 12 December 1990). In 
addition, the migration of unskilled and unemployed labour is 
particularly welcome to labour exporting countries, as it frees that portion 
of the GDP for alternative purposes of consumption or investment. 
Further, in rural areas, emigration of the unskilled and unemployed 
would increase land labour ratio productivity, and the capacity for growth 
(see Stahl 1982: 878-879). The en-dgration of skilled and professional labour 
is considered temporary, and in less magnitude in comparison to 
migration of unskilled workers. 
A classic example of governmental interference in labour 
migration is Egypt prior to 1970, when labour was not encouraged to 
migrate. However by 1970, Egypt found that it was supporting over twice 
the number, of university students its industrial infrastructure could 
support and three times the number of engineers (Ayubi 1983: 434). Thus, 
when in 1970 Egypt allowed migration of workers to the Gulf States, what 
had been a trickle grew to tidal proportions. The interesting aspect of 
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Egyptian emigration was a large scale exodus to the Gulf states of the 
skilled industrial workforce in the manufacturing sector. This resulted in 
public enterprises drawing up regulations which included the prohibition 
of the rehire of production workers who resign or leave, in order to 
protect their productivity. In contrast, non-production and management 
employees were allowed up to four years renewable unpaid leaves-of- 
absence, with guaranteed rehire and retention of seniority and pension 
benefits (LaTowsky 1984: 14). While this indicates the overstaffing in these 
sectors, prohibitive measures intended to strike a balance in emigration do 
not always succeed. South Yemen sought to curtail emigration by 
presenting it in political terms as the scourge of growth and development. 
However, it found it difficult to attract labour back from the Gulf States 
where they were enjoying substantial wages and consumption benefits. 
Restriction on emigration was found to create resentment (see Halliday 
1984: 10). 
Finally, the effects of labour migration requires brief 
examination. Emigration has a significant effect on most labour exporting 
countries, and: 
"in the face of skilled labour shortages, the benefits of remittances to 
the economies of the labour-exporting states are no longer seen as 
clear cut ...... the unskilled, who have a high propensity to remit 
comprise a falling proportion of migrants, and increased numbers 
of dependents are moving to the countries of employment" 
(Serageldin et al. 1983: 32). 
While it is questionable whether unemployment is eased by labour 
migration, it is a fact that labour migration leads to shortages in sectors of 
the economy. If emigration leads to shortage in certain skills, the 
industries involved will either have to increase wages to prevent 
migration or replace lost workers with 'imperfect substitute labour' (Stahl 
1982: 879). The first option could result in inflation, and the second in 
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training costs - the magnitude of which would depend on the suitability of 
the replacement labour. Further, mass migration could lead to the labour 
exporting'countries importing replacement labour from other states as in 
the cases of Yemen and Jordan (Fergany 
. 
1982; Keely and Saket 1984). 
Finally, 'de-skilling' may occur in the employment destinations. For the 
migrants, the opportunity to use their skills to their maximum capabilities 
is not always possible, and in many cases, their jobs involve activities that 
are below their potential. If they are employed in the job for a few years, 
the migrants skills acquired before emigration could diminish or be lost 
altogether. 
5.4 The Role of Indigenous Labour in the GCQ 
(a) Population and Education as a Pool of Resources for the Labour 
market: 
The greatest obstacle to the GCCs efforts in prescribing 
independent and effective development policies is its deficiency in 
manpower resources. In spite of very high growth rates' 2 the individual 
GCC countries lack sizable populations. In 1989/90, Bahrain had a 
population of, 458,000; Kuwait, 2.03 million (pre-invasion); Oman, 1.472 
million; Qatar, 397,000; Saudi Arabia 13.489 million; and the UAE, 1.681 
million (The Military Balance 1989: 93-118). Thus, while in totality the 
GCC could claim a population of just under 20 million (in 1989), the 
reality of the situation is that a sizable percentage of this population 
consist of expatriate labour. In 1987, a report published in Bahrain stated 
that citizens in Oman formed 75.2 percent of the total population, 47.7 
percent in Qatar, 40 percent in Kuwait, and only 36.2 percent in the U. A. E. 
(Arab Times, 15 June 1987). Further, the majority of the indigenous 
population is below the age of 16, and this contributes to the paucity of the 
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numerical size of the indigenous Iabour force. So,. when the structure of 
the labour force is examined, surprise should not be expressed at the 
fragility of the indigenous workforce. 
An excellent representation of this could be noted in the 
distribution of local and foreign manpower in the public and private 
sectors in the UAE and Bahrain. These two countries are at opposite ends 
of the labour scale. The UAE, with its minuscule population and its 
massive development needs contains an enormous expatriate labour 
force, while Bahrain, with the most sophisticated indigenous labour force 
of the GCC countries has a relatively smaller expatriate labour inflow. To 
indicate this statistically; in 1986, UAE local workers constituted 32 percent 
of the public sector and 15 percent of the private sector. Bahrain on the 
other hand, could boast of the public sector constituting 78 percent of local 
workers, and a private sector of 55 percent (Al-Ahram al-Iqtisadi, 14 July 
1986: 46-47). 
The GCC's manpower resource problems are compounded by 
the literacy levels of the existing population. Although tremendous 
progress has been made in literacy levels since 1971, the GCC countries 
have some way to go. The GCC's 1985 figures in descending order of 
illiteracy, indicates that 70 percent of Oman's population is illiterate, 42.1 
percent of Saudi Arabia's, 40 percent of the UAE's, 29.4 percent of 
Kuwait's, 27.1 percent of Bahrain's, and 24.3 percent of Qatar's 
population. 3 
The governments of the GCC countries in cognizance of the 
literacy problem have invested heavily in education. Further, they have 
undertaken additional measures which are controversial enough to 
deserve mention in this analysis. A classic example is the UAE Education 
Minister's order of 17 January 1988 regarding the admission in 
government schools of national and expatriate students. While the order 
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indicates the age of admission of children to government schools, it 
specifically states that expatriate children could be admitted to government 
elementary schools, but government secondary schools will be limited to 
Arab children. Further, the order clearly states that admission to Arab 
children will be undertaken in the following order of precedence: 
first preference: children of Nationals, male and female 
second preference: children of UAE passport holders 
third preference: children of GCC citizens 
fourth preference: children of residents who have documents 
indicating that they are entitled to obtain UAE 
nationality 
fifth preference: children of members of the Arab diplomatic 
corps and Arab regional organisations, residents 
of the UAE carrying diplomatic documents 
issued outside the UAE and children of the 
employees of UAE federal and local departments 
of public corporations (Al Khaleej, 18 January 
1988). 
These policies result in the segregation of national and expatriate children. 
While national children are given every encouragement to enter 
government schools, non-national children are discouraged from doing 
so. This would mean that non-national children would have to be catered 
to by private schools. However, the governments of these countries also 
maintain a strict control on private schools. Kuwait for example, makes 
governmental grants to private schools subject to Ministry of Education 
rules, one of which maintain that at least 90 percent of the administrative 
and teaching staff have to be Muslims and the schools have to be open to 
all nationalities (Arab Times, 11 April 1985). 
While the reasons for these GCC policies could be understood 
in the light of their paranoia at being culturally overwhelmed by a large 
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expatriate population, they could prove to be detrimental in the long run. 
Segregation of the workforce will inevitably lead to discontent among the 
expatriate workers. This discontent could be further fuelled by the visage 
of the pampered and economically protected GCC citizens. The 
expression of discontent can be curtailed by exploiting the vulnerability of 
expatriate workers to deportation or with the use of draconian security 
measures, but it must be remembered, that the GCC countries rely on the 
expatriate work force to perform important tasks. The irony of GCC efforts 
in segregation and financial encouragement for their populations is that 
they have unwittingly cushioned their labour force from vital labour 
sectors. To illustrate this with statistics concerning Kuwaiti labour in 1983, 
it was observed that Kuwaiti labour was primarily found in social and 
personal services - 77.2 percent of total local labour force. Only 7.58 percent 
were involved in transport and storage industries, and only 3.89 percent in 
hotel, catering and retail business. The construction sector employed 
entirely non-Kuwaitis (Arab Times, 17 July 1983). Even in the aftermath 
of the Iraqi occupation of 1990-91, when Kuwait is in desperate need of all 
its citizens performing any development work, very few are willing to 
desert the well paid and secure jobs they held in pre invasion Kuwait, 
though in most cases the need for them in other sectors is far greater 
(Financial Times, 8 July 1991). This vulnerability is not at all conducive to 
GCC grandiose schemes aimed at creating an autarkic economy, especially 
when they choose to ignore that the framework upon which they are 
building the economy is unsubstantial. 
While governmental effort and enthusiasm in promoting 
education and literacy in the GCC cannot be questioned, the vocation 
among students should be. As figures 5.1 to 5.10 indicate, the vast 
majority of students are involved in non-scientific fields, with the most 
popular vocations being teacher training, religion and theology, and 
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commerce and business administration. The figures do not indicate a 
reverse in this trend in 1985 from comparisons to 1980. Further, as most 
graduates are guaranteed a job by their governments on the completion of 
their studies, they are absorbed in the civil service or government 
departments which provide them with secure jobs. The results are 
twofold; the departments which absorb graduates are chronically 
overstaffed and inefficient, and industry and commerce suffer from a 
shortage of qualified educated manpower. The situation is further 
compounded by the fact that: 
"educational systems in the Arab Gulf States, and in other Arab 
countries place emphasis on preparing students for general 
administrative jobs. The system is not designed to develop 
scientific capability and technical skills which form the basis for 
meeting the demands for development" (Rasheed 1984: 176). 
Thus, the embodiment of education as an instrument of progress in 
society has questionable benefits for the GCC countries. 
(b) The role of Women in the Labour Market in the GCC: 
The majority of scholars who have examined the role of 
women in the Middle East, have not really taken into account the 
contributions of Islam. This has led to generalisations 'on' the role of 
women and 'what' the role should be, which provide an excellent 
yardstick of analysis in Western terms of thought but offence and derision 
in Arab and Middle Eastern terms of thought. Islam in itself has made 
more positive than negative contributions to the lot of women, but Arab 
cultural considerations, cloaked in the guise of Islam, have weaned the 
status of women into the traditions of Arab society. Unfortunately, 
Western emphasis on particular tenets of Arab and Middle Eastern 
tradition on women, as for example the veiling of women, which 
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incidently was supposed to have originated in Palmyra and was practiced 
in the Byzantine empire (see Keddie and Beck 1978: 25), ignores that Arab 
society is changing, the change is coming from within, and the change will 
not conform to Western modes of thinking. 
Mernissi (1975: introduction xvii). summed up the different 
ideologies involved in the change of the status of women in the Middle 
East perfectly, when she stated that: 
"while the women's liberation movement in the West focuses on 
the woman and her claim for equality with men, in Muslim 
countries it would tend to focus on the mode of relatedness between 
the sexes and thus would probably be led by men and women alike. 
Because men can see how the oppression of women works against 
men, women's liberation would assume the character of a 
generational conflict, rather than a sexual conflict". 
This point is re-emphasised by Suad Joseph (1986: 3-4) who was of the 
opinion that women do not choose the 'moment' and 'context' of their 
political involvement. Their participation is evoked by the state, rulers, or 
by others in authority. As they are mobilised, they may begin to assume: 
"for themselves and others, public identities apart from the private 
ones of kin and community". 
The role of women in the labour force in the GCC in general 
and in Saudi Arabia in particular are strictly subjected to the dictates of 
Islam and indigenous tradition. Further, information on the region with 
regard to the participation of women in the workforce is scarce and 
analysis on the subject is even scarcer. One source of information can be 
found in Kamala Nath's (1978) examination of education and 
employment among Kuwaiti women. Nath found that Kuwait, with its 
maritime trading tradition, found it easier to accept women into the 
workforce in the wake of its oil wealth. Initially, the first women to 
experience education were the daughters of the merchant elite who had 
power and influence in the communities. To the Kuwaiti government: 
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"educated career women were regarded as a symbol of 
modernisation of the community. The first women graduates who 
came out to work were treated as celebrities. They were interviewed 
by journalists, and the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting 
prepared brochures on them to show visitors to Kuwait how 
Kuwaiti women were participating in and contributing to the 
progress of the country .......... if a suitable job did not exist when a 
particular Kuwaiti woman applied for employment, an entire new 
section was created in a department to provide one for her" (Nath 
1978: 180-181). 
This sort of encouragement towards women joining the labour force has 
been prevalent in all the GCC countries. However, the societies in these 
countries prefer women to enter professions like teaching, social work, or 
medicine. Women working as bank clerks, personal secretaries, 
saleswomen, or in entertainment are frowned upon. Nath found that the 
degrees of most female graduates were all in liberal arts with one 
exception (see Nath 1978: 179). Tbough it could be argued that these 
women's contribution to the workforce is limited, it must be remembered 
that their very participation in the workforce is a positive element in their 
struggle for greater cultural and social freedom. The gradual attempts at 
the emancipation of Gulf women is further demonstrated in the vote in 
the Kuwaiti assembly of 19 January 1982 to grant women suffrage in the 
Emirate. Although the vote was defeated by 27 votes to 7 (Financial 
Times, 13 March 1990), the significance of the vote itself is testimony to the 
metamorphosis occuring in Gulf society. 
The position of women in the Gulf society is as different as 
the individual countries they live in. In the Wahhabi dominated 
countries of Saudi Arabia and Qatar, their participation in society is rigidly 
defined. Saudi Arabia only allows its women to conduct business under 
strict Islamic principles - completely veiled, no contact with the opposite 
sex and so on, and in Qatar, their position is very restricted. The Times (12 
November 1985), rather cynically, but truthfully states that in the case of 
Qatari women: 
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"most marry young, and are busy providing the country with its 
three percent growth in local population". 
On the other hand, Bahrain, Oman and the UAE allow their women to 
participate in many aspects of their societies and economies. Bahrain has 
the highest percentage of working women in the Gulf (International 
Herald Tribune, 11 April 1984), while Omani women are visible in the 
airport as immigration officers, policewomen and in other professions 
(Times, 12 November 1985). The UAE also does not insist on restrictions 
on their women in work or in other economic related activities. 
Over time, the status of women in the more liberally minded 
Gulf states of Oman, Bahrain and the UAE is bound to wear down the 
resistance of the fundamentally minded elements restricting the lot of 
their sisters in Saudi Arabia and Qatar. The difficulty faced by 
conservative elements in these societies. is that the participation by most 
Gulf women in the economies have borne testimony to Sanad and 
Tessler's (1988: 444) assertion that many Arab women seek change within 
the framework of their own cultural system, with a blend of traditional 
and non-indigenous social codes to adhere to. - 
(c) The effects of Nationality, Law, and Residence Policy on Labour in 
the GCC: 
The GCC countries have developed rapidly since the 
discovery of oil in the early 20th century. As noted throughout this 
chapter, the 1973 oil price rises resulted in large inflows of foreign labour 
into these countries. For the first time since the early days of Islam, the 
GCC countries were innundated with enormous wealth. Faced with this 
wealth and the experience of centuries of poverty and hardship, these 
countries formulated residence and nationality laws that have protected 
and enriched their 'original' inhabitants. The original inhabitants are the 
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indigenous population who were residents of the GCC prior to the 
discovery of oil in the early 20th century. 
An examination of GCC residence laws, indicates a 
haphazard pattern. While all GCC countries carefully monitor their 
residents, their residence laws depend upon the demand of labour in their 
markets which in turn is influenced by the economic situation. This is 
especially the case among individual GCC countries, which formulate 
residence policies that conform to the framework of their developmental 
objectives. Prior to the Iraqi invasion of 1990, Kuwait, for instance, in 
response to the the recession in the GCC economies during 1982-88, had 
eased certain restrictions on labour in the country. Expatriates could 
transfer work permits from the private to the government sectors (a move 
that was strictly forbidden before), and residence can be transferred from 
one sponsor to another after two years of work, in lieu of the existing three 
years (Al Qabas, 15 July 1990). Although, at present, Kuwait has tightened 
its visas on expatriates, especially on Palestinians, its enormous 
developmental requirements will necessitate expatriate labour on a large 
scale again. Bahrain, which is facing the prospects of a non-oil economy, 
has relaxed visa restrictions on foreigners in a bid to attract more tourists. 
In a remarkable move (by GCC standards), it has stipulated that tourists, 
businessmen, or relatives of residents would receive an automatic seven 
day visa from 1 June, 1990 if they have valid passports, return air tickets, 
or were not seeking employment. Further, any foreigner residing in other 
GCC countries with a residence permit that is valid for at least six months 
would fall under the same category (Oman, 11 June 1990). 
The UAE in consolidating its development as a trade centre, 
has periodically eased restrictions on labour. One of the most significant 
amendments in recent times was the ruling that expatriates on visit visas 
were allowed to find employment under a new sponsor without the need 
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to leave the country. Prior to this amendment, the person concerned had 
to leave the country and return to take up the employment (Gulf News, 8 
December 1988). Further, the UAE has stipulated that children of 
expatriates are not required to obtain a school certificate to secure a 
residence visa until the age of 18. Previously, expatriate children not only 
needed a certificate from the school, but also had to have it verified by the 
Ministry of Education if they wanted residence visas. (Khaleej Times, 26 
April 1988). - 
However, Saudi Arabia, which is the destination of the 
largest contingent of foreign labour, is less flexible with its residence 
policies. The Saudi's issue four types of visit visa's. The first category is 
for wives and children of expatriates who work in education, experts in 
fields of specialisation like doctors, engineers, pharmacists, and media 
personnel. The second category is for directors of companies, and pilots, 
the third category is for employees who can recruit members of their 
family that are highly qualified in their field of work, and finally, the 
fourth category includes technicians who have experience and 
qualifications (Arab News, 13 January 1989). It must be remembered, that 
the categories expounded upon above are only 'visit visas'. If expatriate 
labour in Saudi Arabia is interested in more than just visits from family, 
then they have to apply for residence visas. However, only two categories 
of expatriate labour are allowed to apply for residence permits for their 
families. 
I 
The first category would include translators, chartered 
accountants, researchers, consultants, staff in education departments, and 
directors of companies. In addition, these people must submit a 
university certificate that indicates their qualifications. The second 
category, includes expatriates working in technical fields (doctors, 
engineers, and others), and they have to submit relevant qualifications as 
well (Arab News, 1 March 1989). In contrast to the UAE, the Saudis do not 
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allow the transfer of visas from visit into residence. Illegal residents and 
citizens who harbour such residents face strict punishment (Arab News, 17 
December 1988). 
Nationality in the GCC is a sensitive subject. If the GCC 
countries are strict on residence regulations for expatriates, they are 
negatively rigid on granting nationality to foreigners. Citizenship is 
zealously guarded. In the extreme case of Kuwait for example, the law 
sharply distinguishes: 
"between 'original' Kuwaitis and those who obtained citizenship by 
naturalisation. All Kuwaiti citizens enjoy access to civil service, 
employment, property ownership, retirement, education, and other 
socio-economic benefits. But naturalised citizens do not have the 
right to vote for any representative body until twenty years after the 
acquisition of citizenship and are ineligible for nomination or 
appointment to a representative body or ministerial position" 
(Russell 1989: 32). 
Further, two Amiri decrees promulgated on 3 August 1987, stipulated that 
all citizens who rent their house to any expatriate should report the name 
of the tenant, passport number and address to the governorate's 
Immigration Department within 48 hours of renting the house. The same 
rule applies if the tenant vacates the house, and to managers of hotels and 
furnished apartments given for rental (Arab Times, 4 August 1987). 
Nationality could be granted to Arabs who have been residing in Kuwait 
before 1945, and foreigners living in Kuwait before 1930 providing they 
have maintained their residence till the present time. Further, the 
national assembly agreed that nationality should not be granted to more 
than 500 people a year (Al Watan, 17 March 1983). These examples 
demonstrate the difficulties in obtaining Kuwaiti citizenship. 
In the late 1980's, faced with the rapid decline in the 
proportion of the indigenous population (4.9 percent growth rate) in 
comparison to the foreign population (6 percent growth rate), Kuwait had 
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to reconsider its nationality laws (Al Qabas, 10 May 1988). One of the 
suggestions it examined was granting certain sections of Arabs in Kuwait 
permanent residence. The 'certain sections' mentioned here would only 
include the best qualified elements among the Arabs (Arab Times, 10 May 
1989). The other GCC countries maintain strict nationality laws, but they 
are not as rigid and stratified as the Kuwaiti ones. Bahrain, even grants 
citizenship to abandoned infants whose parents cannot be traced (Khaleei 
Times, 30 July 1989). One of the elements involved in maintaining 
control on nationality in Oman is the requirement that all Omanis who 
marry foreigners - men or women need a permit from the foreign 
ministry prior to marriage (Oman, 24 January 1986). t 
In addition, the GCC countries protect their populations with 
the use of sponsorship laws. Sponsorship permeates every segment of the 
society. Every foreigner entering a GCC country must have a sponsor, 
whether the sponsor is an organisation or an individual. The sponsor 
must be an indigenous national, and must own at least 51 percent of the 
company. The extent and rigidity of the sponsorship laws depends on 
individual GCC countries. For instance, Qatar's law number 3 of 1985, 
prohibits foreigners from engaging in any kind of trade, export, industry, 
or from establishing small factories in Qatar. They may work in tailoring, 
hairdressing, or similar profession (Al-Ahrarn al-Iqtisadi, 1 April 1985: 41). 
The UAE requires that foreign labour in accountancy or auditing, 
administrative officers or staff, and employees of private oil companies 
may only transfer sponsorship to a similar company or government 
agency; and are not allowed to change their profession. An accountant, for 
instance can only take up the job of an accountant with the new employer 
(Al Ittihad, 20 June 1984). There is also a limit on the legal obligation of a 
local agent. A local agent can provide the necessary services (like agreeing 
to act as a sleeping partner in a commercial company), without being 
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subject to any financial liability or obligation to the company (Al Ittihad, 22 
January 1989). 
Nevertheless discrepancies do occur, and the GCC countries 
are heavy handed against those who transgress sponsorship laws. One of 
the tactics employed by the Saudi Arabians in preventing illegals 
(expatriates who are in the country without a sponsor) from remaining in 
the country, is to insist on an expatriate having written permission from 
his/her sponsor that he is entitled to stay in the kingdom before he can 
rent accommodation. This written letter from the sponsor must also be 
validated by the chamber of commerce (Al Riyadh, 27 July 1984). 
Thus the GCC countries maintain strict control over foreign 
labour as well as offer economic protection to their local populations 
through the institution of sponsorship. The sponsor: 
"often keeps with him the passport and all travelling documents of 
those individuals whom he sponsors. Thus they cannot travel in 
or out of the country or work for anybody else without his consent. 
In other words, the kafil [sponsor] not only extracts a substantial 
profit from the sponsored ones, but he also controls them almost 
completely while they are in his country ........ he has the right to terminate the employment of, or partnership with a sponsored 
person at will. He can demand his deportation at any time" 
(Ibrahim 1982: 102). 
(d) Prospects for Indigenous Labour in the GCC: 
The structure of indigenous labour has been thoroughly 
examined in this section. The GCC countries with their small populations 
have been investing heavily in capital intensive industries. However, 
this policy has two major drawbacks. The first is what Blanchard (1984: 
271) defined as 'economies of scope'. Modern technology faces rapid 
changes regularly. This results in products being phased in and phased 
out rapidly, and a wide range of products is necessary to lower overhead 
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costs. This in turn would necessitate a highly skilled and motivated 
labour force. This leads us to the second drawback - the indigenous labour 
force of the GCC. As has been noted in the previous sections, there is a 
lack of trained indigenous workers in technical fields. In addition, they 
show an alarming enthusiasm to educate themselves in non-technical 
fields. The GCC countries have also protected their local populations with 
sponsorship laws, and the material wealth accruing in the country to 
sections of the society has affected their motivation. The work ethic has 
suffered badly, and is dominated by the idea that the least amount of 
work should generate the most amount of money. This is demonstrated 
by one of Saudi Arabia's leading businesswomen with interests in 
bakeries, construction, marine repairs and computer instruction institutes 
who stated: 
"of course I would rather have Saudi's work for me, but I can't 
because we have no labourers in Saudi Arabia, we have only 
engineers" (Financial Times, 12 December 1990). 
Native GCC workers also refuse to perform manual labour, even if they 
are financially poor and the rewards are high. In the case of Saudi Arabia, 
slavery was legal until 1962 and Saudi's are reluctant to perform jobs that 
were once performed by slaves (see Ibrahim 1982). 
The erosion of the will to work of indigenous workers is also 
observed from the state of Kuwait in the aftermath of the Iraqi occupation 
of 1990-91. In May 1991, it was estimated that half of Kuwait's 650,000 
citizens were still out of the country. Further, in spite of Kuwait's 
enthusiasm to reduce its dependence on expatriate labour by reducing total 
population from a pre-invasion rate of 2 million to around 1 million, its 
ability to do so is questionable. The Kuwaiti's are unable to carry out 
menial tasks, and Kuwait City is still in a state of chaos and squalor, 
though there are many idle young men with guns loitering in the streets 
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(Economist, 22 June 1991: 15). Many Kuwait's in the elite segment of the 
population who constitute the crux of the opposition to the government 
are discontented with the deteriorating situation, but their discontent 
could be tempered if 'certain large re-supply contracts were to be sensibly 
awarded' (See Financial Times, May 11/12 1991). 
The indigenous GCC population also is increasingly 
suffering from what Sherbiny defines as the demonstration effect. It 
comes about when: 
"as a new sign of prosperity, families in many oil countries import 
maids, cooks, gardeners, watchmen, drivers, and house servants, 
whether their services are really needed or not. This is tantamount 
to a 'demonstration effect, where a family's status is measured by 
the number of household servants/ assistants it employs" (Sherbiny 
1984:. 646). 
- 
Fergany (1982) maintains that the segregation of the indigenous and 
expatriate work force has led to a lack of a 'foundation' for self sustained 
development. This foundation: 
"can only be achieved through a two pronged strategy consisting of 
human resources development and integration of the Gulf 
economies in a wider Arab economy" (Fergany 1982: 167). 
This is especially applicable to the significant Arab Workforce residing in 
these countries. - The current Arab workforce is estimated at around 64.5 
million and is expected to reach 99 million by the year 2000. Increasing 
unemployment can only be curtailed by the Arab world creating 2.5 
million job opportunities every year (Al Ahram, 29 March 1990). This 
provides the GCC countries with ample labour and the golden 
opportunity to contribute to the economic development of the Middle East 
concurrently 'with its own development. Unfortunately, the GCC 
countries are enmeshed in their narrow outlook of sustained self 
development, even at the cost of other Arab neighbours. This could prove 
to be detrimental in the long run, as oil is a non-renewable resource, and 
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faces rapid depletion in the face of the growing world population. Thus 
Halliday (1984: 3) has a point when he states that: 
"the tragedy of the Arab world is that the temporary opportunity 
provided by oil, an opportunity lasting for only a few decades, is 
being wasted" 
5.5 Summary: 
The labour market in the GCC countries has progressed 
tremendously since the discovery of oil in the early 20th century. In the 
years leading up to the second world war, Britain with its influence in the 
gulf was instrumental in importing labour from British India, the 
exception to this scenario being Saudi Arabia which insisted on the use of 
local or Arab labour. Labour migration to the GCC between the years 1945- 
1973 consisted primarily of Arab labour, with the vast majority being 
Palestinian refugees from the two Arab-Israeli wars. In 1973, the 
enormous increases in oil prices, led to large increases in foreign labour 
in the GCC. While Arab labour still consisted of a majority of foreign 
labour, this period witnessed the influx of South Asian and East Asian 
labour. Further, the earnings remitted by these migrants led to the 
examination of the role played by their governments in migration. 
In spite of enormous efforts on the part of the GCC countries' 
governments, indigenous labour, which varies from a minor to a major 
segment of the population prefers to be educated in non-technical or 
administrative careers. With foreign labour to perform technical and 
manual labour, the indigenous workforce has become stunted. Further, 
their motivation to engage in industrial activity has been eroded by their 
governments promulgation of sponsorship laws which protect them from 
foreign business competition. The governments of the GCC have 
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attempted to segregate the expatriate workforce from the indigenous 
population through a variety of measures, one of which includes rotating 
labour from different countries to lessen their reliance on a single country 
or group of countries. The role of women in the workforce varies from 
active participation in countries like the UAE, Bahrain, Oman, and 
Kuwait, to tacit participation in Saudi Arabia and Qatar. Residence and 
nationality are zealously guarded, and expatriate labour is monitored. 
Finally, indigenous labour has to confront the prospects of economies of 
scope, their erosion of willpower, demonstration effect, and the wasted 
opportunity of discarding the talents of labour from adjoining Arab 
countries by not naturalising them. 
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Ae has been observed in previous chapters, the Middle East 
has played a significant part in world history ever since Islam erupted 
from the heart of Arabia to stamp its influence and authority over a 
diverse range of cultures. However, it was the 1973 oil price rises that 
focused the worlds attention on the central importance of the Middle East, 
and of the GCC countries in particular to the continued stability of the 
production, sales, and price of oil. The countries that were the direct 
recipients of the oil price rises in the Gulf - the GCC countries, Iran, and 
Iraq, were involved in enormous economic and infrastructural 
development which subjected them to intense scrutiny from the press and 
academic authors. 
The literature existing on the GCC countries is interesting 
and informative. However, the bulk of these are descriptive, and there 
has been a dearth of major mathematical analyses. The reasons for this 
deficiency may be attributed to the following factors: 
The GCC countries are still in an embryonic stage of economic 
development, and the sophisticated modern mathematical 
techniques used in analysing developed and certain developing 
economies cannot be applied to them. 
Even if these mathematical techniques are modified to quantify 
GCC development, these countries total dependence on oil 
revenues hinder a conclusive analysis. 
The data required for mathematical analysis is difficult to secure. 
Given the organisational deficiencies in their economic structures 
- (Qatar, for example does not even have a full fledged finance 
ministry), these countries encounter difficulties in providing 
exhaustive data. Further, not only is the data that is available is not 
up to date but there are doubts on its reliability as well. As the GCC 
countries control large sources of revenue in a region that is 
underdeveloped, they are uneasy of their deficiencies in population, 
technology, and their military vulnerability to larger neighbours. 
As a result they have engaged in policies that are intended to 
CHAPTER 6 184 
disguise their wealth or the deficiencies in their economies. In 
addition, the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait in 1990-91 will increase the 
difficulties in obtaining data from Kuwait as a result of the damage 
inflicted on it. 
Finally, (and importantly), economic analysis of the GCC countries 
cannot view their achievements and failures solely from an 
economic stand-point. The influence of religion, culture, and 
history, must be given more importance than it would normally 
have received in a non - Middle Eastern analysis, and this could be 
one of the reasons that contribute to the lack of major mathematical 
analyses in the GCC. 
This chapter which consists of the third dimension of the 
thesis, analyses trade in the GCC countries by constructing similarity 
matrix tables. The mathematical technique employed (see Technical 
Appendix, section 4: 55-57) compares commodity trade to the World for 1- 
digit, 2-digit, and 3-digit SITC categories of one GCC country with another, 
and generates a single index number between 0 to 100. The rationale for 
the construction of these similarity indices can be identified in 
conventional integration theory - to observe trade diversion, and trade 
creation. However, this chapter will attempt to monitor the reliability of 
the technique when applied to the GCC. 
The reliability of the technique is observed in the extent to 
which the matrices indicate economic trends in GCC trade. The next 
chapter which extends the matrices for trade with the Developed and 
Developing countries will address the problems of ' 
trade creation and 
diversion in greater depth. In the case of the GCC, the higher the 
similarity between two countries (if the index is closer to 100), the greater 
the likelihood of trade diversion occuring, and the lower the similarity (if 
the index is closer to 0) the greater the likelihood of trade creation. This 
occurrence is the result of the dominance of the oil sector. As the GCC 
depends on oil, dissimilarity in their economies will indicate 
diversification from oil, and is beneficial to the group. 
CHAPTER 6 185 
The examination of trade and integration in Developing 
Countries, must take into consideration economies of scale, welfare effects, 
balance of payments, capital imports and underemployment. (see chapter 
2: 17-65). However, the GCC member states do not constitute normal 
Developing Countries. The influence of oil not only ensures that most of 
its revenue originates from the oil sector, but also that its non oil industry 
consists of oil based products, or consumer items and services that depend 
on oil revenue. Johnson's (1962) assertion that countries that are similar 
should consider complementing themselves through specialisation 
provides the best avenue of success. To re state the previous paragraphs 
assertions, this chapter attempts to examine the credibility of the similarity 
matrices, by examining the extent to which it indicates the economic 
events that have taken place in the GCC during the years the matrices are 
constructed. Issues involved in trade creation, trade diversion, and 
complementarity through specialisation are examined in the next chapter, 
when the matrices are extended to examine the GCC's trade with the 
Developed and Developing Countries. 
The latest available data on the GCC countries' from the 
United Nations is analysed for a collective total of 22 years for imports and 
22 years for exports, resulting in 22 x 22 matrices for 1-digit, 2-digit, and 3- 
digit SITC (Standard Industrial Trade Categories). The variables are 
'Bahrain's trade in 1975, '1980', and '1982', the 'UAE's in 1980', '1981', 
and '1982', 'Saudi Arabia's in 1976', '1981', '1982', and '1987' (only imports 
for 1987 is available), 'Kuwait's in 1971' (exports only), '1976', '1980', 
'1981', and '1984', 'Oman's in 1977', '1980', '1981', '1982', '1983', and '1987', 
and 'Qatar's in 1976' (exports only), '1979', and '1982' (imports only). 
The influence of oil (SITC category '3') has been excluded 
from exports to observe the contribution of the non - oil sector to trade. 
Thus, the indices generate nine 22 x 22 matrices, of which six are in exports 
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(1-digit, 2-digit, and 3-digit SITC with oil [three 22 x 22 matrices], and 
without oil [three 22 x 22 matrices]) and three in imports (1-digit, 2-digit, 
and 3-digit SITC with oil). 
6.2 Exports: (Tables Ito VI) 
(a) Bahrain's similarity with the GCC countries: 
The influence of oil notwithstanding, individual GCC 
countries exhibit unique traits that make their economies interesting 
material for academic investigation. Bahrain is a classic example. With 
oil reserves at a negligible level, Bahrain has had to rely on its wits and the 
largesse of its neighbours to survive. This it has done with great resolve. 
It commenced development as the commercial entrepot of the Gulf in the 
wake of the discovery of oil in the early 20th century. By the start of the 
1970's, it had developed an excellent infrastructural and communication 
system which proved advantageous in the years of the oil boom. Its first 
major industrial undertaking of the seventies, the Bahrain aluminium 
smelter (ALBA) was built in 1971 with the intention of creating 
employment for the Bahraini workforce (International Herald Tribune, 22 
July 1981). The oil price rises in 1973 resulted in immense benefits for the 
Bahraini economy. The years 1973 to 1982 were ones in which Bahrain 
benefitted from the development requirements of its neighbours, 
especially that of Saudi Arabia. The indices give an indication of this 
trend. Tables I to VI show a rise in the the similarity of Bahrain in 1982 
from Bahrain in 1975-1980 for all SITC categories. In 1982, the price of oil 
was at its peak, but with the decline of oil prices since 1982, and with curbs 
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on its Off-shore Banking Units, the Bahraini economy went into recession 
with the other GCC economies. 
If we are to briefly examine Bahrain's values with the GCC 
countries, the similarity indices illustrate a low similarity for Bahrain and 
the UAE for all SITC tables. This can be expected, for though both Bahrain 
and the UAE have been vying for economic superiority in entrepot trade, 
their patterns in trading are vastly different. Bahrain's commercial energy 
has been primarily engaged in servicing Saudi Arabia's development and 
financial needs while the UAE has been engaged in a simultaneous two 
pronged effort of developing its own economy from scratch, and 
maintaining a profitable re-export trade to Iran, Oman, Qatar, and within 
the individual Emirates that constitute the UAE as well. This has resulted 
in both Bahrain's and the UAE's economies having a strong non oil 
trading base. The similarity indices indicate this trend whereby, non oil 
exports (in future references N. O. exports) in Tables IV to VI illustrate 
higher similarity than exports with oil included (in future references 0.1. 
exports) in Tables I to III. 
While conventional trade theory would indicate that as a 
result of these low similarity values, trade creation would occur if greater 
trade between Bahrain and the UAE took place, the reality is different. 
The low similarity values in the indexes are not due to different industrial 
development between the UAE and Bahrain, but purely due to different 
trading patterns. The fact is that Bahrain and the UAE have almost 
identical industries. In 1979, the Emirate of Dubai in the UAE commenced 
on its Jebel Ali Free Port, and one of the first industries constructed was 
the Dubai Aluminium Company (DUBAL). In contrast to Bahrain's 
ALBA, DUBAL, constructed at the cost of $1.3 billion, (Financial Times, 22 
June 1981) is one of the most sophisticated in the world employing the 
latest technology available. 
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Further, the Organisation of Arab Petroleum exporting 
Countries (OAPEC) constructed their Arab Shipbuilding and Repair Yard 
(ASRY) in Bahrain, and Dubai in competition has an enormous dry dock 
and shipbuilding yard at Jebel Ali. In the eventuality of Bahrain and the 
UAE having to compete for the same markets, it is likely that the greater 
oil and gas reserves of the UAE (Abu Dhabi, Dubai, and Sharjah) would be 
sufficient to give. it a financial edge over Bahrain. Thus if the GCC were to 
uphold the principles of integration as propounded by Corden's (1972) cost 
reduction effect, (see chapter 2: 17-65) the less cost effective producer 
should withdraw from the market, leaving the more cost effective 
producer with the benefits of economies of scale. However, this situation 
is unlikely to occur in the GCC, as the political stability of Bahrain takes 
precedence over the economic feasibility of its industries, and Bahrain 
could expect to be subsidised by its financially endowed neighbours to 
ensure its survival. 
Bahrain and Saudi Arabia's trade rose sharply in the 
aftermath of the 1973 oil price rises. The similarity values of Bahrain's 
0.1. export trade in 1975 with Saudi Arabia in comparison to 1980, indicate 
large increases of over 10 percent for all SITC digits. The increases are due 
to the higher oil prices which enabled its 250,000 barrel a day Sitra refinery 
to refine imported crude oil from Saudi Arabia at a handsome profit, as 
well as increased revenue from the Abu Safa oil field which is operated by 
Saudi Arabia, but from which Bahrain receives half the revenue. In 1982, 
Bahrain's 0.1. export similarity indices decline from 1980 for 1 and 2-digit 
SITC, and this could be attributed to the reduction in world demand in oil 
from 1981. The minor rise in 3-digit SITC similarity is due to'the refining 
capability of Saudi Arabia which was enhanced when its refining plants 
became operational from the early 80's giving it greater similarity with 
Bahrain, the mainstay of whose oil activities are in refining. 
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The similarity values of Bahrain and Saudi Arabia's N. O. 
exports are erratic across all SITC digits. This trend is understandable as 
Saudi Arabia from developing at a feverish pace since 1973, was able to 
organise its own trade by 1980, when its infrastructure was nearing 
completion. However, the indices exhibit a general trend of increasing 
similarity for Bahrain in 1980 from 1975, and a decline in 1982 from its 
1980 figures. Further, non oil industries in Bahrain in the years 1973-81 
(especially in the private sector), were involved in Off-shore Banking Unit 
(OBU) operations, rather than in industrial activity which was deemed to 
be less profitable. These OBU's. which were part of the governments plan 
to diversify the economy and enhance its status as an entrepot centre have 
had a tremendous influence on the Bahraini economy and deserve 
further mention. 
The OBUs were formed in 1975, when the Bahrain Monetary 
Agency allowed foreign banks to conduct currency business with non 
residents through local offices. They were allowed to operate tax free and 
have no minimum reserve requirements and no foreign exchange 
controls (National Westminister Bank 1981). The billions of dollars spent 
by the GCC countries and Saudi Arabia in particular between 1973 and 1981 
towards infrastructural and industrial projects created an enormous 
reserve of cash that required a repository and a range of financial services 
which were efficiently performed by the OBU's. Syndicated loans, a 
forward market in US dollars, Saudi riyals, and other regional currencies, 
were part of OBU operations, though Saudi business remained paramount 
to their survival (Euromoney, September 1984: 43). At its peak in August 
1982, OBU assets were estimated at US$ 61 billion (National Westminster 
Bank 1984). 
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However, the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) 
concerned at the influence of the OBU's on its currency, began to regulate 
their activities in the country in 1983. The regulations were as follows: 
Permission is needed from SAMA for Saudi banks to invite off- 
shore banks to participate in riyal syndications for Saudi clients. But, 
as permission is rarely given, OBU's have been effectively phased 
out of riyal syndications in Saudi Arabia. 
SAMA has made it cheaper for Saudi clients to borrow riyals from 
Saudi domestic banks by withholding 15 percent of the interest a 
client pays on a riyal loan from an off-shore bank, as a sort of 'profit 
tax'. This has ensured that the borrowing costs of Saudi clients from 
OBU's have increased by around 1/2 percent, making the domestic 
banks more attractive. 
Finally, SAMA introduced Bankers Security Deposit Accounts 
(BSDA) which act in the manner of treasury bills, and attract excess 
liquidity. The first BSDA's were offered in 1984, and have since 
been developed to offer Saudi clients a wider range of options 
(Euromoney, September 1984: 43-45) 
Bahrain and Kuwait have a certain degree of resemblance in 
that their economic policies are influenced by merchant families. A 
review of their'similarity values for 0.1. exports in Tables I to III indicate 
high similarity across all SITC digits, which could be attributed to the 
influence of oil exports. However, the indexes indicate two interesting 
aspects that separate their values from being a reflection of Bahrain/Saudi 
trade. The first is the increasing similarity between them in the 1980's in 
comparison to the 1970's, and the second, the strong similarity between 
them in the 3-digit SITC category. 
While the first aspect is surprising, as the values would be 
expected to be lower due to the fall in the demand and the price of oil 
during the eighties, the reason can be attributed to Bahrain's increased 
reliance on oil exports in the 80's in the wake of lower revenue, in tune 
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with Kuwait, who increased production to finance a diverse range of 
economic activity from financing Iraq in war to the resolution of its 
unofficial stock market crash. The second aspect is due- to Kuwait's 
downstream diversification in the oil industry, which, has enhanced its 
refining capabilities. Since Bahrain's oil activities are solely in refining, 3- 
digit SITC can be expected to indicate high similarity values with Kuwait 
in comparison to Bahrain's trade with other GCC countries in that 
category. 
Bahrain andý Kuwait's N. O. exports indicate a range of 
similarity values that are moderately strong (39 to 72 for 1-digit SITC, - 14 to 
56 for 2-digit SITC and 7 to 53 for 3-digit SITC), but this is primarily due to 
their trading patterns being synonymous rather than to any industrial 
affinity. Both of them were involved in the re-export trade, though 
Bahrain was involved with Saudi Arabia and Iran, and Kuwait with Iraq. - 
Bahrain and Oman's similarity values for 0.1. exports are 
high across all SITC digits until 1982. In 1982, Oman's similarity values 
with Bahrain decline sharply. This sharp decline is not due to any sudden 
change in the structure of Oman's economy, but rather due to the 
influence of two factors which overshadowed its exports of oil - oil based 
industrial diversification and re-export trade. In contrast to the other GCC 
countries, Oman has modest oil reserves, and it embarked on an oil 
exploration and development programme after 1970. 
"Even if it had not wished to learn from the development excesses 
of its neighbours, its income would have limited its aspirations" 
(Financial Times, 13 January 1983). 
Sultan Qabus who has steered Omans development path since he began 
his reign in 1970, has simultaneously financed an astute two directional 
economic path of infrastructural and industrial development with the 
countries oil revenues. 
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Further, Oman has benefitted from the tensions emanating 
from the Iran-Iraq war. Rather than brave the Straits of Hormuz during 
the height of the war, many shippers unloaded cargo at Muscat to be 
redirected landward. This sharp decline in indices as a result of the change 
in the structure of trade is substantiated in the United Nations 
International Trade Statistics Year-book of 1985, a copy of the relevant page 
of which is provided in the Technical Appendix (section 6: 68). In 
addition, at the 3-digit SITC categories, similarity values are low for all the 
trade comparisons, and this is due to the contrast in oil exports. The 
mainstay of Bahrains exports being refined products, while Oman's oil 
exports are solely in crude oil. 
Bahrain and Oman's N. O. exports seem to vindicate the 
previous paragraphs assertions. There is no indication of any sharp 
decline in similarity values, and the values are observed to increase for 
Bahrain's trade with Oman's in 1977 in comparison to its trade with 
Oman in 1980 to 1987 across all SITC digits. The pattern of Oman's 1980 
- to 1987 trade with Bahrain exhibits a rather erratic pattern which could be 
attributed to the infancy of the economy, though in general, the non oil 
sector seems to have made an impact on the economy. 
Bahrain and Qatar's similarity values for 0.1. exports are high 
for 1-digit and 2-digit SITC, and low for 3-digit SITC. The high similarity is 
a result of synonymity with Qatar in oil exports, and the low similarity at 
3-digit SITC, is purely the result of oil refining again, which is the 
mainstay of Bahrain, and is non existent in Qatar as it exports crude oil. 
N. O. exports in Tables IV to VI indicate an increase in similarity values of 
Bahrain and Qatar in 1979 compared to Bahrain and Qatar in 1976 for 1- 
digit SITC. This is primarily due to Qatar's efforts in heavy industry, 
especially in aluminium, which give it an increasing similarity with 
Bahrain. However, at 2-digit and 3-digit SITC similarity is very low, due 
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to Qatar's attempts at developing the future of its heavy industrial exports. 
Consequently, in 1976 and 1979, (which consist of its latest SITC data 
available for analysis), its exports in 2 and 3-digit SITC were purely in one 
category due to the infancy of the industry, which results in a low 
similarity with Bahrain who has developed its modest industrial base 
since the 1970's and exports a wider range of products. 
(b) The UAE's similarity with the GCC countries 
The UAE's political structure and history has been covered in 
chapter four, (pages 105-107) and is seen to be a unique country. Its 
domination by the Emirates of Abu Dhabi and Dubai gives the economy a 
two dimensional outlook. Abu Dhabi has 95 percent of the country's oil, 
but accounts for only 2/3 of its production. This is due to Dubai producing 
excess oil in defiance of the UAE's quotas, according Abu Dhabi the burden 
of dealing with OPEC's ire (Financial Times, 14 April 1989). Dubai's oil is 
helpful to its infrastructural development, but its primary activity is in re- 
export trade. 
The similarity values of the UAE's 0.1. export trade in tables I 
to III, and N. O. export trade in tables IV to VI, when compared over three 
different years - 1980,1981 and 1982, are observed to be very high across all 
SITC digits. The interesting aspect provided by the similarity values is not 
the change in values from 1980 to 1982, which could be attributed to oil 
prices, but the marginal difference between 0.1. exports and N. O. exports, 
when its economy is compared over these three years. This marginal 
difference is due to the simultaneous evolution of oil revenue from Abu 
Dhabi and the re-export trade of Dubai, though Dubai's trade is ultimately 
reliant on the oil revenues of its neighbours. 1 In fact, the seven 
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individual Emirates developed without any regard to the needs of the 
UAE as an entity, but rather according to their local needs and desires. Two 
examples are the ports and the airlines. Every single Emirate developed 
its own, port, and Dubai built two - Port Rashid and Jebel Ali. This 
resulted in a, small country of 1.6 million people of which 800,000 are 
expatriates (The Military Balance 1990: 120) having an unnecessary eight 
ports. The entrance of Dubai's 'Emirates' airlines in 1985 to rival the 
present gulf routes of Gulf Air, provides another example of economic 
development that ultimately must take political interests into 
consideration. 2 
A review of the 0.1. exports of the UAE and the GCC 
indicates a low range of similarity values across all SITC digits. Unlike 
Bahrain, whose similarity comparisons were analysed with each 
individual GCC member, the UAE's similarity values with individual 
GCC countries are synonymous enough to analyse them in an entirety. 
This is not because the UAE is a non oil exporter, for it gains a large part of 
its revenue from oil exports. The low similarity values are solely the 
result of the re-export trade. In the UAE, the volume of the re-export trade 
is enormous, and though the profit is not comparable to revenue from oil, 
in the matrix calculations its volume* gives the UAE a low similarity with 
the other GCC countries whose non oil activities are insignificant when 
compared to their oil activities. The one exception to these values are the 
UAE's similarity comparisons with Oman 1982,1983, and 1987. The 
reasons for Oman's 0.1. export trade losing the dominance of oil in the 
similarity values have already been explained in page (191) when it was 
compared with Bahrain, and it is these very reasons which give Oman 
relatively higher values in its comparison to the UAE across all SITC 
digits. 
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N. O. exports between the UAE and the GCC substantiate the 
previous paragraphs assertions, as they demonstrate higher values than 
the 0.1. exports across all SITC digits. These similarity values are the result 
of re-exports and non oil industrial exports primarily engineered by Dubai. 
Abu Dhabi, in spite of its enormous oil reserves and potential, has chosen 
to spend its revenues on a combination of indigenous industrial 
development and large foreign investments through its Abu Dhabi 
Investment Fund to cushion its economy in times of recession. By the 
end of 1989, its overseas assets were estimated at $40 billion (Financial 
Times, 14 April 1989). Although the BCCI liquidation in 1991 has not been 
a financial success for Abu Dhabi, it still has substantial foreign 
investments, and oil revenue to support itself for decades. 
On the other hand Dubai, has successfully developed itself 
into the premier trading city of the Gulf. It has been responsible for the 
flexibility of the immigration laws of the UAE in comparison to the other 
Gulf countries, and has encouraged industry and trade. It has 53 scheduled 
airlines call at its airport and 120 shipping lines at its ports. It has 
constructed a US$ 75 million cargo village to cater to its growing status as a 
trade centre (Financial Times, 18 July 1991). Although it has the advantage 
of having an experienced mercantile class at its disposal, the re-export 
trade is no mean achievement. 
The centre of its achievements lie in its position as a supplier 
to the other emirates, and the dhow trade. In spite of the construction of a 
huge dry dock and port facilities at Jebel Ali, along with the sophisticated 
cargo and airline services that -it offers, the dhow trade from its creek at 
port Rashid is among its most profitable activities. The dhow is a 
traditional Middle Eastern shipping boat that throughout centuries has 
traded with the East. Dubai's dhows carry its merchandise all over the 
Gulf, but primarily to Iran. It has encouraged the dhow trade, and in 1977, 
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constructed a unique 'synchrolift' facility which offers dhow owners the 
possibility of repairing their ships in the eventuality of damage (Lloyds 
list, 14 May 1985). 
(c) Saudi Arabia's similarity with the GCC countries: 
Saudi Arabia is the jewel in the GCC crown. With its 
enormous oil reserves, and large population (by GCC standards), it plays a 
pivotal role in the group. The similarity values of its 0.1. exports are 
observed to be very high across all SITC digits, when its economy is 
compared in the three different years of 1976,1981, and 1982. This trend is 
a result of the influence of oil. In spite of gigantic efforts in non oil 
industrial diversification, oil remains, and will continue to remain, the 
dominant financial force in the Saudi Arabian economy. The influence of 
its oil policy is such, that it has performed the role of a 'swing' producer in 
OPEC by either increasing or decreasing its oil production to regulate the 
world price of oil. 
Its N. O. exports in three years indicate similarity values that 
are above 85 for 1-digit SITC, above 58 for 2-digit SITC, and above 41 for 3- 
digit SITC. These high values are a result of its tremendous efforts in non 
oil industries. In the aftermath of the 1973 oil price rises, Saudi Arabia 
developed its infrastructure, industries, agriculture, and foreign 
investment simultaneously. Invariably, such a haste to develop resulted 
in a large amount of wasteful expenditure. In fact, it was estimated that 
during the 1973-1980 years: 
........ 60 cents in every dollar spent was going into excessively 
expensive or duplicated facilities" (Financial Times, 28 April 1980). 
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The central strategy of its non oil industrial diversification is the 
development of petrochemical industries, the majority of which have 
been located in the industrial cities of Jubail and Yanbu. 
The construction of these cities in the midst of barren desert 
encompassed enormous physical and financial effort. To portray the 
example of the city of Jubail on the Gulf: 
"enough earth was moved in site preparation to build a highway 30 
feet wide and 3 feet deep around the world at the equator" and "the 
seawater canal for industrial cooling handles a daily flow equivalent 
, to two thirds of the annual volume of the Tigris and Euphrates 
rivers combined" (International Herald Tribune, May 1982). 
Thus, it is not difficult to believe the rumour that Ying Hussein of Jordan 
dubbed Jubail and Yanbu as the 'Sauds Pyramids' (Business Week, 31 
March 1980: 52-54). The manufacturing core of these cities will consist of 
refineries, methanol, petrochemical and fertiliser plants, and hundreds of 
supporting industries and services (International Herald Tribune, May 
1982). The entire petrochemical industry is fed by the Master Gas System, 
which was started in 1975, and comprises gas gathering, treatment, and 
transmission plants (South, September 1986: 55). By 1986, the first two 
phases of the Master Gas System had cost Saudi Arabia US$20 billion 
(Financial Times, 21 April 1986). The Saudi Arabian government has also 
made efforts to develop agriculture, and though it has attained self 
sufficiency in certain food products, agriculture's future as a viable non oil 
export industry is doubtful. 
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait display very high similarity values 
for 0.1. exports in tables I to III, and moderate values (50+ for 1-digit, 26+ 
for 2-digit, and 8+ for 3-digit SITC) for N. O. exports across all SITC indexes. 
Their high 0.1. indexes are a result of the dominance of oil exports, but 0.1. 
exports demonstrate a gradual decline from Saudi and Kuwait's 1971 trade 
to Saudi and Kuwait's 1984 trade. The explanation for this decline could 
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be sought in non oil exports. Kuwait had been receiving an increasing 
amount of its income from financial investments abroad, while Saudi 
Arabia has invested heavily in domestic industry. Its financial 
investment abroad'is in short term investments, intended to cushion the 
economy in times of need. Nevertheless,, Saudi financial investment 
abroad is substantial - at its peak in the early eighties they were estimated 
at US$ 140 billion, though with funds being drawn upon for deficit 
financing, they have dwindled, and are estimated today at around US$ 60 
billion onwards,, (Financial Times, 13 December 1989). The Gulf War of 
1990 could be expected to further shrink the deposits. (N. O. exports display 
an erratic pattern which could be attributed to the different non oil 
industrial policies. Kuwait has made minimum efforts in non oil 
industry, and if its N. O. export similarity with Saudi Arabia gives any 
indication of a high trend, it is more as a result of its re-export trade, which 
enables it to import industrial machinery and consumption goods rather 
than to any substantial investment in industry. 
Saudi Arabia and Oman's similarity values for 0.1. exports 
demonstrate very high similarity across all SITC digits until Oman's 
change in the structure of its trade in 1982, when the similarity values 
experience a sharp decline. The reasons for this decline are earlier noted 
in Oman's trade with Bahrain. As can be expected, Saudi Arabia and 
Oman's N. O. exports demonstrate higher similarity values across all SITC 
digits than its 0.1. exports. The higher N. O. export similarity is influenced 
by both these countries efforts in investment for industrial diversification, 
and the influence of re-export trade on the Omani economy. 
Saudi Arabia and Qatar display very high similarity for 
values 0.1. exports across all SITC digits, given the composition of the 
Qatari economy, which is totally reliant on oil exports. N. O. exports are 
very low for 1-digit SITC, and almost nonexistent for 2 and 3-digit SIM 
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Qatar's 1979's comparison with Saudi Arabia displays higher similarity in 
comparison to its 1976 values, due to the gradual efforts in heavy 
industries. But, given the infancy of the industry in 1979, its capability at a 
wide range of products at 2 and 3-digit SITC, was limited, and results in 
low or non existent similarity with Saudi Arabia. 
(d) Kuwait's similarity with the GCC countries: 
Kuwait was one of the first Gulf countries to receive oil 
revenue in large quantities. By the time of the 1973 oil price rises, it had 
(over the years) built a modest infrastructure, though it was the oil price 
rises that enabled it to indulge in grandiose development plans. Kuwaits 
0.1. export similarity values are very high across all SITC digits. Its N. O. 
trade values though high, are found to be more erratic. The influence of 
oil exports are considerable in Kuwaits revenue, but it is receiving an 
increasing amount of its revenue from non oil exports, especially re- 
export trade and overseas investment. However, the entire economy has 
received two major set-backs; the 1982 collapse of its unofficial stock 
exchange market - the Souk Al Manakh, and the Iraqi occupation of the 
country during 2 August 1990 to 27 February 1991. 
According to the Kuwaiti government, the collapse of the 
stock market originated from a minor stock market crisis in 1977, which 
cost it US$ 500 million in a bail out scheme, and resulted in it banning the 
floating of all new companies. However, since local savings were rapidly 
increasing and channels of investment were limited, offshore companies 
shares were traded in an unofficial stock market. Further, the Kuwaiti 
government's restrictive credit policy was out of tune with the local 
economy, and to sustain the demand for loans, a parallel and unofficial 
market of credit through the issuance of ýost dated cheques came into 
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being. These cheques circulated among investors without being cleared by 
the banks. The system entailed the purchasing of shares against cheques 
postdated up to a year, or in some cases even longer. The shares brought to 
the purchaser immediate ownership, and the ability to sell them for cash. 
The system collapsed, when one buyer panicked and rushed to a bank to 
clear a cheque by a dealer for US$ 345 million. The cheque bounced, and 
in the rush to cash their post dated cheques, buyers found that most people 
who had issued post dated cheques, did not have the funds to cover them. 
When the Kuwaiti government finally stepped in, it found that the total 
face value of cheques held by some 100,000 Kuwaitis' amounted to US$ 
92.46 billion (Far Eastern Economic Reviezv, 3 March 1983: 51-53). 
The Iraqi occupation of 1990-91 resulted in enormous physical destruction 
and looting., While the details of the occupation are covered in chapter 4: 
122-129, reconstruction of the Emirate is expected to exceed US$ 20 billion. 
A brief mention of Kuwait's investment policy is in order. 
Kuwait's investment policy is two dimensional - investment in financial 
markets and in downstream diversification of the oil market. Its 
investment in financial markets is long term, and is intended to sustain 
future generations in an economy bereft of oil revenue. It has also bought 
shares in major companies, examples of which are the German companies 
Hoechst (25 percent), Daimler-Benz (17 percent), Metallgesellschaft (15 
percent) and Britain's Royal Bank of Scotland (14.5 percent). In 1986, 
Kuwaiti investments were estimated at US$ 80 billion onwards (Financial 
Times, 22 February 1988). Its downstream diversification in the oil 
industry has earned it the nickname of '8th sister', the seven other sisters 
being the seven giant oil companies that have been and are so involved in 
Middle Eastern oil. The Kuwait Petroleum Company (KPQ which was 
created in 1980 to handle its oil related activities counts among its assets 
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4500 petrol stations in seven countries and two refineries in Europe, a fleet 
of 23 tankers, and the oil exploration and engineering company - Sante Fe 
International (Financial Times, 22 February 1988). However, the cost of 
the 1990-91 Gulf war, maintaining Kuwaitis' in exile and other factors had 
depleted Kuwaits massive foreign reserves from around US$ 100 billion in 
1990 to around US$ 70 billion by the end of July 1991 (The Independent, 2 
August 1991). 
Kuwait and Oman's 0.1. similarity values are high across all 
SITC values until the decline in similarity with Oman's 1982 to 1987 
comparisons. The reasons for the sharp decline are noted in Bahrain and 
Oman's similarity comparison in a previous section of this chapter. 
Kuwait, in spite of its significant non oil revenue is still an oil dependant 
economy and oil exports are still the dominant force in the economy. 
This change in the structural pattern of Omani trade has resulted in low 
similarity values for 0.1. trade. However N. O. exports indicate no decline 
across SITC digits. Further, similarity is higher in N. O. comparisons for 
Kuwait and Oman's 1982 to 1987 values than its 0.1. values. 
Kuwait and Qatar's similarity values are very high across all 
SITC digits for 0.1. exports due to the influence of oil. Their N. O. exports 
display moderate values for 1-digit SITC (a range of values of 29 to 50), but 
are very low, or non existent at 2 and 3-digit SITC. This is a result of the 
minimum efforts of Kuwait and Qatar in non oil industries. 
(e) Oman's similarity with the GCC countries: 
Oman until 1970 was ruled by an ultra conservative Sultan 
who refused to allow development or progress in the country, and 
maintained a feudalistic and underdeveloped society. When he was 
deposed by his son Qabus in 1970, the new Sultan faced a formidable task. 
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The country was poor, and he faced a full scale rebellion in the province of 
Dhofar. Further, Oman has not been endowed with enormous oil 
reserves like its GCC brethren, and oil revenue had to be used prudently. 
Sultan Qabus's strategy encompassed the use of a combination of 
infrastructural and social development with military strength. 
There were no 'white elephants' in -the 1970-80 decade of 
Oman's development. Industry was developed, though in contrast to the 
GCC nations ventures in heavy industry and petrochemicals, Oman has 
concentrated on: 
"... small and medium sized industry, into which private enterprise 
has been lured with a combination of incentives and protective 
measures, such as generous loans and the attraction of a ready made 
industrial estate at Rusail. A favourable tax scheme and the absence 
of control regulations also attract foreign based corporations. " 
(South, December 1984: 77). 
Oman's 0.1. export values are observed to be high in similarity across all 
digits from 1977 to 1981, but the decline due to the change in the trade 
structure in the eighties is evident in the sharp decline in similarity from 
1982 to 1987. N. O. similarity values Indicate low values for Oman's 1977 
and 1980 similarity comparisons and higher values for the rest of Omans 
indexes across all SITC digits. This is due to Oman's trading structure 
until 1981, which was totally influenced by oil exports. The diversification 
of the country's industries and its re-export trade since 1982 has resulted in 
similarity calculations indicating a non oil sector that is rapidly 
developing, though, unlike Kuwait, whose non oil investments are 
profitable Oman's are still in an embryonic stage of development. 
Oman and Qatar 0.1. exports values are high in similarity 
until Omans comparisons in 1982 to 1987 when the structure of its trade 
changed. N. O. exports values'are very low due to Qatars; non oil export 
trade being negligible. 
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Qatar's sin-dlarity with the GCC countries 
Qatar's oil revenues are not very large by GCC standards, but 
the country is wealthy due to the small size of the population. However, 
the country's' oil reserves are only expected to last for around another 25 
years, unless there are new discoveries (BP Statistical Review of World 
Energy, June 1988). The similarity values for its 0.1. export trade 
comparisons for its economy in 1976/1979 is high across all SITC digits in 
tables I to III due to the influence of oil exports. Further, in a future 
without oil, Qatar's survival will not be put to the test due to its large gas 
reserves. It has the largest gas reserves in the world estimated at around 
150 trillion cubic feet (Financial Times, 22 February 1990). N. O. exports for 
its 1976/79 similarity trade comparisons stand at 24-78 for 1-digit SITC in 
table IV, and at zero at 2 and 3-digit SITC in Tables V and VI. This is 
because of Qatars total reliance on oil exports, and recent forays in non oil 
industries. Qatar's non oil industry has been limited to three heavy 
industrial ventures -a fertiliser plant constructed in 1973, a steel mill in 
1978, and petrochemical production in 1981 (The Times, 12 November 
1985). However, as export data on Qatar is unavailable after 1979, the non 
oil similarity calculations are seen to be low for N. O. exports. 
6.3 Imports (Tables VII to IX): 
The SITC values of imports are examined in a bloc rather 
than by country and group or country and country. This is because 
imports are totally reliant on the oil revenues and development policies 
of these countries. Further, given the synonymity of the GCC's 
economies, they have little choice to importing in a similar pattern. In 
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spite of the tremendous efforts they have made in non-oil industries, they 
remain oil dependant. Even their non oil industries like petrochemicals 
are oil related, and their re-export trade depend on the essentials of 
machinery, technology and commodities which have to be imported. A 
perusal of import data would reveal that they import almost the entire list 
of SITC categories - Category '0' (food and live animals), Category T 
(beverages and tobacco), Category T (crude materials excluding fuels), 
Category '4' (animal, vegetable oil fat), Category V (basic manufactures), 
Category 'T (machinery and transport equipment), Category '8' 
(miscellaneous manufactured goods), and Category'9' (goods not classified 
by kind). Efforts have been made at import substitution, (as in the case of 
Saudi Arabia food and agricultural policies), but they have been found to 
be uneconomic and a drain on valuable financial resources. With the 
decline in oil prices and world demand in the mid 80's,, the GCC 
economies have begun to concentrate their efforts in the development of 
industries that would sustain their economies in a future without oil, and 
subsidies to uneconomic sectors and industries have been trimmed. 
Similarity values for GCC imports from tables VII to IX are 
observed to be high across all SITC digits. They range from 77 to 98 for 1- 
digit SITC, 51 to 95 for 2-digit SITC, and 30 to 90 for 3-digit SITC. The one 
exception to this pattern is the imports of Bahrain, which are seen to be 
lower with all the GCC countries across all SITC tables. These lower 
values are a result of Bahrain's imports of crude oil for its refinery at Sitra. 
Since none of the other GCC countries import oil, the similarity values 
differ sharply. 
6.5 Summary: 
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This chapter has attempted to analyse the Gulf Cooperation 
Council's integrational scheme through the construction of a 
mathematical technique that employs its trade data. In spite of the 
methodological problems involved in the application of mathematical 
techniques to Middle Eastern economies, the construction of these 
similarity indices have proved to be useful as an indicator of these 
countries economic efforts. The Similarity matrix indices applied in this 
case may have its defects, but its contributions as a supplement to GCC 
economic theory cannot be dismissed. 
Each individual GCC country's similarity is analysed in the 
context of its economic development, and with the relationship it enjoys 
with other members of the group. The similarity matrices have proved to 
be a reliable indicator of the interaction of economic forces in the GCC if 
their general results are compared to the numerous economic and 
financial publications on the Gulf. Bahrain's oil export indices were 
observed to have risen in conformity with economic analyses over the 
period of the growth of its offshore banking units. The UAE, Saudi 
Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, and Oman's oil exports are found to indicate 
high similarity with exceptions. Further these countries non oil efforts in 
industry and trade are observed to influence the matrices. Bahrain and 
the UAE's re-export trade and financial services, Kuwait's foreign 
investments, Qatars gradual efforts in heavy industry, Saudi Arabia's 
efforts in petrochemicals and foreign investments, and Oman's structural 
change in trade due to its non oil industrial diversification have been 
portrayed by the matrices. 
Finally, the influence of imports in these countries 
economies has been examined. Their dependence on mineral reserves to 
sustain their economies is observed in spite of their enthusiastic efforts in 
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non-oil autarky. Imports matrices indicate a synonymous pattern across 
the GCC countries, and a review of the data indicates their dependence on 
a wide range of SITC products, including products that are necessary to the 
smooth functioning of their non oil industries. This suggests that the 
GCC countries efforts at non oil diversification have some way to go. The 
similarity matrices have been employed as an instrument for the better 
understanding of these countries. Trade Creation and Trade Diversion are 
not examined in detail here, but are analysed in the next chapter, when 
the matrices are expanded to examine GCC trade with the Developed and 
Developing world. 
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7.1 Introduction: 
The previous chapter applied a mathematical technique to 
measure the similarity of GCC trading patterns to that of the world. The 
rationale behind the analysis was to observe the credibility of the similarity 
matrices as an efficient quantitative indicator of GCC economies. However, 
though the similarity indices of GCC trade to the world have been quite 
successful in indicating economic trends in the economies, their indication of 
the occurrence of trade creation or trade diversion is more limited. The 
reason for this state of events lay in the very 'generality' of the indices. 
Additional information was necessary before a commitment to the 
observance of potential trade creation or diversion was made. This chapter 
has attempted to undertake that commitment by extending the similarity 
matrix technique to the analysis of GCC trading patterns with Developed and 
Developing countries. If the difference in GCC trading patterns to the 
Developed or Developing countries is examined over a period of time, and it 
is linked to the economic and quantitative information from the previous 
chapter, it is conceivable that sufficient information on the extent and 
potential of trade creation or diversion can be gathered for a better 
understanding of the group. 
As in the previous chapter, the mathematical technique 
employed (see Technical Appendix, section 4: 55-57) compares commodity 
trade for 1-digit, 2-digit, and 3-digit SITC categories of one GCC country with 
another, and generates a single index number between 0 to 100. The 
technique examines the latest GCC trade data from the United Nations to 
construct 22 x 22 matrices. All the variables used in the previous chapter 
have been re-employed to give the overall analysis continuity. They are, 
'Bahrain's trade in 1975', '1980', and '1982', the 'UAE's in 1980', '1981', and 
'1982', 'Saudi Arabia's in 1976', '1981', '1982', and '1987' (imports only), 
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'Kuwait's in 1971' (exports only), '1976', '1980', '1981', and '1984, 'Oman in 
197TI '1980', '1981', '1982; '1983', and '1987', and 'Qatar- in, 1976' (exports 
only), '1979', and '1982' (imports only). The influence of oil has been 
excluded from GCC exports to monitor the progress of non oil exports. This 
has resulted in a total of eighteen 22 x 22 matrices, nine for trade with the 
Developed world and nine for the Developing world. Exports consist of six 22 
x 22 matrices (three for oil included exports and three for oil excluded 
exports), while imports consist of three 22 x 22 matrices (three for oil included 
imports) for each of the two blocs. 
7.2 A Brief Note on the GCC's Political Relations with the Developed and 
Developing Countries: 
Until the discovery of vast reserves of oil in the early 20th 
century, the fate of the GCC member nations evoked very little interest in 
world affairs. Britain had been firmly ensconced in the Persian Gulf since the 
late 18th century, and had established protectorates over these states primarily 
to safeguard trade routes to the East from piracy. The discovery of oil in these 
regions in the early 19th century fuelled the interest of the -western 
industrialised nations who not only maintained, but also intensified the 
strong commercial links they had had with these states. However, it was only 
in the aftermath of the 1973 oil price disruptions that the Developing 
Countries (in future references DC's) comprehended the significance of these 
small gulf states on world oil production. This revelation induced the DC's 
to alter their pre- 1973 policies which: 
10 ... were mainly motivated by morality, tradition and sentiment" (Price 1976: 5) 
The oil price rises in 1973 gave the GCC countries 
superabundant financial wealth which enabled them to transform their 
countries in a short period from being among the most primitive in the 
Middle East to among the most affluent. It was necessary for these countries 
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to gain access to sophisticated technology in industry and infrastructure, a 
need fulfilled by the DC's with the use of expatriate labour. As a result, 
between 1973 and 1982, the GCC nations were involved in immense 
industrial and infra-structural construction. The scale of the projects were 
enormous, but as Price (1976: 8) aptly observes: 
"... all the ruling elites can remember a pre-petroleum past when living 
conditions were at a subsistence level; to many nomadic communities, 
life was nasty, short, and brutish. Not surprisingly, all the states are in 
a hurry to develop and evolve". 
Therefore, the DC's assisted the GCC countries iii building an economic 
system similar to their own with free enterprise as the keystone of the 
economy. In addition, the lack of a substantial indigenous population in the 
GCC countries left their governments little choice other than to invest in 
capital-intensive industries which further increased their dependence on the 
DC's for technical assistance. 
On the other hand, the Developing Countries (in future 
references LDC's) have a different relationship with the GCC nations. They 
provide the GCC economies with expatriate labour for construction work, 
clerical work, teaching, commercial activity, and in the case of a few countries 
- basic technology for engineering and electrical projects. The LDC's are 
dependent on GCC oil and benefit from inexpensive hydrocarbon exports. In 
return, their exports to the GCC consist of textiles, food products, and in a few 
exceptions, (i. e., the NIC's) a wide variety of manufactured goods. The 
contrast between GCC exports and imports to the DC's and LDC's is noted in 
figures 7.1 to 7.12. From the figures, it can be observed that trade with the 
DC's constitute at least 60 percent of total GCC trade, with Japan accounting 
for the majority of Asian trade. The two exceptions are Bahrain's imports 
from Saudi Arabia in figure 7.4 and Oman's exports to Asia in figure 7.12. 
However, the general representation of the figures indicate strong 
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7.3 Similarity of GCC Exports to the DC's and LDC's (Tables I to Xll): 
(a) Bahrain's Similarity with the GCC countries: 
The similarity indices have been analysed in pairs, i. e., by 
observing the similarity values of the DC's and the LDCs in unison for each 
SITC digit. This method of examination ensures that the diversity of GCC 
export patterns to either the DC's or LDC's are discerned with greater ease. To 
commence with the Bahraini economy, it is noted that the similarity values 
of Bahraini trading patterns for exports with oil included (0.1. exports) for its 
economy from 1980 to 1982 display higher similarity values for exports to 
LDC's in comparison to DC's across all SITC digits. One of the observations in 
the previous chapter was that Bahrain's oil based activities were primarily 
engaged in refining. The reasons for these higher LDC values may be sought 
in its refined products which find an easier market in the LDC countries than 
in the DC's who have their own refining capabilities. Non oil exports (N. O. 
exports) do not display the same difference in Bahrain's exports from 1980 to 
1982 across- SITC digits. The difference is not only erratic across SITC digits, 
but the range of difference is also small in comparison to the range in 
difference for 0.1. exports. Bahrain's entrepot status, which involves its 
position as a transit centre for goods from east to west, or to other regional 
areas, and its non-oil industrial activity are both given equal consideration in 
government policy. However, as trade to DC's and LDC's involve both 
activity, the resulting range in similarity is not large. 
Bahrain and the UAE's economies are noticed to be following 
similar structural development. 0.1. exports to the DC's are observed to 
contain lower similar values than exports to LDCs across all SITC digits-' If 
the general similarity indices from the previous chapter are recalled, it will be 
remembered that similarity between GCC countries was low when they were 
paired with that of the UAE, where the volume of the re-export trade heavily 
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influences its matrix values. In general, the trend continues as similarity 
values are observed to be low across all SITC digits for both the DC's and 
LDC's. The highest value has not crossed 45. Thus, the possibility of trade 
creation occuring if Bahrain and the UAE were to extend their economic 
activities in the DC's or the LDC's are substantial. A conflict of interests need 
not arise if Bahrain and the UAE are able to concur on concentrating on a 
combination of - different regional and non-regional markets. In fact as 
Bahrain and the UAE have a well developed merchant class, it would be in 
their; interests to coordinate economic policies not only at the level of 
government, but more importantly, through the commercial level. 
Unfortunately, regional economic jealousies have proved stronger than 
economic cooperation. Since its inception, the GCC has demonstrated that 
the threat of political instability or aggression has greater effect on its policies 
than farsighted economic vision. 
N. O. exports also indicate higher similarity values across all SITC 
digits for Bahrain and the UAE's trade with the LDC's in comparison to the 
DC's. Further, there are two aspects of the matrices that require 
consideration. The first, is that the range of difference between exports to the 
DC's and LDC's in 1-digit SITC is not large, and the second, is that, it is large at 
the 2-digit and 3-digit SITC. While the former situation could be the result of 
the re-export trade from the East to the West with Bahrain and the UAE as 
transit centres as well as the export of raw material (in chemicals and oil based 
products), the latter situation's reasons could be sought in the the range of 
products in which the LDC's require a greater selection to satisfy their diverse 
development needs. On the other hand, the DC's with sophisticated 
industries to service their economies require only the raw material. - 
Yet again, similarity values across all SITC categories suggest at 
numerous opportunities for trade creation, especially in exports to the LDC's 
in 2-digit and 3-digit SITC, if Bahrain and the UAE are able to concur on a 
combination of markets to be served by each. Low similarity values to the 
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DC's at 3-digit SITC, though indicating potential markets, also involves 
strong competition and experience, which is by far the easier obtained in LDC 
markets until a shift to DC markets can be undertaken. At this stage, one 
feature of Bahrain and the UAE's economies should be re-emphasised - they 
are primarily service and trade-based economies rather than heavy non-oil 
industrial producers. This is an element that could work to their advantage 
in the long run as it entails the possibility of a future service role not only for 
the Gulf, but also for the entire Middle East, especially since Lebanon which 
occupied that role slid into civil war and chaos in 1976. If Bahrain and the 
UAE were to work together, the possibility would become a reality. 
Unfortunately, their vision seems to be limited to the regional markets 
surrounding them (Saudi Arabia for Bahrain, and the individual Emirates, 
Qatar and Oman for the UAE), and present day policies do not as yet indicate 
any efforts at a long term Middle Eastern strategy. 
Bahrain and Saudi Arabia have an intimate economic and 
political relationship. The similarity values of 0.1. exports in tables I to VL 
display very high similarity values for 1-digit and 2-digit SITC for trade to the 
DC's. There is one exception. The similarity values of Bahrain; s trade in 1982 
with Saudi Arabia decline very sharply. Further, 3-digit SITC values are at 
minimal similarity for Bahrain/Saudi trade. To delve into the reasons 
behind the behaviour of these similarity values, it is noted that the data 
indicates the decline in values for Bahrain's 1982 trade with Saudi Arabia as 
the result of a change in the trading patterns of exports from the DC's to the 
LDC's. This assertion is corroborated by the matrices indicating 0.1. export 
trade to the LDC's across 2-digit and 3-digit SITC. They display a decline in 
Bahrain's 1982 trade to the LDC's that is very much less in proportion to the 
decline it faces in exports to the DC's. The high similarity that is present in 
Bahraini/Saudi trade for both the DC's and LDC's is primarily the result of 
similarity in oil exports. 3-digit SITC demonstrates a low similarity for both 
DC's and LDC's because of oil refining. Saudi Arabia's oil refining plants had 
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begun to make an impact on its economy since 1982. But, as the matrices do 
not have an indication of Saudi trade since 1982 due to the unavailability of 
data, the resulting decline in similarity with Bahrain's refinery based oil 
industry is logical. 
The similarity values of Bahrain and Saudi Arabia's N. O. 
exports to the DC's and LDCs are low across all SITC digits. The general 
picture that a viewing of the matrices in tables VII to XII provides is that the 
similarity values are higher for exports to the LDC's than to the DC's. The 
non oil industries of Saudi Arabia are concentrated in heavy industry and 
petrochemicals, while Bahrain has made some effort in heavy industry. 
However, the LDC's markets are easier targets for these countries as export 
outlets than the DC's, which have well-entrenched industries of their own. 
The values are not at all high, (the highest among them for DC's and LDCs is 
59.98), and there is potential for increased trade with both groups. 
Nevertheless, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia would demonstrate greater wisdom 
if they continue targeting the LDC's as they have been doing (unprofitable 
though the trade is), until they have the capacity to overcome obstacles 
preventing entry into the market placed in their path by the competition in 
the DC's. 
Though Bahrain's economy is heavily interlinked with Saudi 
Arabia's, Bahrain cannot expect benefits in the long run. The Saudi economy, 
workforce, population, and size give it an advantage over Bahrain. Bahrain's 
advantage of a more sophisticated economy has been eroded since the Saudi's 
commenced an enormous infrastructural, economic, and social development 
in 1973. This erosion is being rapidly increased, and unless Bahrain discovers 
another avenue of trade, it faces the danger of turning into another Saudi 
province. The matrices indicate potential for greater trade either in services 
or re-exports with the DC's as well as the LDC's, and Bahrain has the added 
advantage of being centrally located between both. However, to date, 
Bahraini economic policy does not, indicate concerted economic efforts in 
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creating new opportunities in contrast to the Emirate of Dubai which is 
seeking out new avenues of trade with dynamic efficiency. The Bahraini's, 
living complacently under the Saudi umbrella of economic wealth do not, as 
yet, see the need for concerted effort in future development independent of 
Saudi Arabia, and when they do, the possibility of Dubai being well 
entrenched and experienced in available markets is one they will have to 
consider. 
Bahrain and Kuwait's 0.1. exports display higher similarity 
values for exports to the LDC's in contrast to exports to the DC's. The decline 
in Bahrain's 1982 values that was evident in Bahrain/Saudi trade to the DC's 
is also evident in Bahrain/Kuwait trade, but Bahrain and Kuwait's similarity 
values for exports to the LDC's do not indicate a smaller decline in proportion 
to trade with the DCs, but a gradual increase. This increase is the result of 
Kuwait's downstream diversification in the oil industry which has given it a 
greater range of products to sell. This diversification is also noted in the 3- 
digit SITC, which displays a gradual increase in similarity with Bahrain in 
1982 and Kuwait in 1971-1984 for both the DC's and the LDC's. 
Bahrain and Kuwait's N. O. exports do not present such a 
fulsome picture. As in 0.1. exports, similarity values of exports to the LDC's 
are higher in value than exports to the DC's across all SITC digits. Yet again, 
this situation is a result of the LDC's proving a reliable market for these 
countries non oil exports in comparison to the DCs. However the similarity 
values for 2 and 3-digit SITC are not high for both the LDCs and DC's, which 
indicates the possibility that both Kuwait and Bahrain have future potential 
in exporting a wider range of non-oil products, though the Iraqi- occupation of 
Kuwait will have delayed Kuwait's potential. Further, the matrices generally 
display a sharp decline and rise pattern for Bahrain's 1975 to 1982 trade across 
SITC digits with both the DC's and LDC's. This fluctuating pattern is a result 
of Bahrain's increased dependence in oil revenue in the 1980's in the face of 
increasing difficulties it faced in maintaining its entrepot status in the Gulf as 
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a result of the rapid development of other GCC nations. This is corroborated 
by the 0.1. export matrices which do not demonstrate any decline, but rather 
an increase across all SITC digits for Bahrain 1975 to 1982 trade with the DC's 
and LDC's. 
Bahrain and Oman's similarity values display characteristics 
that not only retain the structure of their general matrix comparisons 
observed in the previous chapter, but also contribute to the overall picture. 
The values indicate a sharp decline in 0.1. exports across 1-digit and 2-digit 
SITC from Bahrain's exports to Oman in 1977-1981 in comparison to Oman in 
1982-1987 to both the DC's and the LDCs. As explained in the previous 
chapter, this decline is the result of change in the structural pattern of Oman's 
trade. Further, as in the case of Bahrain/Saudi similarity comparisons, 
Bahrain's 1982 values for 1-digit and 2-digit SITC display a large decline in 
values for exports to the DC's, in favour of the shifting of trade to the LDC's, 
where the decline is proportionatly less. Again, this shift is due to Oman and 
Bahrain's greater interaction with LDC's with regard to oil exports. The 3- 
digit SITC for 0.1. exports display very low, or non-existing similarity values 
for exports to the DCs and LDC's. These values are a result of Bahrain's 
refining operations in contrast to Oman, whose oil exports are solely in crude 
oil. 
Bahrain and Oman's N. O. exports display higher values for 
exports to the LDC's than exports to the DC's. Why has this pattern been 
observed in most of the similarity comparisons that have been examined 
between the GCC countries so far? The answer lies in the easier accessibility 
of LDC markets to the GCC's non oil industries. In many cases, this 
accessibility takes the form of barter trade. The GCC countries export oil or 
petrochemicals to the LDC's who in turn export primary products. However, 
in general, the values are observed to be low in exports to both the DC's and 
LDC's across all SITC digits (the highest value is 42.55), and the potential for 
trade creation is substantial. There need not be a clash of interests. Oman has 
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been noted in the previous chapter to be involved in building small and 
medium sized industry, and greater co-operation among GCC nations could 
encourage the burgeoning of these industries to the benefit of other GCC and 
Middle Eastern'countries, if regional prejudices are overcome and an overall 
development strategy is co-ordinated. 
Bahrain and Qatar's 0.1. exports portray a similar picture to 
Bahrain's similarity with other major oil producers, i. e., high similarity, in 1 
and 2-digit SITC for exports to the DC's with Bahrain's 1982 values declining 
sharply from previous years though the decline in exports to the LDC's is 
proportionately less. Further, 3-digit SITC is observed to indicate zero 
similarity as a result of Qatars minuscule efforts in downstream oil industry, 
as it prefers to export crude oil. N. O. exports demonstrate a sharp fluctuating 
pattern at 1-digit SITC for the DC's as well as the LDC's due to the diverse 
exporting pattern of Bahrain and Qatar. Similarity at the 2 and 3-digit SITC 
stands at zero, with exceptions being the result of erratic cases of trade exports, 
rather than due to any industrial strategy aimed at export promotion. 
(b) The UAE's similarity with the GCC countries: 
The volume of the UAE's re-export trade heavily influences the 
values of its similarity matrices. To give an example of the extent of its re- 
export trade, Dubai in '1983 received imports from 115 countries and re- 
exported to 87 countries (Wall Street Journal, 13 February 1985). The matrices 
provide an accurate mathematical indicator for the re-export trade. 0.1. 
exports for the UAE and the GCC countries' similarity values are observed to 
be lower for exports to the DC's and LDC's in comparison to N. O. exports. 
Further, the UAE and the GCC's 0.1. exports display higher similarity values 
for exports to the LDC's in comparison to exports to the DC's across all SITC 
digits. Oman's 1982-1987 similarity values provide an exception to this case, 
but the change in its trade structure has been examined and does not 
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necessitate further elaboration. N. O. exports display higher similarity for 
exports to the LDC's in comparison to the DC's across all SITC digits as well. 
There are a few exceptions, as in the example of the UAE and Oman's 1977 
non oil trade which stands at zero across all SITC digits. But these exceptions 
are solely a result of emphasis on oil exports in particular years, rather than to 
any incompatibility in trading patterns. 
The UAE's re-export trade is known to be concentrated in 
exports to the regional areas, a knowledge that has been confirmed by the 
matrices indicating higher values for N. O. exports to the LDC's than to the 
DC's. While similarity values for exports to the LDC's are observed to be high 
across SITC digits, values for exports to the DC's indicate a potential for 
expansion. In contrast to the other GCC countries low similarity values for 
N. O. exports to the DC's, the UAE's lower values are not due to difficulty in 
penetrating the market for non-oil products. The UAE has made minimal 
efforts in non-oil industries, and its lower values are the result of 
concentrating its efforts in the LDC's in general, and the regional markets in 
particular. The potential for its expansion as a transit route for goods and 
services from the East to the West is enormous, and should be exploited to 
the maximum level. 
Unfortunately, the UAE's entire activity is presently engaged in 
local and regional trade which is proving to be extremely profitable. As yet, 
its economic situation does not warrant immediate diversification, and its 
future is assured as long as the Emirate of Dubai retains its remarkable 
entrepreneurial skill and liberal attitude to expatriate residence and 
contribution to the workforce. The advantage of Dubai is that it is able to 
balance a liberal business, atmosphere with basic Islamic values that are not 
visibly present, but are subtly enforced. This ensures that neither Islamic 
fundamentalists nor liberal minded professionals and businessmen are 
alienated. The lack of democracy in the Middle East has resulted in 
populations taking refuge in Islamic fundamentalism as a medium of 
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expression, as the example of Iran and Algeria have demonstrated. Further, 
even governments that apply the Shari'a rigidly have been discredited, as the 
case of Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and Iran have shown. In this atmosphere of two 
extremes, the path followed by Dubai and the UAE, adapted to local needs, 
could provide Middle Eastern governments with the middle path that is so 
necessary to satisfy most of their populations. 
(c) Saudi Arabia's Similarity with the GCC countries: 
Saudi Arabia is a major world oil producer. Its 0.1. similarity 
indexes with the GCC members for exports to the DC's and LDC's are 
observed to be high across all SITC digits. The similarity matrices reflect 
Saudi's close relationship with the west by demonstrating higher values for 
exports to the DC's than to the LDC's, though the difference is not as large as 
previous comparisons in this chapter. The exception of Oman's trade since 
1982 has been examined and does not, require further attention. 
Saudi Arabia has made tremendous efforts in non-oil industrial 
diversification with petrochemical production as the centre of its strategy. 
The involvement of the DCs in the construction of these plants is important. 
Table 7.1 indicates the level of this significance; 
TABLE 7.1: Saudi Arabia's heavy industrial plants 
PROJECT NRME PROJECT FOREIGN CRPRCITY 
LOCRTION PRUNER (1000'metric 
tonnes per 
annum) 
Saudi Jubail Shell Corp. 655 Ethylene 


























National Plastic Co. 
(Ibn Hayyan) 
Saudi Iron 





































Jubail Lucky Group 300 Vinyl 
(Ko. rea) Chloride 
Monomer 
Jubail Korf Stahl 800 Steel 
(W. Ge. rmany) 
Jeddah Korf Stahl 140 Steel 
(W. Germany) 
Jubail Korf Stahl 500 Urea 
(W. Ge. rmany) 
LLDPE is linear low density polyethylene 
HDPE is high density polyethlene. 
SOURCE: SoUth, September, 1986: 57. 
A review of the table brings to attention the fact that all Saudi 
Arabia's foreign partners are from the DC's with the exception of Korea. 
Heavy industry in Saudi Arabia falls under the aegis of the Saudi Arabian 
Basic Industries Corporation (SABIC) which was founded in 1976. In the case 
of joint ventures, Saudi government regulations stipulate that: 
"... SABIC and the foreign partner are each responsible for 15 percent of 
the equity. A further 60 percent is provided by the government Public 
Investment Fund (PIF), which puts up soft loans with an initial rate of 
interest of 3-5 percent. The remaining 10 percent of the equity comes 
from commercial bank loans"(South, September 1986: 55). 
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In the decade since its inception, 
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SABIC has been responsible for the 
establishment of 15 primary industries at the cost of US$ 53 billion, or 23 
percent of all development expenditure (South, September 1986: 55) 
Saudi Arabia's N. O. exports to the GCC display higher similarity 
for exports to the LDC's than the DCs across all SITC comparisons. Although 
the DC's are heavily involved in setting up Saudi heavy industries, they have 
been reluctant to market the products in their own countries. On the other 
hand, the LDC's benefit from cheap Saudi petrochemical exports, with the Far 
East constituting the largest outlet for Saudi petrochemicals (see Financial 
Times, 13 December 1989). The DC's opposition to Saudi products stems from 
indigenous producers who fear that the Saudi's with cheap energy at their 
disposal, would drive them out of business. However, the Saudi's are keen to 
overcome tariff and trade obstacles to their products in the DC's, and at 
present have set their sights on a reduction of the tariff against them in the 
European market. The crux of their arguments in favour of a preferential 
trade agreement between the EEC and the GCC can be found in the Saudi 
industry minister's statement that: 
"we let 55 percent of European products into Saudi Arabia duty 
free ...... we are entitled to ask you for the same treatment, not a tariff of 14 percent" (Financial Times, 2 December 1985). 
Saudi Arabia's greatest advantage is its size and vast oil reserves, 
which are expected to last for over a hundred years (see Table 4.1, Technical 
Appendix, section 2: 10). In spite of tremendous efforts in diversification, the 
contributions of non-oil industries to the total economy is minuscule in 
comparison to oil. However, Saudi Arabia has time on its side. Even with 
the uncertain oil market, the non existence of a viable commercial alternative 
to oil and petroleum ensures the continuity of its enthusiastic development 
programmes. The Saudi's have witnessed tremendous progress since the 
1973 oil price increases, and by the time their oil runs out, the governments 
policy of creating a viable industrial base with petrochemicals as the monolith 
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in it should give it more time to diversify industrial development. The 
immediate problem that the Saudi's will face will not be the economy, but the 
most important element that contributes to it - the people. Economic and 
technological development is outstripping the absorptive capability of the 
numerically small indigenous population, and expatriate contributions will 
continue to be the crucial element in the economy in the foreseeable future. 
Further, the economic protection offered to indigenous populations in the 
GCC are so strong that they have eroded their entrepreneurial dynamism. 
However, as the economic danger is not as yet imminent, the Saudi's have 
not given priority to the social development of their indigenous workforce, 
and this could prove to be their undoing in the long run. 
(d) 
. 
Kuwait's Similarity with the GCC countries: 
Kuwait is an oil producer which has substantial non-oil 
investments. 0.1. exports in tables I to VI display higher similarity values for 
exports to the DC's in comparison to the LDC's across all SITC digits. But, the 
range of difference is not very large. Oman's values since 1982 indicate lower 
similarity with the GCC countries as observed in comparisons with the other 
GCC oil producers and require no further explanation. The portrait of N. O. 
exports are not as'clear-cut as 0.1. exports. In general, exports to the LDC's are 
observed to be higher than exports to the DCs. Kuwait's downstream 
diversification and in particular its oil refining is responsible for the higher 
values in LDC's. Prior to the Iraqi invasion of 1990, its foreign investments 
were estimated to be in the region of US$ 80-100 billion, with the majority of 
them in the DC's (Financial Times, 12 December 1990). Kuwait's confidence 
in investing in western financial markets was briefly shaken when Libyan 
assets in the USA were frozen in January 1985, and they threatened to spread 
their investments to a wider group of countries - China, the Soviet Union, 
India, Turkey and South Korea (see The Guardian, 14 May 1986). However, 
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Kuwaiti investments to the west have continued as they have offered the 
greatest scope for profitable investment and security. Diversification of 
investments to the LDC's is still limited by size (International Herald 
Tribune, 19 May 1986). To return to the matrices, the values to both blocks 
are observed to be low, which indicates that there are ample possibilities for 
expansion and trade creation if Kuwait were to make more effort in tangible 
non-oil industrial investment rather than engaging in the re-export trade 
which is subject to sudden change. The Iraqi occupation of the country in 
1990-91 and the rampant destruction of the Emirate is likely to result in a 
government policy of increased foreign investments when the country has 
recovered. Industrial investment is unlikely to be given priority, and already 
the authorities in Kuwait are mentioning 'rehabilitation' rather than 
'reconstruction' of the economy. 
(e) Oman's Similarity with the GCC countries: 
Oman's values display a higher similarity for exports in the 
years its trading patterns were influenced by oil (1977-1981), and in its 
comparisons with Qatar, than in the years its trade structure changed i. e., 
(1982-1987). Similarity values of 0.1. export trade to the DC's are observed to 
be higher than LDC's for Oman's 1977-1981 exports across all SITC digits, and 
vice versa for Oman's 1982-1987 exports. N. O. exports demonstrate zero 
similarity for exports to the DC's, and low similarity to the LDC's across all 
SITC digits. As in 0.1. exports Oman's 1982-1987 trade is observed to display 
higher values than in previous years of comparison. Oman is still in an 
incunabular stage of industrial development, and its non-oil industrial 
strategy advocates the encouragement of light and medium sized industries. 
In spite of strong interaction with the Western Industrialised Nations - Oman 
sent an envoy to the USA 147 years ago (International Herald Tribune, 23 July 
1987), its N. O. export future lies in its ability to service thd heavy industries 
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in the immediate region and the Middle East. It seems to be undertaking 
efforts in this direction, as its N. O. export values are observed to be higher for 
exports to the LDC's in comparison to the DC's in the years 1982-1987. 
Further, the Omanis have been examining the idea of 'controlled tourism' 
from other GCC areas. The GCC countries have gone to great lengths to cover 
their landscape with greenery which abides in abundance in Oman's province 
of Dhofar. The future of tourism for Oman is bright. It has been described by 
a foreign correspondent as a: 
"... country of spectacular natural beauty with a superb winter climate, 
and a thousand kilometres of coastline fringed with beaches and 
picturesque rocky coves" (South, November 1985: 104-105). 
However, it remains to be seen if the Omanis' exploit this advantage. Their 
tourist ambitions cannot be reconciled with present restrictive visa policies. 
Omani development policies seem to envisage tourism as a reserve to fall 
back upon. Since Oman's oil reserves are expected to last for two decades at 
least, it is engaged in developing infrastructure and industry and tourism can 
be expected to be relegated to the bottom of its agenda. 
(0 Qatar's Similarity with the GCC nations: 
The structure of the similarity indices in tables I to XII are such 
that when Qatar's turn is due, it has already been compared with all the GCC 
countries and all that is left to be examined is the difference in the similarity 
of its own exports between the years 1976 to 1979. Qatar, is an oil based 
economy which has engaged in minimal non-oil industrial diversification. 
This lack of diversification is not due to any lack of enthusiasm on Qatars 
part, but due to the unavailability of a large amount of capital investment. 
Qatars wealth is not derived from gigantic oil revenues (as in the case of 
Saudi Arabia), but from large oil revenues that are divided among a small 
population. Further, it has a cautious government whose long term strategy 
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rests on the exploitation its vast gas reserves. As is to be expected, its 0.1. 
exports are observed to be high across all SITC digits, with exports to the DC's 
being higher than exports to the LDC's. N. O. exports are nonexistent for 2 and 
3-digit SITC for both the DC's and LDC's. It is at 100 for 1-digit SITC to the 
DC's and 32.99 for the LDC's. These values are a result of Qatars's export 
patterns. Qatar's non-oil exports are concentrated in a few industries, and the 
range of its export patterns are limited. The hundred percent similarity 
values for exports to the DC's are the result of the export of a few 
commodities whose sales continued over the years to the DC's. The lower 
similarity values with the LDC's are the result of the increase of the range of 
products Qatar sold to the LDC's (primarily in petrochemicals) in 1979 from 
its exports in 1976. 
7.4 Similarity of GCC Imports from the DC's and LDC's (Tables XIII to 
XvIll): 
The GCC countries' imports are dependant upon their oil 
revenues and their non-oil exports. The previous chapter examined GCC 
imports across all SITC digits in totality because of the synonymity of their 
importing patterns. Further, it wa's observed that the GCC countries imported 
most of the SITC categories. 
The imports matrices for the GCC countries indicate higher 
similarity values for imports from the DC's than the LDC's across all SITC 
digits. This is because the DC's offer the GCC countries a more sophisticated 
range of products, and their advanced technology gives them an edge over 
LDC's. However, there are two aspects of the import matrices that need 
further consideration. The first is the absence of a sharp decline in Oman's 
1982-1987 trade values with any of the GCC countries to the DC's across all 
SITC digits. The reasons for this absence can be found in Oman's 
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development requirements which have not changed dramatically, but have 
been steadily pursued over the years. The decline in the export matrices to 
the DC's was the result of re-exports and non oil industrial diversification. 
Thus, the pattern of Oman's imports has remained constant over the years. 
The second, is the noticeable decline in Kuwait's similarity pattern of imports 
with the GCC countries after the 1982 Souk al-Manakh crash. While the GCC 
countries similarities for imports generally indicate a decline in values due to 
the oil price reductions of the early 1980's, it is not as noticeable as the decline 
of Kuwait's 1984 similarity values from its 1981 values for all GCC countries 
and across all SITC digits. The decline is more noticeable for imports from 
the DC's than the LDC's. The dual reasons of the Souk al-Manakh, and oil 
price declines were responsible for the similarity declines. 
7.5 Summary: 
This chapter has endeavoured to examine potential trade 
creation and diversion in the GCC countries by extending the similarity 
matrix technique used in the previous chapter to analyse GCC trading 
patterns with the Developed and Developing countries. Before embarking 
upon the analysis, a brief examination was carried out on GCC relations with 
the Developed and Developing countries. Each GCC country was found to 
exhibit characteristics which portrayed the unique structure of their 
economies, in spite of the fact that their survival ultimately depends upon 
oil revenues and the continued tolerance of the Developed world. While 
the importance of the Developed countries as a supplier of technology and 
goods to the GCC countries, as well as an important recipient of GCC oil, is 
significant, the Developing countries were also found to be important to the 
sustenance of GCC's non-oil industries. Further, individual cases of GCC 
success in non-oil ventures in the Developing or the Developed world - as in 
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the example of Saudi Arabia's success in the petrochemical industry, or 
Kuwaits foreign investments are noted. Potential trade creation is 
mentioned, but, the influence of a number of , Ifs and but's have restrained 
its long term development. Finally, a brief examination is performed on 
imports which are known to be dependant upon oil revenue. 
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The GCC's progress at integration has been examined at length 
in this thesis, and the verdict on the success or failure of the grouping should 
on balance be negative. The formation of the group in 1981 has provided the 
GCC countries with no real tangible benefits. The GCC was modelled on the 
European Community, but when its compatibility with integration was 
examined, its rate of success was found to be constrained by certain political, 
economic, and manpower factors. These factors constitute a potent force and 
play an unbalancing role in the group, both in the pre and post integration 
period. 
Integration in its very basic form consists of four broad elements 
of Free Trade Areas, Customs Unions, Common Markets, and Economic 
Unions. Free Trade areas and Customs Unions are synonymous in that they 
allow the tariff free movement of products in the area, the distinction 
between'thern being that member countries belonging to the free trade areas 
are at liberty to fix their own tariff against the rest of the world while those in 
a customs union have a common tariff against the-rest of the world 
(Common External Tariff - CET). A Customs Union is a mixture of free trade 
and more protection, as it provides freedom of trade to the participating 
countries as well as more protection for producers in the area against outside 
competition. A Common Market has all the attributes of a Customs Union, 
as well as the additional features of allowing the free movement of labour 
and capital in the'region. Finally, an Economic Union is the most 
sophisticated form of integration involving the addition of fiscal and 
monetary functions to that of a Common Market. ' 
Free Trade areas, Customs Unions, Common Markets, and 
Economic Unions, have been empirically measured by a host of academics to 
observe the positive and negative aspects of integration. Ultimately, the 
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quantitative theory of integration is concerned with the measurement of the 
static and dynamic effects of integration. The static effects of integration are 
observed to occur when the reallocation of a fixed amount of productive 
resources result in changes in output and income, while the dynamic effects 
are changes in growth rate due ý to economies of scale and increased 
productive resources (Kreinin 1975). Empirical analyses of integration are 
primarily based on ex ante and ex poste studies, though ex poste studies are 
considered by some authors to be superior to ex ante ones. 2 
Since it has been generally accepted by protagonists of integration 
theory that the Developed economies are interested in the static effects of 
integration and the Developing economies in the dynamic effects, the 
application of the theory of integration to the GCC should take into account 
economies of scale, changes in terms of trade, balance of payments problems, 
externalities, capital imports, and underemployment which are the dynamic 
effects normally examined in Developing Countries' integrational schemes. 3 
However, the large financial revenues of the GCC countries should exempt 
them from all these considerations except for that of economies of scale. 
Even the potential of economies of scale is not encouraging, as the small size 
of the GCC market is a constraint to its. development. Lizano's (1976) 
assertion that integration for the developing countries could be considered as 
a mid-path between autarky and 'outward looking paths of development' 
holds certain relevance for the GCC. The 'outward looking paths of 
development' is a definition for exports that are concentrated in a few 
traditional products. Lizano's ideas are well suited to the GCC's image of 
integration, as by his definition its integration could be observed to lie mid- 
path between autarky and a single outward looking path of development i. e., 
exports in the oil sector only. 
The G. C. C. can at best be categorised under Customs Unions, 
though it has borrowed liberally from Free Trade theory and Economic Union 
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theory as well. While it permits the free movement of member countries' 
goods in the union, 4 it has adapted the principle of the CET on foreign 
imports to include one that is in the range of 4 to 20 percent. 5 This adaptation 
is due to member countries' inability to agree on a fixed CET, and has resulted 
in it being subjected to continuous pressure from the 'trade based' members 
of the group, i. e., countries like the UAE, Bahrain, and Kuwait, who levy a 
lower CET against the rest of the world, and have incurred the wrath of Saudi 
Arabia, Qatar and Oman who are interested in a higher CET to encourage 
local industry. This conflict of interests among members, has forced the GCC 
to impose 'rules of origin' restrictions on imports to deter trade deflection, 
which occurs when imports are re-directed from member countries with 
lower tariffs to member countries with higher tariffs in the area. 6 Further, in 
yet another adaptation of Economic Union theory, the GCC has allowed the 
free movement of labour and capital in the region, with the labour and 
capital only applying to GCC citizens who in most member countries barely 
constitute a majority of the population, and prohibits the movement of non- 
GCC citizens. 
The measure of success of a Customs Union is indicated through 
the examination of the trade creation and trade diversion generated. Trade 
creation occurs as a result of a union induced shift from the consumption of 
products produced by the home country at a high price to the consumption of 
products of a partner country at a lower price. On the other hand, trade 
diversion occurs when a country reduces the consumption of low cost 
products from the rest of the world for high cost products from partner 
countries. Further, the concept of trade suppression should be given 
consideration. Trade suppression occurs when domestic production in a 
country replaces cheap world imports. 7 In contrast with the principles of 
integration, some GCC member countries actively encourage trade 
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suppression in a variety of commodities, notable examples of which are 
cereals, dairy farming, poultry, and livestock. 
The GCC countries are observed in the preceding paragraphs to 
have adapted the concepts of integration to their own requirements. This is 
perfectly acceptable in economic terms, and their, ineffectiveness at 
integration is not due to any significant divergence with integration theory, 
but rather due to the existence of substantial residual factors. These factors 
which are political, economic, and involve manpower security, would 
normally have been expected to constitute a minor residual influence in an 
integrational grouping, but in the case of the GCC, they have played a major 
constraining role. The magnitude of their constraining influence will be 
better understood if they are individually elaborated upon: 
Politics: 
The importance of politics in the formation of an integrational 
grouping has been recognised in integration theory. Viner (1950) believed 
that in a Customs Union, economic union took second place to political 
unity. De Beers (1941), Bye (1950) and Mann (1987) all recognised the 
importance of political considerations, while Shibita (1976) was of the opinion 
that even if a country's consumers gain tremendously from an integration 
scheme, no government can act solely on its consumers interests and must 
consider the political implications of Custom Union formation. 
Middle Eastern integrational schemes have been observed to be 
highly politically motivated. In the age of Tanzimat in the Ottoman empire, 
Sultan Abdel Hamid 11 (1876-1909) attempted to use Afghani's Pan-Islamic 
movement to his advantage by transforming his nominal power of Caliph 
into one of religious absolutism. During the first world war, Sharif Hussein 
of Mecca wanted to create an Arab kingdom in the territories that would 
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encompass the present day states of Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Israel, 
and Jordan at the expense of the Ottoman empire with him as king. The 
integration of Egypt and Syria into the United Arab Republic (UAR) in 1958, 
was the result of Gamal Abdel Nasser's political prestige rather than due to 
any economic considerations, and the euphoria involved in its formation 
had long evaporated by its acrimonious termination in 1961. The catalyst in 
the formation of the seven Trucial States into the United Arab Emirates was 
the announcement of Britains decision to withdraw its military deterrent 
from their territories rather than due to any overwhelming desire to 
integrate. Even the formation of the GCC itself was Primarily in response to 
the commencement of the Iran-Iraq war. 8 
The modern concept of integration is not new to the Middle 
East, as integration in the region has always existed through Islam. However, 
the degree and nature of integration in the region varied through the 
centuries. During the period of the first four Caliphs, there was total political, 
economic, military, and religious integration. While the nature of the 
regions integration became more and more disjointed over the passage of 
time with the succession of different dynasties, the basic concept of 
integration remained. Thus, the numerous semi-autonomous or 
independent rulers of the region sought legal recognition from the Caliph for 
their reigns long after the office had lost its political and military power. 
Even the Shi'a sect of Islam does not recognise the concept of individual 
political states, and advocates a single Shi'ite Islamic state for the entire 
region. 9 
The very formation of individual GCC states reflects the 
influence of Western political interests., The Saudi Arabian 'Kingdom', and 
the 'Emirates' of Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, and the UAE owe a great deal to tacit 
Western encouragement to transform themselves from autonomous units 
with nominal allegiance to the Ottoman empire into independent states. 
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With the destruction of the office of Caliph in 1924, many of the rulers in 
these countries endeavoured to enhance control over their people by seeking 
religious legitimacy through the creation of their own religious authority. 
Thus, the King of Saudi Arabia and the Sultan of Oman are technically the 
supreme religious heads in their countries. Further, the founder of Saudi 
Arabia - Abdel Azziz Ibn Saud, used his power as the 'Imam' of the religious 
sect of Wahhabism to create a fanatically dedicated group of followers, the 
'Ikhwan' which enabled him to transform his desert principality into a 
kingdom of some substance. 10 
Prior to the formation of the GCC, the Gulf monarchies were 
able to maintain the status quo in the Persian Gulf by playing the two major 
players in the region - Iran and Iraq against each other. While this strategy 
was dangerous, it ensured their survival. Ever since the disintegration of the 
Ottoman empire, Iraq or Iran at one stage in time or another have 
endeavoured to create a regional group under their aegis, but the Gulf 
monarchies, suspicious of their motives, had elected to remain aloof. 
However, the fall of the Shah of Iran in 1979, the belligerence of the Islamic 
regime that succeeded him (especially toward the Gulf monarchies), and the 
invasion of Iran by Iraq in September 1980 convinced them of the danger of 
individual existence. 
In the opinion of the individual GCC countries, these events 
increased rather than decreased the political threat posed by the larger Persian 
Gulf states of Iran and Iraq, and convinced them of the need for a collective 
security apparatus that would provide them with a semblance of protection. 
A series of meetings of foreign ministers of these states culminated in a basic 
constitution on 10 March 1981, which was ratified and signed by the six heads 
of states on 25 May 1981. The constitution endeavoured to provide co- 
operation and integration in economic, social, and cultural affairs. The 
economic co-operation agreement covering investment, petroleum, the 
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abolition of customs duties, harmonisation of banking regulations, and 
financial and monetary co-ordination was signed in June 1981.11 
An interesting aspect of the GCC was, that in spite of its hurried 
formation in 1981 as a collective security organisation, its defence aims were 
muted. In the initial stages of its formation, member states were concerned 
that their group would be viewed as a threat by larger Persian Gulf states, and 
continually emphasised its economic nature. However, the abortive Shi'a 
coup attempt in Bahrain in 1981 over-rode these concerns and resulted in a 
defence ministers meeting in January 1982 to discuss a common security 
policy including a joint air defence system and standardisation of weapons. 
The ground forces of member states held joint military exercises in October 
1983, and naval and air exercises in 1984. In October 1987, following an 
Iranian missile attack against Kuwait, GCC foreign ministers issued a 
statement declaring that aggression against one member state would be 
considered as an aggression against them all. Whilst on paper all these efforts 
seem impressive in reality they have been cosmetic. The ineffectiveness of 
the GCC's military response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait is a classic example. 
Most GCC countries did not even report the invasion to their populations in 
its early days, and they were unable to respond in military unison towards the 
possibility of an Iraqi attack on Saudi Arabia. During the war, their forces 
were used in minor battles (like Khafji) and in supporting roles. In general, 
their military deterrence as an integrational group portrayed even the 
pessimistic opinions of their effectiveness as optimistic. 
Thus the political factors involved in the formation of the GCC 
are observed to be extremely powerful, perhaps more powerful than they 
should be in a normal integration grouping. However, the unfortunate 
aspect is that they are still playing a counterbalancing role in the group. At 
present the difficulty lies in the selfish pursuit of individual members 
political goals. As the GCC evolves, it would be expected that further 
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economic integration would eventually iron out political differences, but this 
has not proved to be the case after ten years of integration. Perhaps, the 
problem lies in the unique nature of the economies which are dominated by 
a single non-renewable resource - oil. The political factors are still as 
influential in the post-integration years as they were in the pre-integration 
ones. 
(b) Economics 
This section lists the shortcomings of the economic 
characteristics of the GCC countries. At present, individual GCC states are 
more concerned in pursuing economic strategies that would ensure that their 
states would survive in a non-oil future, and the interests of the GCC as a 
whole are given very little consideration. Interest in the GCC is only 
stimulated on occasions when the individual states feel that it would be in 
their interest to pander to GCC policy. This is, indicated in the following 
examination of the economic features of development which display an 
abject lack of co-ordination. 
To commence with natural resources, 12 the GCC -countries are 
observed to be at a disadvantage since they depend on one resource only - oil. 
In spite of large reserves (40.1 percent of world reserves), oil is a non- 
renewable resource, and is subject to sudden price fluctuations in response to 
world events. While the GCC countries have large reserves of oil which are 
sufficient to sustain them for a few generations as well as significant deposits 
of natural gas, the unreliability of such an enormous revenue generating 
resource is detrimental to the success of the GCC. To compound the problems 
of having to rely on one natural resource, the GCC countries also suffer from 
a numerically deficient population. 13 In spite of the fact that population in 
1989 had increased by 93 percent from 1976 (i. e., from 10.57 million in 1976 to 
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20.36 million in 1989), a significant number of the population consist of 
expatriates. Expatriates in the GCC countries are estimated at around 7.686 
million, which would make them 38 percent of total GCC population. This 
substantial amount of expatriate labour is yet another obstacle to GCC 
integration. 
Another important economic indicator - the GDp, 14 displays 
erratic growth due to the influence of oil. GDP growth among different GCC 
countries is observed to vary significantly, which re-emphasises the assertion 
that there is a lack of economic and industrial co-ordination among them. 
The enormous contributions of the oil sector to GDP by industrial activity is 
also noted. Imports and exports Is of the GCC countries have indicated that 
in the 1980's, imports have increased significantly in response to oil 
revenues. This rise in consumption for both the government and private 
sectors in the GCC countries will make it increasingly difficult for the 
governments to co-ordinate their policies, and allocate development projects 
and resources to members in greatest need. At present, the lack of co- 
ordination is yet another element that contributes to the overall picture of the 
GCC's problems. . 
The role of the governments 16 of the GCC is crucial to the 
success of the group. The GCC governments are powerful monarchical ones 
with absolute power. Further, their direct control on oil revenues ensures 
that an unorthodox economic system prevails in which the people derive 
their income from the state, rather than the state deriving its income from 
the people, which is normally the case. Fiscal policy is practically non- 
existent, and does not have the importance it has in most other countries. If 
the effect of taxes on the revenue of GCC governments were examined, 17 it 
would be observed that the GCC countries receive the majority of their taxes 
from 'property and entrepreneurial' income which includes oil revenue. 
Bahrain receives 74 percent of its income from oil related activities, Kuwait 95 
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percent and Oman 64 percent. The UAE is a ý-trade based economy and 
receives 99.86 of its revenue from current transfers. In comparison to the 
GCC, the two Developed countries of USA and UK receive 7.22 and 7.71 
percent of their income from oil and property. Brazil, which is given as an 
example of a Developing economy, receives 23.65 percent of its income from 
property. If the analysis is extended to observe tax income, it is noticed that 
Bahrain receives 2 percent of its income from direct taxes, Kuwait 2 percent, 
and Oman 26 percent. The UAE is a tax free economy. In contrast, the USA 
and UK receives 53.32 and 41.42 percent of their income from direct taxes, 
while Brazil receives 14.59 percent. Indirect taxes provide only 6 percent of 
Bahrain's income and 2 and 3 percent for Kuwait and Oman, while for the 
USA, UK, and Brazil they provide 6.91,32.94, and 34.76 percent of total 
receipts. Bahrain is the only GCC country that is a beneficiary of government 
revenue from social security contributions but they contribute to only' 3 
percent of government receipts, while in the USA they are 30.69 percent, and 
in the UK and Brazil they form 17.23 and 26.40 percent of total government 
revenue. These statistics do not include Saudi Arabia and Qatar due to the 
unavailability of data, but as they are oil based economies too, their receipts 
from oil and property could be expected to be as high as Kuwait. 
This monopolistic control of state revenue by the governments have 
given them an added responsibility, in that their developmental policies are 
vital to the survival of the people. While the achievements of the 
governments in education, research and development and health's are 
commendable (educational expenditure increased by an average of 466 
percent for the GCC in 1987/88 in comparison to 1975, and health facilities for 
Oman and the UAE also increased considerably), they have been criticised for 
the segregation of the indigenous population. The structure of the economic 
systems are such, that, the governments have indulged the whims and 
fancies of the local population in excess. As a result, the indigenous populace 
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have contributed marginally to real development, and have enhanced the 
utility of the expatriate population. This is a trend that requires reversal, as 
the foundation and future of the GCC depends not on the expatriate but on 
the local population. This need was amply demonstrated in the aftermath of 
the 1990-91 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, where the indigenous population is still 
unenthusiastic about performing blue collar expatriate jobs. Unfortunately, 
present trends do not indicate any reversal of government policy, and the 
indigenous population is still being catered to at the expense of the group. In 
addition, the enormous wealth these countries generate through oil revenue 
is found to be disproportionate to their achievements in other fields of 
development. The Human Development Index which indicates this 
disproportion is a result of recent research conducted by the United Nations 
Development Programme. However, the negative difference between these 
countries GNP and HDI rankings can be expected to decline through the 
passage of time as the GCC populations increase their access to education, 
literacy, health, and other development objectives. 
Industry19 provides yet another excellent example of the 
assertions made in the previous paragraph. Industry in the GCC countries is 
heavily dependant upon oil and government expenditure. As the 
governments control all the large sources of capital, they have taken a leading 
role in industrialisation. In the GCC countries, most of the major 
petrochemical, refining and oil-based industries are in government hands, 
while the private sector is concentrated in intermediate industries, wholesale 
and retail trade, and the service industry. Although the GCC governments 
maintain that they have invested heavily in these major industries to 
stimulate private entrepreneurship, and eventually intend to sell public 
sector industries to the private sector, this may not be a feasible proposition. 
Most of the major GCC industrial undertakings are concentrated in oil-based 
and petrochemical industries, and as oil is a non-renewable source of energy, 
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private investors may be wary in acquiring a stake of the industries. Further, 
petrochemical and oil based industries are subject to significant fluctuations 
in demand and supply, which private investors cannot afford on a regular 
basis. Thus, it is conceivable that heavy industry in the GCC countries will 
remain in government hands for some time to come., 
In addition, mention must be made of the unnecessary 
allocation of resources to the attainment of self sufficiency in agriculture and 
livestock. 20 While the achievements of the GCC governments notably Saudi 
Arabia in agriculture have been impressive, their cost-effectiveness is 
dubious, and have been achieved through enormous subsidisation and 
encouragement. Further, this sector utilises valuable water resources which 
are non-renewable and difficult to replace in the long run. 
Finally, the adverse effects of the destruction of Kuwait and the 
BCCI bankruptcy are important considerations. While Kuwait's 
reconstruction is only a matter of time, the wanton destruction of the country 
by another Arab nation demonstrates the depth of ill feeling towards the 
Emirate by Iraq. This ill feeling is also prevalent among other Arab nations 
towards the rich Arab oil producers, and present GCC policies in the labour, 
economy, or foreign aid are unlikely to allay suspicions and jealousies among 
these nations. 
Labour and Social effects 
The scarcity of a skilled and educated labour force has always 
been prevalent in individual GCC countries. Prior to the Second World War, 
Britain, with paramount political influence in the Gulf, was able to ensure 
that oil companies imported managerial or technical staff from Britain, and 
clerical staff or semi-skilled labour from British India. 21 However, during the 
post war period, i. e., 1945-1973, the decline of British influence, and the Arab- 
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Israeli wars resulted in the exodus of large numbers of Palestinian labour to 
the GCC states. Me oil price rises in 1973 completely transformed the supply 
and demand for labour in this region. The GCC countries received enormous 
financial revenue from their oil exports which they utilised toward the 
modernisation of their economies. Labour from other Arab states, South 
Asia, Africa, and the Far East were imported to this end. 
A closer examination of expatriate labour in the GCC does not 
provide us with a very positive picture. The GCC countries have 
endeavoured to balance the nature of their labour between various 
nationalities, so that no single nationality may be a potential threat to their 
autocratic system of government. On the other hand, the labour exporting 
countries are dependant upon the remittances sent home by the labour and 
are forced to overlook any irregularities in employment. Generally, the fastest 
growth has been in Asian labour, who are concentrated in blue collarjobs in 
the nature of carpentry, masonry, electricians, plumbers, lorry drivers, 
mechanics, and heavy equipment operators. 22 
The indigenous labour is encouraged to participate in the 
development programmes of these countries. The size of indigenous labour 
varies from a high of 75.2 percent of the total population for Oman to a low of 
36.2 percent for the UAE. Nevertheless, the local population is 'cushioned' 
from the countries' real development needs. Most of them are employed in 
non-productive sectors of the economy, examples of which are 
administration, civil service, and social and welfare activities. The GCC 
governments have followed a subtle policy of segregation, which has even 
been applied to the schools. 23 In addition, an examination of the educational 
system is not reassuring. A review of students involved in education 
indicates that a significant majority are involved in non-scientific fields like 
teacher training, religion, theology, and business administration. Their 
governments' guarantee of employment after education, regardless of the 
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type of education has resulted in overstaffed and inefficient government 
departments. The pressure of staff shortage in the economy in general could 
be eased if women were allowed to contribute to the workforce. Yet, the 
Islamic dictates of these societies which have to be taken into consideration, 
do not encourage women to work, especially since the indigenous 
populations in the GCC states are well provided for by the governments. In 
the relatively few cases that women are allowed to work, society encourages 
them to work in selected professions like social work, medicine or teaching24 
The paranoia with which the GCC countries view their 
expatriate labour is well illustrated in their residence and nationality laws. 25 
The nature of these laws vary between GCC countries, but in general they are 
strict. Saudi Arabia, whose expatriate population is nearly double that of all 
the other GCC countries combined, has very strict residence laws, and only 
issues visit visas to families of qualified professional expatriates. Nationality, 
in the extreme case of Kuwait, is divided into two 'classes'. 'First Class' 
nationality is reserved for inhabitants of Kuwait who can prove their lineage 
prior to the 1920's. 'Second Class' or naturalised citizens enjoy the same 
benefits as first class citizens, except that they cannot hold public office, and 
can only vote for representative institutions after holding citzenship for 
twenty years. Further, Kuwait does not seem to have learnt from the Iraqi 
occupation in its treatment of Palestinians. Its present mistreatment of 
Palestinians gives the impression of a nation that is frustrated in its inability 
to inflict any retribution on Iraq, and chooses instead a defenceless 
population, most of whom are innocent of collaboration charges. 
The expatriate population in GCC countries is heavily 
monitored and their freedom of expression severely limited. In most of the 
GCC states, they have to work in professions they were employed in, and are 
not allowed to change professions, even if they change their employers. This 
monitoring is even extended to include the indigenous population, who are 
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expected to report the details of the people they employ, as well as the tenants 
they rent out accommodation to. The governments also protect the local 
population through sponsorship laws which stipulate that the expatriate 
employee must leave his or her passport and documents with the employer. 
The employee is totally at the mercy of the employer, who can insist on 
deportation at will. Understandably, a system like this leads to the 
exploitation of labour, especially labour from the third world which is 
vulnerable, and therefore, there is some justification in calling them 'gulf 
slaves' (McShane 1991: 15-16). ' 
IL Prospects: 
The examination of the prospects of any country is difficult to 
directly ascertain. This thesis endeavours to determine GCC prospects 
through the quantitative examination of trade data, along with literature and 
economy surveys of past and present economic performance. GCC problems 
as enumerated in the previous section are substantial, and cover a wide range 
of areas in politics, economics, labour, and social structure. However, a 
concerted-and co-ordinated effort on their part can alleviate the impact of 
political, labour and social effects on the countries. The economy has to be 
approached differently. ý In a country with one resource only, and that too a 
non-renewable one, the strategy of economic development must be carefully 
thought out. Uncoordinated economic policies in countries that are 
demographically, geologically, culturally and politically similar could result 
in duplication of industries and trade. This would not only waste valuable 
financial resources, but also impair the efforts of these countries to secure 
their survival in a non-oil future. 
There has been a dearth of major mathematical analyses in the 
Middle East. This shortage is due to the difficultY in adapting sophisticated 
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modern 'mathematical techniques used in examining the industrialised 
world's economies, the strength of the oil sector, the difficulty in securing 
quantitative data, and the existence of substantial residual factors noted in 
section one. The mathematical technique used in this thesis constructs a 
similarity matrix from the trade data of the GCC countries. The rationale 
behind the construction of the matrices is to observe the similarity in the 
trading patterns of the GCC mathematically, as well as the potential of trade 
creation or diversion that has and could occur. The data involved covers the 
entire range of products traded in a year, with the depth of trade restricted to 
3-digit SITC categories. The time period varies across GCC countries because 
they are restricted by the availability of data, but in overall GCC terms covers a 
time period from 1971'to 1987.26 
A total number of twenty seven matrices have been constructed, 
nine for GCC trade to the Rest of the World, and eighteen for GCC trade to 
the Developed and Developing countries. The influence of the oil sector is 
removed from exports by constructing matrices for non-oil exports. As 
expected, the GCC countries have enormous differences in oil and non-oil 
trade, but what is unfortunate is the fact that non-oil industries are still 
insignificant, the exception to this case being re-export trade. Further, 
integration has not made any impact on the GCC economies, and economic 
strategy still exhibits signs of duplication among countries. An examination 
of the matrices combined with a knowledge of the GCC economies provide us 
with the quantitative proof of the failure of integration. 
The matrices have been organised into two groups. The first 
group exan-dnes GCC trade with the world, i. e., general GCC trade, and the 
second group examines GCC trade with the two world blocs - the Developed 
and Developing countries. The first group is intended to quantitatively 
indicate the trend the GCC economies have followed from 1971 to 1987, while 
the second group provides us with a more in depth view of the scheme, along 
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with a general idea of future prospects based upon 'how' the present 
economic structure is being developed. 
(a) The similarity of GCC trade to the world 
To commence with the Bahraini econoMy, 27 the matrices 
indicate the rise in similarity with the other GCC countries from Bahrain's 
1982 trade to 1975-80. However, this increase is not due to the benefits of 
integration, but rather due to the influence of Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia is 
sensitive to any instability in Bahrain and subsidises the Bahraini economy by 
providing crude for its Sitra refinery, as well as income from the Abu Safa oil 
field. In addition to the oil income, Bahrain's non-oil sector is geared toward 
trade, mostly with Saudi Arabia. In the 1973-82 decade, the Bahraini's were 
able to reap enormous financial benefits from Saudi business, given the 
underdeveloped state of the Saudi economy. 
Further, the non-oil sector profited from Offshore Banking Unit 
(OBU) operations, which were involved in servicing the enormous financial 
capital that was generated by the development needs of the Saudi's. 
However, by 1983, the decline in oil prices and Saudi regulations on the 
OBU's affected Bahrain tremendously. Unfortunately, the latest trade data 
on Bahrain is in 1982, but as its economy is regularly analysed, it is a known 
fact that the recession that affected Saudi Arabia during 1982-88 as a result of 
low oil prices and production affected Bahrain in greater proportion. Further, 
Bahrain's relationship with the other GCC countries is varied, and does not 
really show any benefits from integration in 1981. Its similarity with the UAE 
is higher in trade which has the oil sector excluded rather than included, 
because of the synonymity of their efforts in the re-export trade. 
However, the loss to the future of their integrational grouping is 
because of the duplication of their industries, particularly in aluminium 
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production, ' shipbuilding and repair, and re-export trade. , The higher 
similarity values in non-oil exports are a result of synonymous industries 
catering to different markets, which is one of the nightmare scenarios of 
integration theory, especially since the possibility of these countries 
competing for the same market could arise in the future. The unfortunate 
aspect of these countries' development, is that such duplication is not being 
rectified, which substantiates the assertion that GCC attempts at integration 
are insincere. 
Bahrain and Kuwait, Oman or Qatar demonstrate similarity due 
to the dual elements of oil exports and re-export trade. Trade in the non-oil 
sectors is observed to be significant in comparison to the oil sectors. ' A sharp 
decline is observed in total oil included trade with Oman. This decline is the 
result of Oman's re-export trade and the strength of the non-oil sector and is 
not in evidence in non-oil trade matrices. Thus the Bahraini economy is 
utterly dependant upon Saudi Arabian munificence, and its future role is 
restricted to an entrepot for Saudi Arabia. 
The UAFS28 development is not very encouraging. The data we 
have is restricted to 1980,1981, and 1982, but economic literature on the UAE 
indicate, its development as a commercial entrepot, and the matrices confirm 
this. Further, the formation of the GCC provided negligible benefits to the 
UAE's development. While the fastest growing sectors in the economy are 
services and re-exports, the UAE suffers from a lack of co-ordination from the 
very individual Emirates that constitute the federation itself. While the 
UAE's oil trade is crucial to its survival, its non-oil sector is the strongest in 
the GCC, and this is indicated by higher non-oil trade values in the matrices 
than oil included trade values. Moreover, the GCC has been unsuccessful in 
curtailing the economic and political rivalry that exists between the 
constituent members of the UAE federation. It has even been unable to 
convince the UAE that co-ordinated development is necessary in-its own 
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federation, let alone the GCC. Thus, the UAE's development remains in the 
hands of constituent members, and its major markets remain Iran, Qatar, and 
Oman for the members with the re-export capability, notably Dubai, while 
memberswith substantial capital like Abu Dhabi prefer to channel their 
investments to foreign financial markets. 
-Saudi ý Arabia 'S29 enthusiasm for integration has been the 
primary element in the GCC's formation, but its development strategies 
generally ignore the GCC itself, and it is observed to be involved in massive 
industrial isation schemes with emphasis in heavy industries and 
petrochemicals. While oil can be expected to remain the dominant sector in 
the Saudi economy for the next century, its substantial efforts in 
petrochemicals and oil related products (which can be noted from significant 
similarity values in non-oil trade)30 indicate a trend that is moulding the 
Saudi economy in a similar pattern to the problem which it is facing today - 
dependence on one major product that is non-renewable, i. e. 1 from sole 
dependence on oil production to sole dependence on petrochemicals 
production through natural gas energy. The only economic aspect of the GCC 
that seems to interest the Saudis is the possibilities of exporting their 
expensive and cost-ineffective indigenous products to-other member states, 
examples of which are dairy and farm products. Further, excess Saudi capital 
is being invested abroad in financial markets rather than being used towards 
the strengthening of the GCC. This is yet another element in the economic 
development of individual GCC states that contribute to the ineffectiveness 
of the grouping. 
Kuwait, 31 in *spite of being one of the first GCC countries to 
receive oil revenue, has been totally immersed in its own plans for 
development. With the lack of substantial natural gas reserves, Kuwait has 
chosen to rely on its substantial foreign investment and downstream 
diversification of the oil industry. During the Iran-Iraq war, it profited from a 
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significant re-export trade to Iraq, but government policy seems to be directed 
towards a basic maintenance of the economy to continue its status as a re- 
export centre, as well as substantial rentier earnings from foreign investment. 
Unfortunately, Kuwait seem to be beset with intermittent setbacks, examples 
of which are its stock market crash in 1982, and the invasion in 1990. Further, 
with the experience of Iraqi occupation for seven months to remind them, it 
seem unlikely that the Kuwaitis will drastically change development policy. 
After the rebuilding of their country, it seems likely that government strategy 
will revert to pre-invasion policy, which maintained a re-export and oil 
economy and which channelled excess funds abroad. 
Oman, 32 with its modest oil reserves is the most enthusiastic 
among the GCC members for integrated and co-ordinated development 
policies. The tensions emanating from the Iran-Iraq war provided benefits to 
the Omani economy, as shipping preferred to unload at Muscat rather than 
brave the Straits of Hormuz. Further, through expedient economic 
development in the 1970's, Oman was able to develop a strong non-oil sector 
with concentration in medium and small scale industry in the 1980's. 33 But, 
the Omanis have thus far been unsuccessful in the strengthening of the GCC 
grouping due to the half-hearted efforts on the part of the other members, 
especially when the interests of the GCC and their own are in conflict. 
Qatar'S34 dependence on oil revenue is still very much in 
evidence in the similarity matrices. Its non-oil sector is barely developed, 
with efforts only being made in a few sectors only. Qatar accrues its wealth 
not from large oil deposits, but from a minuscule population enjoying 
significant oil reserves. Although Qatars oil reserves are expected to last for 
only another quarter of a century, it is hoping to secure its future from the 
production and sale of its gigantic gas reserves. In this respect, it seems to be 
following the path taken by Saudi Arabia, in that it is proceeding in the 
direction of sole dependence on one resource - oil, to the sole dependence on 
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another resource - gas. This strategy of Qatars could benefit Kuwait, Dubai, 
and Bahrain who suffer from a shortage of gas reserves needed to maintain 
industrial ventures. The GCC could be an instrument in co-ordinating a 
pipeline that supplies these countries from Qatar, but its present 
ineffectiveness has not even furthered the project beyond the idea generating 
stage. Qatar must also shoulder part of the blame. It seems to be more 
interested - in securing a natural gas future with Japan and the developed 
nations, and has only been indicating interest in its fellow members when its 
discussion with the industrialised nations have been bearing little fruit. This 
example is yet another illustration of the motivation and commitment of the 
members of the GCC toward integration. 
(b) The Similarity of GCC trade with the Developed and Developing 
Economies: 
The similarity matrices - have been extended to observe GCC 
trade to the Developed (DO and Developing countries (LDC). The variables 
used for the analyses are identical to the previous section to give the analysis 
continuity. A review of the resulting matrices indicate that the scope for 
trade creation among the GCC for trade to the DC's and LDC's is significant, 
with the LDC's indicating greater potential than the DC's. However, other 
non-economic factors need to be taken into consideration. 
Among the 'residual factors' mentioned in section one, the 
influence of politics is observed in many'stages of this dissertation. While it 
will be in the GCC's interest to make efforts in penetrating markets in the 
LDC's which have been quantitatively indicated from the matrices to have 
not only a greater potential for trade creation, but also easier entry 
possibilities, the reality is different. The DC's in general, and Britain in 
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particular, have been involved in the Middle East since the early 19th 
century, an involvement which they cemented in the early 20th century 
when oil was discovered. The enormous 1973 oil price rises gave the DC's an 
opportunity to offer the GCC countries economic development on a large, 
efficient and sophisticated scale through the use of capital intensive 
technology and imported labour. To the GCC countries with small 
populations and low literacy rates, the advantages of securing capital 
intensive technology that would modernise their economies rapidly, and 
foreign labour that could be reduced or increased in proportion to their 
requirements proved too good an opportunity to miss. Unfortunately, this 
has led to over dependence on the DC's whose technology is vital to GCC 
survival, and disregard for the LDC's whose labour and agricultural help can 
be regulated at Will. 35 
Bahrain, 36 as has been observed earlier is an entrepot centre 
which depends upon Saudi Arabia as a regional market. As a result, its trade 
with the DC's could be expected to be lower than that to the LDC's. This is 
especially noticed in the case of non-oil exports. However, given that 
Bahrain's dependence upon Saudi Arabia is primarily oil based, i. e., though it 
is actively involved in the Saudi non-oil market (especially until 1982), the 
magnitude of oil revenue is greater, the similarity matrices of 
Bahraini/Saudi trade display higher values for the exports with the oil sector 
included than excluded. The matrices also substantiate the assertion that 
integ ration in 1981 provided no real benefits for the GCC countries, as 
Bahrain's 1982 exports with the oil sector included for Saudi Arabia decline 
sharply over pre-intregation years. Bahrain and the UAE, Oman, and 
Kuwait's similarity values display higher values for exports to the LDC's than 
DC's. This is rather due to the synonymity of their trading patterns, than due 
to integration. 
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The UAE37 is primarily a trade based economy, and can be 
expected to have higher similarity values for the LDC's than the DC's. While 
the matrices indicate that the UAE is engaged in regional markets, the scope 
for expansion is great for both the LDC's and DC's. This is also the case in the 
latter part of Oman IS 38 trade, when its trade structure underwent change. On 
the other hand, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Qatar's 39 exports with the oil 
sector displays higher similarity values for the DCs than LDC's. Exports with 
the oil sector excluded in these countries reflect their development policies. 
The Saudi's have been attempting to generate a non-oil economy, and as a 
result, its similarity values are higher to the LDC's than the DC's. A similar 
situation occurs in Kuwait, which is not due to its non-oil efforts but rather 
due to re-export trade, while Qatar's non-oil exports are negligible in 
comparison to its oil exports. 
To sum up, the matrices indicate that the GCC countries are 
more involved in the LDC's than DC's. While this seems to indicate a 
healthy trend, an in depth analysis of the GCC proves different. The UAE, 
Oman, and Kuwait are involved in re-exports with regional partners like 
Iran, Iraq, and amongst themselves. Their trade contacts with other Middle 
Eastern States, let alone the rest of the LDC's are minimal. Further, their 
economies seem to be developing towards transit centres from East to West. 
Ultimately, their trading goals seem to be markets of the DC's. The UAE (Abu 
Dhabi), and Kuwait have large financial investments in DC markets which 
strengthen their arguments for greater co-operation with the DC's. Saudi 
Arabia has proved no different. It has made no secret of the fact that it wants 
its petrochemicals to sell in DC markets. In fact, many of its petrochemical 
concerns are joint ventures with the DC's that are contract bound to sell a 
significant part of the produce abroad. Bahrain and Qatar, given their small 
size and resources, can expect a future with their GCC partners rather than 
with any wider group. 
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The GCC involvement with the LDC markets seems to be half- 
hearted and devoid of long term strategy. It appears that the LDC's are being 
used as experimental bases for market experience which will eventually be 
used to penetrate the well developed and competitive DC markets. Again, 
this strategy does not indicate any co-operation among individual GCC 
countries, and while they could be able to individually secure a profitable 
future with greater interaction with the DC's, the danger lies at home. In a 
future without oil, the importance of the region will diminish in the world's 
eyes, and the GCC countries will have to live with neighbours whom they 
have at different stages manipulated or ignored from the umbrella of DC 
protection. 
(c) The scope for rectification: 
The problems faced by the GCC countries are deep rooted, and 
when observed in totality question the possibility of salvaging the group from 
eventual ineffective redundancy. Further, there is doubt if the individual 
members are interested in raising the effectiveness of the group. While the 
suggestions offered in this section could provide the best possible solutions to 
the future of the group, they are, and will remain, suggestions. Ultimately, 
the future of the GCC depends upon the degree individual members are 
willing to sacrifice their own selfish interests for the greater good of the 
group. At present, a review of their economies and development strategies 
indicate no such altruism, and individual success is being given priority over 
collective economic welfare. However, if a situation should so arise in which 
the desire for greater integration is renewed, the GCC countries have to 
redress the following problems. 
To commence with politics, it is implicitly understood that 
while the influence of politics in any group can never be completely 
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eradicated, it can be curtailed significantly. In the GCC, politics play a negative 
rather than a positive role. The greatest obstacle is the lack of the freedom of 
expression in these countries. While the governmental structure of the GCC 
can be expected to continue, the strict political repression of the people should 
be reduced, and they should be given access to more democratic expression 
through existing or promised political institutions which are suited to these 
countries needs. As the situation stands, the governments' greatest nemesis 
are their own people. Their experiments in pseudo-democracy have been 
half-hearted, and have been suspended at the least sign of confrontation. A 
good example may be observed in the suspension of the Bahraini parliament 
in 1975. The catalyst for the dissolution of the parliament was its opposition 
to the issuence of a draconian decree by the Amir of Bahrain. The decree 
empowered the Minister of Interior to arrest and detain any person for up to 
three years if the person was suspected of endangering the security of the state 
or contributing to a disturbance in public order. Twenty nine of the 
parliaments thirty members voted against the decree, and, in reply, the Amir 
dissolved the parliament, and suspended certain articles of the Constitution, 
one of which included the re-election of a new-parliament (see Khalaf 1985: 
26). 
The Saudi royal family has maintained its control over the local 
populace through rigid internal security laws, and in spite of the corruption 
of the regime, has cloaked itself in the guise of Islamic defenders of Saudi 
Arabia. In this they have been given religious sanction by the Al Sheikh 
family, and the ulema, and tribal sanction by the numerous tribal sheikhs. 
These elements occupy positions of power and wealth in the Kingdom, 
(though at the whim of the royal family), and they blame any upheavals 
upon innocent parties, the favourite of which are the foreign workers. -Thus 
Hisham Nazer, the Saudi Minister of Planning in 1982 was very much in 
tune with the elitist line of thought, when he stated that Saudi economic 
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planning is aimed at promoting the welfare of the Saudi citizen and 
preserving Islamic values and Arab identity. He stressed the fact that foreign 
workers in Saudi Arabia would not be allowed to bring in 'undesirable 
ideologies' (Al-Fajr al-Iqtisadi, 12 April 1982: 46-47). 
Nevertheless, these restrictive measures against the local 
population could turn out to be detrimental in the long run. Kuwait 
witnessed it first hand, when in the spate of explosions in Kuwait City in the 
early 1980's and the protests against the dissolution of the parliament in 1985, 
the government appealed to citizens and residents in 1988, to join hands with 
security forces in stepping up vigilance to detect any acts intended to upset the 
security and stability of the country. The government proclaimed that it was 
setting up a new office that would be named the'Citizens Service Office', and 
would respond to the citizens queries, which would in turn enhance the 
cooperative spirit existing between the public and the Interior Ministry's 
departments (Arab Times, 25 May 1988). The Kuwaiti government has also 
not used the energy and spirit that has been infused into the people in the 
aftermath of the Iraqi occupation. It has announced elections to the National 
Assembly only after enormous pressure, and they are a year away. At present 
a number of young Kuwaitis are frustrated and disappointed in their 
government's ineffectiveness, though whether they will transform their 
frustration into action is questionable in the face of the government's 
promises of wealth and subsidisation. 
In addition, the governments of these countries should bury 
their differences and demonstrate political maturity. As long as they are 
guardians of some of the largest oil reserves in the world, the industrialised 
nations will assure their safety. These safeguards alone should assure them 
that their future lies in unity rather than diversity, and that in a powerful 
integrated unit rather than in a loose, rubber-stamp federation. 
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The economics of the grouping is another difficult matter. 
While bad economic development needs to be rectified before it is too late, 
GCC problems are unique. Given their dependence upon one export product 
only, their options for development are limited. To begin with population, 
the increases in population growth in the past decade have been impressive, 
but is still a long way from self sufficiency. In addition to rapid population 
growth, the GCC countries could naturalise the significant number of Arab 
and Palestinian workers in their countries. Many of these people have been 
in the GCC countries for decades, and they share a similar language, religion 
and to some extent history. Government co-operation and co-ordination will 
help. The health and educational systems need to terminate their implicit 
policies of segregating the indigenous population which must be exposed to 
market forces and competition. Education also needs to be evenly distributed 
among the people, and the system of preferences should be abolished. 
Labour policies need major revisions. If, as stated above, the 
GCC countries naturalise Arab and Palestinian expatriates and integrate them 
into the society as far as possible, the labour problems will be lessened. 
Further, the needs of other expatriate labour merit urgent attention. While 
the GCC policy of balancing labour between nationalities can be understood, 
their ill-treatment of them cannot. The introduction of humane labour laws, 
effective labour tribunals, and protection of labour rights against the excesses 
of the indigenous population will be a positive step in this direction. The 
draconian residence and nationality laws are harmful in the long run. While 
expatriate labour needs to be monitored for security reasons in any country, 
the restrictions on their family visits, and their freedom of expression, even 
in cases of injustice is harmful to GCC credibility. It would be in the GCC's 
interests to keep labour happy with more liberal rules. This would create a 
better busifiess atmosphere and stimulate industry. The sponsorship laws 
which over-protect the indigenous population should be toned down. While 
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the desire to protect the welfare of the inexperienced indigenous population 
can be understood, there is no need to grant them such enormous power over 
business and'labour. The 'reduction of their power will expose them to 
competition and install in them a stronger entrepreneurial spirit than they 
now have. At present, with powerful government guarantees of 
employment in the private and public sectors, indigenous labour suffer from 
a lack of motivation. 
Finally, an overview of the individual GCC countries indicate 
that a lack of co-ordination among them has led to the duplication of 
industries. This duplication can be rectified if the countries that are trade 
based - the UAE, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and Oman co-ordinate their 
development policies. Saudi Arabia's gigantic size gives it the advantage of 
pursuing development policies which the others cannot match. Oman, has 
shown the most sense by developing its medium size and small scale 
industries. Nevertheless, the excess capital channelled abroad by Saudi 
Arabia, Kuwait, and Abu Dhabi does not have to be in such large amounts. 
Part of it could be used in strengthening the GCC, i. e., in helping Oman, and 
the poorer Emirates of the UAE's industries, in helping Qatar build a gas 
pipeline which would supply Kuwait, Dubai, and other energy needy GCC 
members, and even in contributing to the development requirements of its 
Middle Eastern neighbours. In addition, though GCC attempts to penetrate 
DC markets are commendable, doing them at the expense of the LDC's are 
unnecessary. The best possible solution would be a combination of both. 
Further, the GCC states are observed to be too involved in their own 
markets, and ignore the possibilities of extending their operation to the other 
Middle Eastern states, and to other LDC markets. 
CHAPTER 8 
Thus, to sum up: 
258 
The GCC governments should democratise their political systems, and 
allow greater freedom of speech, though they could be expected to 
retain power. 
There should be more co-ordination and co-operation among GCC 
governments. 
More citizens should be naturalised from the neighbouring Arab states, 
especially the Palestinians. 
The segregation of the local populations should be discontinued and 
they should be subjected to competition market forces, with 
sponsorship laws being kept to a minimum. 
Labour laws and protection of the expatriate population should be 
introduced. 
Education should be more evenly distributed among the population, 
and students should be encouraged to study in technical fields. 
Draconian residence laws should be reduced, and the monitoring of 
expatriates should be kept to a minimum. 
The re-export economies of Bahrain, Oman, UAE, and Kuwait will do 
well to co-ordinate policies to stop the duplication of industries. 
The excess capital being channelled abroad should be reduced, and 
partly used towards the development of other GCC countries and Arab 
countries. 
There should more sincere efforts in penetrating LDC markets 
especially non-regional markets and Middle Eastern ones rather than 
restricting themselves to present ones. 
These suggestions do not provide a panacea for the GCC's 
problems, yet, they are an essential step if the GCC intends to survive as an 
integrated unit in the future. Unhappily, at present, many of them remain 
unsolved and ignored. To the GCC countries, they are not as yet recognised as 
problems purely because the group itself has not asserted itself over 
individual members. However, if at any stage in the future the group should 
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assert itself over members, the redressal of the problems enumerated above 
should be given priority. 
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ENDNOTES 
1. Please see Technical Appendix (section 1: 3-9) for the detailed provisions of the 
Unified Economic Agreement. 
2. Please See Chapter 2: 13-67. 
3. Please see Chapter 3: 69-89. 
4. Please see Chapter 3: 72 
5. Oman is an exception, as it did not constitute part of the Ottoman Empire, though it 
would have recognised the Ottoman Sultan as Caliph. 
6. Please see Chapter 4: 109-111. 
7. Chapter 4: 112-113. 
8. Chapter 4: 114-118. 
9. Chapter 4: 116-118. 
10. Chapter 4: 116-118. 
11. Chapter 4: 119-120. 
12. Chapter 4: 121-127. 
13. Please see Chapter 5: 147-175. 
CHAPTER 2: 
1. Quesnays (1694-1774) tableau econornique of 1756, was in the words of the 
Penguin dictionary of economics, "... the first attempt to construct a Macro- 
economic input-output model of economics" (Graham Bannock etal 1984: 366) 
2. The physiocrats believed in the 'rule of nature. They felt that true wealth derived 
only from the soil. Quesnay in his Tableau Econornique, classified agricultural 
expenditure as 'productive', and expenditure on manufactured commodities as 
'sterile'. (Quesnay 1758) 
3. The Zollverein was created in 1833 when Prussia, Hesse Cassel, Hesse Darmstadt, 
Bavaria and Wurttemberg agreed to form a customs union with a common 
external tariff. 
4. For further information, please see Robson (1987: 13-30) 
5. Mrydal too criticized the use of the equilibrium approach by developed countries 
that lead to laissez faire approaches, in opposition to comprehensive state 
planning and interferences necessary to break economic stagnation (for 
underdeveloped countries). He stated that this advice was unrealistic, as it did 
not take into account the'dynamics of international economic inequalities'. For 
a full discussion, see Myrdal, (1957: 147-158) 
6. The core concept implicitly describes the game of coalition choice of countries, while 
for Riezman, the definition is different. A country, (say A) is in the core if it is 
untouched by any possible coalition. For information on the core concept see, 
Luce and Raiffa (1957). 
7. Bracewell-Milnes gives three methods to measure height of the tariff. a) measured 
on a scale from zero to unity, zero representing free trade and unity no trade, the 
measurement variable is either trade turnover or profit which is turnover minus 
variable costs. b) to weigh the ad valorem tariffs on different items by the 
volume of transactions which is estimated would take place under free trade c) 
tariffs are weighed by the volume of trade in each commodity over a given 
period which may be before of after any change in the tariff. d) by weighting 
the tariff changes with the changes in trade volume, (see Bracewell-Milnes 
1976: 59-60). 
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8. The 'break even level' is described thus, - if from four countries A, B, C, D, form a Customs Union, if all have equal trade flows between them, the break even 
level of the CET at which liberalization remains the same is 3/4 of the sum of 
the tariffs of the Customs Union. This according to the author is below the 
higher tariff if the difference between the tariffs is large and above the higher 
tariff if the difference is small. example; if A and B have a Customs Union to C 
and D the outside world, A has low tariff (1) of 0, and b high tariff of 50, the 
break even level tariff would be 37.5. From Milnes table, he states that "as the 
ratio of the lower to the higher tariff rises, the break even level first equals and 
then exceeds the higher tariffs" (Bracewell-NEnnes 1976: 64) If instead of 4 
countries, the number of countries were n, then this general formula is given; 
X =_ O+h) (n+D 
2n 
where I=country with lowest tariff, h=country with highest tariff, n=number of 






10. They estimated trade creation, trade diversion and the Generalised System of 
Preferences. (See Baldwin and Murray 1977: 30-46) 
11. An 'efficient tariff is "one that provides any specified level of industrial production 
in the customs union irTespective of the composition and distribution of this 
production - at the lowest cost in terms of combined national income forgone by 
two countries" (Cooper and Massell 1965: 466) 
12. In the 'outward looking path' of development, exports are concentrated in a few 
traditional products. 
13. The 'anti-monde' was first proposed by the novelist P. Doninos who proposed 
alternative worlds in which all events except one are identical to those in our 
history. 
14. In integration ex ante estimates are those based on prior knowledge that the planner 
might have before integration, and ex poste analysis are based on an analysis of 
the historical experience of integration. (see Williamson and Botrill 1971: 326). 
15. Ile formula for the 'apparent effect of integration' Aij in year t was 
0000t0 
Aij 2- YijNi - Yijai YijMl* 
00t000t0 
I- Yij/Yj ) Yi/Yi +I- Yij/Yi) Yj/Yj 
where Ylt=total exports of bloc j in year t and zero is the pre -integration base 
year. A, will be at unity if imports of i from j develop typically of their trade, 
while if this trade develops rapidly (slowly), Aij will exceed (fall short of) 
unity. For a further discussion, (see Williamson and Bottrill 1971: 326-327). 
16. Williamson and Bottrill (1971) cite the example of the analysis of Walter in import 
propensity. 
17. Williamson and Bottrill cite the example of the work done by the EFrA secretariat 
(1969) in this regard. 
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18. Their study expands on a model used by Minabe (1966) who has in turn 
generalized Keynes and Johnsons (1953) export multiplier. For a detailed view 
of Cordoni's model, see (Cordoni et al 1971: 242-262). 
19. In this paper the EEC and EFTA. 
20. The weighted share analysis consists of the 'share effect' and the 'flow effect' . For a further discussion, see (Verdoorn and Schwartz 1972: 292-310). 
21. Verdoorn & Schwartz define the total rate of change in constant prices of trade 
flows Xij as a function of the following variables, 
Xij = fij ( ATmj, ATgj, Vi, Yj, Plj, P2j,.... Pnij .... Q) 
Where Xii = total relative change in constant prices, Tmj is the changes of the 
pre-integration tariff (on imports from partner countries), ATgj is the change of 
the pre-integration tariff level on imports against non partner countries, Vi is the 
volurnke growth rate of manufacturing production in the exporting country, Yj 
is the relative volume growth of GNP of the importing country, Pij is the total 
relative price change of Xij, and Qj is the total relative price change of 
competing domestic products in the importing country. 




Xij = ...... +ayi xj 
7 
Dij 
Where Dij is the distance between i and j. (See Verdoom and Schwartz 1972: 
310-311). 
22 The equations for the diagrammatic analysis can be observed from Resnick and 
Truman (1975: 42-44). 
23. Resnick and Truman (1975) analyse partial direct price elasticities and cross price 
elasticities. 
24. Pelzmans (1977: 714) model is: 
nn 
log Xij - go + gl log Yj + g2 log Yi + g3 log NJ + g4 log N! + g5 log Dij + g6 log Pij + log Eij 
nn 
where Xij is the value of i's exports to j, Yi Yj is the nominal GNP of country i 
and j in US$, Ni Nj the populations of country i and j, Dij the distance between 
the commercial centers of the two countries (geographic distance), Pij a dummy 
preference variable reflecting membership in the CMEA. The value 2 is 
assigned to intra-CMEA trade and I to inter CMEA trade flows, and the logs are 
natural logs 
25. For a further discussion please see Bikker (1987: 317-324). 
CHAPTER 3: 
1. The authors most helpful in the construction of this section are; Abdullah (1978), 
Duignan and Gann (1981), Hasou (1985), Hassouna (1975), Heard-Bey 
(1982), Lenczowski (1980), Long (1980), Fenelon (1973), Peretz (1983), 
Kerr (1966), Mansfield (1973), Kedourie (1966), Keddie (1972), Keddie 
(1968), Hourani (1962), Antonous (1969), Entelis (1980a), Entelis (1980b), 
Entelis (1980c), Entelis (1980d), Reich (1980a), Reich (1980b), Zartman and Tessler et al. (1982) and Hopwood (1990) 
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2. Chaldean and Syriac are also used by very small sections for religious purposes. 
The origin of both modem Arabic and Hebrew scripts can be traced back to the 
Phoenicians, another ancient, but now extinct semitic people. 
3. While the origin of the Ottomans are shrouded in myth, the Ottoman empire was 
founded by Sultan Osman, a Seljuk Turk who began a policy of expansion in 
1288 A. D. at the expense of the Byzantine empire. 
4. This section owes its existence to Saunders (1965), Kirk (1957), Heikal (1983), 
Kissling, et al (1969), Bannerman (1988), Hiro (1988), and Montgomery Watt 
(1974). 
5. Ile Arab League at present is the second oldest existing regional organization of its 
time, the only other organization with a longer history being the organization of 
American States. 
CHAPTER 4: 
1. The Polytheism Wahab condemned was the reverence paid towards saints shrines 
and holy places besides Mecca 
2. The treaty lasted until 1961 
3. The seats however remained vacant 
4. Source: Table 4.1, Technical Appendix, section 2: 10. 
5. The Reserves/Production ratio is calculated "if the reserves remaining at the end of 
any year are divided by the production in that year, the result is the length of 
time that those remaining reserves would last if production were to continue at 
the then current level" (BP Statistical Review of World Energy, July 1989: 2). 
6. See Table 4.1, Technical Appendix, section 1,10. 
7. Source: Table 4.2 and 4.3, Technical Appendix, section 2: 11. 
8. Source: Table 4.4, Technical Appendix, section 2: 12. 
9. Source: Table 4.6, Technical Appendix, section 2: 13. 
10. Source: Table 4.7, Technical Appendix, section 2: 14. 
11. Source: Table 4.7, Technical Appendix, section 2: 14. 
12. Source: Table 4.11, Technical Appendix, section 2: 16. 13. Source: Table 4.13, Technical Appendix, section 2: 18-20. 14. Source: Table 4.15, Technical Appendix, section 2: 22. 
15. Source: Table 4.22, Technical Appendix, section 2: 29. 
16. Source: Table 4.23, Technical Appendix, section 2: 30. 
17. Qatar is experimenting with the use of solar power to create greenhouses to cool 
vegetables. (International Herald Tribune, 22 February 1985) 
18. Apart from pouring millions of dollars of revenue during the two five year plans 
(1980-85 and 1986-91), the government has making major improvements in 
harbours, fishing shelters, storage facilities, and fish processing plants, as well 
as constructing new freezers and fish storage units. (International Herald 
Tribune, July 23 1987). 
CHAPTER, 5: 
1. For more information on incentives on remittances, see Arnold and Shah (1984, 
Table 3: 3 10). 
2. Annual population growth rates of the GCC countries from 1980-87 stood at 3 
percent for Bahrain, 4.5 percent for Kuwait, 4.3 percent for Oman, 5 percent 
for Qatar, and 5.1 percent for the UAE. (United Nations [1989] 1987 
Demographic Yearbook) 
3. For further information on literacy in the GCC, please examine table 5.2 
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0 
1. It would be informative if the UAE's similarity values of trade were computed prior 
to 1980 when it was feverishly developing, but, the data for a similarity 
analysis was unavailable as the UAE only started reporting its trade data in 
detail since 1980. 
2. The Financial Times provides a good article on Emirates and Gulf airlines on 23 
October 1985, and another one on 14 May, 1987. 
CHAPTER 7: 
1. There are exceptions to this statement as in 
the UAE in 1981 and 1982 for 1 -digit for exports to the DCs rather than the 
increase could be in the increase of oil 
DC's rather than the LDC's in the face 
the early 80's. 
CHAPTER 8: 
the case of Bahrain's trade in 1982 with 
SITC, which displays a higher similarity 
LDCs, but the reason for this particular 
business for these two markets from the 
of the oil price and demand declines in 
1. Please see Chapter 2: 13-25. 
2. Chapter 2: 47-65. 
3. Chapter 2: 47-65. 
4. Customs duties on members countries products were abolished in march 1983. 
5. The customs levy of 4-20% was imposed in 1986. 
6. See Chapter 2: 13-46. 
7. See Chapter 2: 13-46. 
8. Please see Chapter 3 for a brief summary of Middle Eastern efforts at integration. 9. Please see Chapter 3: 72, for the influence of Islam in the Middle East. 
10. Please see Chapter 4: 94-108, for a brief review of the establishment of individual 
GCC states. 
11. For a brief introduction to the institutions and formation of the GCC, see Yearbook 
of International Organisations 1990191, Vol. 1,27th edition, p. 1056, The 
Europa World Year Book 1990, Vol. 1, pp. 124-25, and The Middle East and 














Please see Chapter 4: 109. 
Chapter 4: 110. 
Chapter 4: 112. 
Chapter 4: 112-114. 
Chapter 4: 114-118. 
Please see Table 4.21, Technical Appendix, section 2: 28. 
Please see Chawer 4: 116-118. 
Chapter 4: 119. 
Chapter 4: 121. 
Please see Chapter 5: 147. 
Chapter 5: 150-159. 
Chapter 5: 160-163. 
For the contributions of women 
25. Chapter 5: 167-17 1. 
26. Please see Chapter 6: 183-204. 
27. Chapter 6: 186-192. 
28. Chapter 6: 193-195. 
to the workforce, please see Chapter 5: 164-166. 
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29. Chapter 6: 196-198. 
30. Please see the matrix tables in Technical Appendix, sections 5 to 7: 58-86, or the 
explanations of them in the thesis: 186-203. 
31. Chapter 6: 199-200. 
32. Chapter 6: 201-202. 
33. This is indicated in the change in Omani trade in similarity matrices for total oil 
included trade, and substantiated for non-oil matrices in technical appendix, 
section 5: 58-67. 
34. Chapter 6: 203. 
35. Please see Chapter 7: 209-21 1, for a brief reveiw of the GCC political relations with 
the DCs and LDCs. 
36. Chapter 7: 212-217. 
37. Chapter 7: 218-219. 
38. Chapter 7: 224. 
39. Chapter 7: 225. 
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